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Abstract 
This thesis examines the role emotions play in the practice and sociality of Palestinian 
solidarity activism in Israel and Palestine. It finds that emotion is a subtle and sophisticated, 
and often ambiguous, form of knowledge and perception which is implicit in forming, 
appraising and adjusting the relationships participants have with intimates, fellow dissenters 
and public discourses on identity and the regional conflict. Fieldwork was based in and 
around Jerusalem and carried out over twelve months in 2011-12. This is a highly diverse 
transnational field where Palestinians, Israelis and Internationalists come together at specific 
times and places to practice various forms of dissent, largely but not exclusively against the 
socio-political conditions of the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israeli State policy. I present three 
separate propositions on Weirdness, Wrongness and Love, which relate to three different 
affective dimensions; perception, morality and loyalty. Each proposition also develops upon 
what Hannah Arendt defined the innate political faculties or activities of the human 
condition; thinking, action and judging. 
The perceptive quality of finding something Weird is found to produce doubt in the 
subjective mind, the purpose for which Arendt believed thinking to be a political act. The 
moral appraisal that something is Wrong, underwrites concerted political action in the public 
realm. Finally judging, as the attempt to understand the world from the perspective of 
another, is facilitated by the discourse of Love in the long-term loving relations activists have 
with friend and family, who are antagonistic to the aims of solidarity activism. Taken 
together these feelings are found to flow through and inform one another, constituting a 
nuanced affective understanding and appraisal of our world, one that is producing and 
maintaining a politically engaged transnational community of dissent. This community has 
been fostered to a large degree by the insistence and perseverance of a small number of 
Palestinians in villages across the West Bank and East Jerusalem, who call upon peoples of 
all creeds, colours and places to witness and experience the repression of non-violent 
resistance. If as researchers we are to understand the complexities of human life and 
practices, I believe we must carefully attend to this sophisticated form of emotional reasoning 
and begin to think not just about feelings, but also with feelings. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is about the role emotions play in political dissent. There is nothing novel in that 
itself and what original contributions I make are based on an attempt to draw together various 
understandings of emotion’s relationship to perception, knowledge and belonging. In doing 
so I step away from passions such as anger, fear and exhilaration to present a model of affect 
as a subtle, sophisticated, and often ambiguous, form of knowledge, perception and 
interpretation. These are feelings which emerge in our bodies as we move through the sensual 
world we share with others, feelings which inform and challenge our equally embodied 
acculturated understandings of the world. To properly understand the role these processes 
play in the emergence, practice and endurance of pro-Palestinian ‘solidarity activism’, much 
of the ethnography occurs outside of protests and the structures of particular movements. 
Instead I address the non-instrumental activities and relationships of dissenters which not 
only help the struggle to coalesce and endure, but are also producing something more akin to 
a complex transnational community than a social movement. The daily sociality of dissenters 
is intrinsic to this development. Yet in the final analysis the practice of protests at a dozen or 
so villages and neighbourhoods, initiated and lead by no more than a few hundred people, 
remains integral to this global phenomenon. The tactic of inviting others from around the 
world - week after week, year after year - to witness and experience the repression of 
unarmed resistance has been crucial in the growth of a politically engaged transnational 
community of dissent to Israeli policies and practices vis-a-vis the Palestinians. For 
academics and activists alike, this is perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from 
these few hundred ordinary activists. 
The solidarity activism I explore is, the loosely organised, non-violent, collective 
resistance to Israeli policies and practices in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.  The 
ethnography reveals, in three separate propositions, that Weirdness, Wrongness and Love are 
all affects which help produce and maintain solidarity activism amongst a highly diverse 
transnational constituency. More generally, I argue that such a nuanced understanding of 
affect may better inform us in how we conceptualise relationships and actions regarding 
knowledge, nations, communities and intimate acquaintances. A corollary argument is that 
the works of Hannah Arendt on human political faculties and given conditions, is a useful 
framework for understanding the totality of being a political dissenter, both within the 
structures of a ‘movement’ and in the everyday complexity of relationships with the plural 
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world we all share. However in contrast to Arendt, I argue that the political faculties of 
action, thinking and judgment, rather than being impeded by the ‘passions’, are enabled and 
augmented by the human capacity for feeling. As researchers, if we are to understand the 
complexities of human life and practices, we must carefully attend to the sophisticated 
reasoning of feelings. This will require the development of new categories through which to 
think about what affect is and how it works, and where it emerges in new ways. To do so 
entails not only thinking about feelings, but also thinking with feelings. 
The thesis emerged from a year’s ethnographic experience based in Jerusalem with 
practitioners of solidarity activism, which revealed affective commonalities powerful enough 
to overcome ambiguity, plurality and betrayal. The theoretical framework I develop is 
phenomenological which, in highlighting the role of affect in intentionality, also argues that 
the subject’s culturally constructed interpretive lifeworlds must be understood as an 
embodied emotional system. Methodologically, the focus is on feelings and ambiguity rather 
than on definitive emotions. Rather than referring to supposed primary/secondary emotions, 
such as fear or envy, this work addresses weirdness, wrongness and love as cascading 
feedback systems in meaning making. The thesis thus aims to contribute to an understanding 
of affect as flowing through perception, moralities, loyalties, memories and thoughts in an 
embodied critique and judgement on the lived experience. To achieve this, I draw together a 
variety of experiential, cultural and historical understandings of affect. The model I present, 
to a large degree, avoids two important factors which shape affective experience; language 
and gender. This is mainly a consequence of the highly diverse make-up of solidarity 
activism, where ‘second’ languages are often the primary means of communication and the 
complexity of different gender constraints make generalisation problematic. However, in 
adopting the categories of Weirdness and Wrongness, this work is also more focused on the 
pre-linguistic ‘wordless knowledge’ (Damasio, 2000) of embodied experience.  
This was also an engaged ethnography, both in terms of my personal affinity with the 
aims of solidarity activism and in my attempt to become an activist with the guidance of other 
activists. However, I was very much the novice activist when I came to the field in 2011 and 
my affinity stems largely from family connections. My wife and two young children, who 
joined me in Jerusalem, are Jewish citizens of Israel and the possibility that my two sons will 
be conscripted into an army of occupation is a very real worry. My own terms of engagement 
thus moved between being the visiting Internationalist while also being an activist with a 
Jewish Israeli family, deeply connected to the Israeli national narrative. Much of the 
ethnographic insights thus emerged from this position, whereby concerns could be shared and 
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genuinely felt. The thesis is thus political both in terms of its subject matter and its 
application. It is hoped that the findings here will be of use both to academia and the practice 
of civil resistance. The main thesis is divided into three parts relating to three separate 
propositions on weirdness, wrongness and love respectively. Though each part in turn deals 
with a different categorization of affect and a related political faculty, the thesis demonstrates 
that such processes must not be understood in isolation but rather as the unfolding and 
reflexive experience of being. 
Background  
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been enmeshed in deep transnational processes for 
decades. It began with the nineteenth century origins of political Zionism in the European 
Diaspora, through British imperial acquisitions in the Levant, the refugees of the Holocaust, 
the United Nations recognition of the State of Israel in 1948 and the creation of a Palestinian 
diaspora in the same act. Such processes continued with the ingathering of Eastern Mizrahim 
Jewry in the 1950s, Pan-Arabism and Cold War alliances through the 1960s and 70s, 
American Jewry’s fervour for Israel post-1967, the broadcasting of the First Intifada on 
satellite networks across the globe in the 1980s. Today it includes the public diplomacy 
outreach programs of the Israeli state, political tourism and a network of ‘pro-Israel’ and 
‘pro-Palestinian’ activists that spans the globe. Pro-Palestinian or Solidarity activism, has 
grown significantly over last the ten years since the end of the Second Intifada around 2004-
5. This phenomenon encompasses a broad range of individuals, associations, grassroots 
movements, global NGOs, professional jurists, journalists, fundraisers, academics and more. 
Such a spectrum necessarily contains multiple motivations, aims and objectives and the 
ethnography includes individuals who would neither see themselves as activists nor primarily 
driven by the moniker ‘pro-Palestinian’. Furthermore, the ethnography is not focused on a 
particular ethnicity, organization, form of practice, or specific political aims with regard to 
the conflict. I therefore use the term Transnational Dissent to collectively describe the 
activities of participants who are (or were) involved in some way in agitating against the 
discourse that violent coercion is a legitimate means to either maintain or resolve the conflict 
in Israel and Palestine. 
The first chapter offers a political history of Israeli military occupation and 
colonisation practices and discourses in the Palestinian territories since 1967, and the history 
of various movements and discourses resisting such practices. It is intended to situate the 
reader in the contemporary context of the conflict and to highlight the continuity of 
4 
 
transnational processes which have shaped it. This chapter attempts to condense over forty 
years of history, focusing primarily on political and civil society movements’ adoption and 
adaption of varied discourses to legitimise or de-legitimise the appropriation of land by the 
Israeli state and the settlement of their citizens in these territories. This chapter is not an 
analysis or critique of transnational theory. Its main purpose is to (dis)orientate the reader as 
to the complexity of relationships and exchanges promoting, restricting  or contesting state 
authority, including diasporas, international law and treaties, United Nations conventions, 
communism, liberalism, international media outlets and Global Civil Society. Most 
importantly the chapter highlights the historical heritage, continuity and development of 
transnational dissent to Israel’s military occupation and colonisation practices.  
It must be acknowledged that this chapter by and large ignores both the history of the 
region prior to Israel’s acquisition of the territories in the Six Day War in 1967 and the gross 
levels of violence at the local level that also define this history. The Palestinian narrative is 
tightly bound to their indigenous link to the land preceding the establishment of the Israeli 
state in 1948. Likewise the Zionist mythology self-identifies as a diaspora being finally 
redeemed after 2,000 years in exile. The sheer brutality of violence, often inflicted on 
civilians, and the feelings of euphoria and despair which always attend victory and defeat 
have left an indelible mark on lives near and far. Such episodes and emotions cannot be 
forgotten either by those who experienced them or the reader of this thesis. Nonetheless the 
subject of the dissertation is the contemporary practice of non-violent, or in Palestinian terms 
‘unarmed’ civil resistance. For the past ten years such resistance has most notably involved 
Popular Committees from Palestinian villages agitating against the construction of the 
separation barrier on their lands.  alongside Israeli and international visitors. The historical 
review outlines the historical continuity and deep knowledge basis by which such practices 
are themselves legitimised and reproduced over generations and demonstrates that peoples 
from all sides of the conflict have always proven the human capacity to transcend the 
passions that produce and reproduce violence when ‘everybody is swept away unthinkingly 
by what everybody else does and believes’ (Arendt, 1971, p. 191).  
Theory & Methodology 
In order to understand how the complexity of sometimes contradictory feelings of being a 
dissenter shapes their relationships to other activists, family and friends and wider society, I 
adopt a phenomenological approach which proceeds from the subjective experience and 
concept of intentionality. I take intentionality to be a fully embodied feedback experience, 
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cascading from lower through higher consciousness, through an equally embodied 
interpretive lifeworld in which affect plays a central role. This is drawn from a number of 
phenomenological, sociological and philosophical authors and from the experiences, 
thoughts, actions and feelings of participants encountered in the fieldwork period. The central 
affect theorists I utilise are neurologist Antonio Damasio (2000) who posits emotion as 
representing the relationship between ‘things’ and the subjective ‘organism’ and the 
philosopher Jesses Prinz (2004, 2007) who place emotions at the core of morality. These 
authors provide an understanding of affect as fully embodied, pre-cognitive, intentional 
perception with the capacity for nuanced appraisals which inform those ‘higher’ conscious 
processes associated with cognition and reason. However, we cannot take intentional affect to 
be a simple or dominant experience and what Damasio calls emotion’s ‘hint half-hinted’ may 
often be suppressed by the constraints of acculturated knowledge in the lifeworld, and the 
crowd of other embodied signals being constantly produced. This produces ambiguity, but at 
certain times and for certain feelings, Prinz argues, that the affective dimension of moral 
appraisal has the capacity to ‘dumbfound’ rational arguments which attempt to justify moral 
transgressions (Murphy, Haidt, & Bjorklund, 2000; Sneddon, 2007). Thus the salience of 
affect is highly contextual. 
To address this tension I argue that the subject’s interpretive lifeworld is itself an 
embodied construct. This entails an examination of a number of sociological theories and 
theorists of affect and collectivity, such as Durkheim, Handelman, Levy and Deborah Gould 
in particular (Durkheim, 1912a; Gould, 2009; Handelman, 2004; R. I. Levy, 1973). 
Interactional Ritualism and the Dramaturgical model provide the foundations for positing an 
embodied lifeworld, a term originating from Husserl to describe the ‘unquestioned, practical, 
historically conditioned, pre-theoretical, and familiar world of people’s everyday lives’ 
(Desjarlais & Throop, 2011, p. 91). Durkheim’s Interactional Ritualism, as expanded upon by 
Handelman (2004), demonstrates how ‘public ritual’ coordinated by national bureaucracies 
help foster unquestioned affective associations to the symbols and narratives of the state, 
forging the collective identity of the nation. Dramaturgical theory expands on this by 
recognising  the importance of culture in defining which emotions are to be experienced and 
how they are expressed, not just in ritual event but in all social situations (Lawler & Thye, 
1999). Robert Levy’s work reinforces this by showing that even so-called ‘primary’ or 
universal emotions may be suppressed by cultural norms which assign alternative meanings 
to embodied experiences. As such, though embodied affect informs conscious appraisal, the 
acculturated interpretations of lifeworlds also inform how the body emotes. Through this 
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cascading feedback process, I conclude that the lifeworld is not merely a stock of knowledge 
and practices retrieved from memory but, like the mind itself, is a fully embodied affective 
construct. This notion has affinities to Deborah Gould’s concept of an ‘emotional habitus’. 
The insight I take from Gould’s work is that the emotional habitus is a malleable construct 
such that the meanings of emotions may be altered, through a crisis of affective confusion. 
This last factor is crucial to understanding both the emergence of dissent to previously 
unquestioned interpretations and to the management of the inner turmoil which can 
accompany the practice of protest. 
The attempt to situate this framework into a theory of political activism led me to 
Hannah Arendt’s work on three of her innate political faculties or activities of humanity; 
action, thinking and judging. Alongside labour as the need to sustain life and work the 
production of material things to furnish our world, action was for Arendt the third 
fundamental activity grounded in the vita activa, ‘the basic conditions under which life on 
earth has been given to man’ (Arendt, 1958 p.7). Action is the most political faculty for it is 
the only one which requires the development of a relationship with someone else. A key 
concept for Arend’s understanding of action is the inescapable plurality of the human 
condition. When people come to act together in concerted public political expression, power 
emerges through action. Such a conceptualisation is clearly evinced by this ethnography and 
the concerted action of the plurality of transnational dissent is of particular relevance to the 
proposition in Part II that a practice of community is emerging from a shared sense of 
wrongness. Arendt also posited the realm of the vita contemplativa as the life of the mind, 
which also has three fundamental activities; thinking, willing and judging. Judging she 
considered to be the most political faculty of the mind in that, as with action, it is an 
intersubjective activity by which one attempts to resolve the particularities of being with the 
generalisations of possibilities. It requires ‘the ability to see things not only from one's own 
point of view but from the perspective of all those who happen to be present’ (Arendt, 1968, 
p. 221). Judging thus produces understanding but this understanding resides neither in the self 
nor in the other but within a ‘third position’ of the intersubjective relationship. Again, this is 
supported by the ethnography and not just in the plurality of transnational dissent but, as I 
argue in the proposition on love in Part III, also within the long-term intimate relationships of 
dissenters to their ‘non-aligned’ friends and family members who opposed their political 
stances and practices. Finally thinking is the core activity which relates to the proposition on 
weirdness in Part I. The outstanding characteristics of thinking for Arendt are ‘its withdrawal 
from the common-sense world of appearances, its self-destructive tendency with regard to its 
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own results, its reflexivity, and the awareness of sheer activity that accompanies it’ (Arendt, 
1971, p. 88).  Equating ‘common-sense’ with the acculturated lifeworld, thinking represents 
the human capacity to transcend received interpretations. Though Arendt’s understanding 
was that thinking created nothing except doubt in the mind, she believed such doubt was 
crucial to the avoidance of ‘evil’. Part I of the thesis argues that the emergent feeling of 
weirdness is a pre-cognitive process which serves the same function by calling into question 
received wisdom and sowing doubt in the mind and body. 
Despite the convergence between the ethnographic findings and Arendt’s political 
activities, this thesis argues for a number of adjustments to the understanding of these 
faculties. Most fundamentally, Arendt holds human emotions with low esteem. Her model 
harshly delineates between body, mind and soul, leading to a compartmentalised 
understanding of the form and processes of consciousness, affect, cognition and thought 
which is at odds with the embodied approach used in this thesis. In her ontology emotions are 
the ‘passions’ of the soul, bound by the body which provide only a functional role in human 
survival. Mind, where thinking’s activity resides, is a different and distinct kind from both 
body and soul. This thesis shows that action, thinking and judging are enabled and aided 
rather than inhibited by affect. Doubt can be created by the feeling of weirdness, concerted 
action supported though shared wrongness, and the intersubjective space required for judging 
is enabled by feelings of love. Emotion, I argue, is not by its nature an impediment to critical 
reflection and understanding; affect can positively aid us in the appraisal of what may be 
right and wrong and the effort to avoid evil. 
 
The methodology chapter relates to my engagement with the ‘field’ and research participants. 
The protests of solidarity activism take place at a number of sites at weekly intervals. They 
are attended by people who come from near and far, who then return to scattered residences 
across the region. The first problem then is how to describe and define this ‘field’ of varied 
identities moving through sites of activism and secondly, what are the processes and form of 
knowledge by which ethnographic engagement accesses the affect lives of participants. 
Building on the notion of the plurality of the human condition, I understand fieldwork to take 
place in a shared world which social, sensual and imagined dimensions variously 
complement and contradict through the movement of participants in that world. I adopt 
Ingold’s (2011) concept of a meshwork as apposite to the task of defining this ‘fieldsite’. 
Life, Ingold asserts, is lived along lines of movement through the unfolding world which 
become inscribed as experience as a meshwork a texture of interwoven threads. This is not 
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merely an abstract network of connections but the totality of the affective experience of 
movement through the sensual world. It is an affective dimension of the embodied lifeworld.  
(Ingold, 2011). Transnational dissent is movement along particular ‘lines’ anchored by 
specific sites of protest practice and sociality in the regular schedule of solidarity activism. 
This meshwork of movement is not simply geographical, for as dissenters become familiar 
with travelling along these lines, the sensuality of repeated experiences becomes embodied in 
their own lifeworld. The structuration afforded by the villages and neighbourhoods where 
solidarity activism takes place thus produces a recognisable pattern of knowing and 
interpreting that also constitutes the field of transnational dissent.  
Having thus defined the field, I turn to the general question of how ethnography can 
reliably access the emotional lives of its participants. Here, I base the validity of my 
assertions on my politically engaged approach with the aims of solidarity activism and on the 
trusting relationships developed with certain participants though the year. I again borrow 
from Ingold (2008) who understands anthropological knowledge as emerging from the 
practice of working with people in their world. For Ingold participant observation, as 
immersion in the world of participants’ activities, allows the anthropologist to see, hear and 
touch the world from the vantage points of those participants. I expand upon this to argue that 
it also allows us to feel the world from that vantage point. However, this is not to say that I 
somehow know what they feel and so to refine the form that knowing takes I turn finally to 
Michael Jackson’s interpretation of Arendt’s faculty of judging, in which knowledge and 
understanding exists in the third position of intersubjectivity (Jackson, 2009). Thus, though 
we may come to feel from the vantage points of our participants, we can neither become the 
participant nor lose our researcher self. Jackson argues that the ‘imaginative displacement’ 
which the ethnographer must adopt to reconsidering her own world from the standpoint of 
participants is in essence Arendt’s activity of judging. The ethnographic knowledge this 
effort produces is therefore reducible neither to the researcher’s nor the participants’ 
understandings, but emerges from within the shared space of intersubjectivity itself – the 
third position. In synthesising Ingold and Jackson I argue that, having learnt to feel like a 
dissenter with the guidance of participants, the ethnographer’s act of displacement is not 
merely imaginative but includes a degree of shared embodied knowledge garnered along 
common paths in the meshwork of transnational dissent. It is these commonalities which 
afford insight into the subtle role that ambiguous and conflicting feelings of weirdness, 
wrongness, love and betrayal play in the sociality of dissent. 
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Structure 
The main body of the thesis is divided into three parts, each of which presents a different 
proposition on the affective dimensions of dissent. Part I relates most directly to intentional, 
or reflex affect. It presents the proposition that Weirdness is a feeling which emerges when 
our received understandings fail to properly describe the world as experienced. It is an 
emotional encounter with the limits of the hegemonic certitudes of our lifeworld. This relates 
to subjective intentionality and Damasio’s (2000) understanding of emotion as a kind of 
‘wordless knowledge’ about the human organism’s relation to the apprehended object or 
action. In affect studies this phenomenon is often referred to as reflex emotion. Weird 
therefore, is not a property of an object or action itself but of the relationships between the 
observer, the observed and the dominant cultural discourse to which the observer belongs. 
Although neither the Palestinian nor International dissenters can encounter Israel’s military 
occupation as normal, a focus on the Israeli constituency is most revealing. These individuals 
have been raised on the principles of Zionism their whole lives and are intimately acquainted 
with its hegemonic narrative and interpretations. This discourse describes a democracy forced 
to protect itself against an intractable and violent foe and encounters with the limitations of 
this truth are apt to be experienced as weird. The ethnography here does not highlight gross 
transgressions of this discourse, which can evoke the moral outrage often associated with 
social movement mobilization. Instead, the focus is on the banal and everyday instances of 
life under a deeply institutionalised military occupation. Affective encounters with this reality 
are described as baffling, crazy, bizarre, Kafkaesque or just weird and the experience reveals 
cracks in the patina of the hegemonic discourse which supports the occupation. As with 
Arendt’s faculty of thinking, weirdness produces doubt not through the reasoning of a 
disembodied mind but by the subtle, emergent and pre-cognitive embodied signals of feeling. 
The nuanced affect of weirdness prepares the subject to break with received wisdom and so 
opens the pathway to political dissent. Indeed, I argue that as the process of becoming a 
dissenter proceeds, weirdness moves from being simply an intentional experience to become 
an embodied wordless knowledge, a way of interpreting the world. The seasoned lifeworld 
comes to know that the logic and practice of occupation is an inherently contradictory form 
of social organisation for a state claiming to be a democracy in the twenty-first century. The 
intentional experience informs and refines the embodied knowledge of the lifeworld. 
Part II turns to political action in the public realm by addressing collectivity in the 
transnational diversity of solidarity activism in Jerusalem and beyond. I argue that this 
collectivity is fostered by the affective dimension known as moral emotions. This is not 
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morality as an intentional moment of shock or outrage, but rather as a deep-seated and hard to 
shake feeling that something is wrong. The ethnography describes a huge diversity of 
Palestinian, Israeli and International actors coming together to act in concert. These 
individuals have widely different reasons for coming to dissent, are unagreed as to a future 
prognosis and face a complexity of deeply embedded, mature and often elusive structures of 
oppression in which a clear antagonist is deliberately obscured. The activists here have gone 
beyond weirdness and, I argue, come to share the affective sense that something is wrong. 
They are also, in Arendt’s terms, engaged in concerted political action based on this shared 
feeling. However, there is much more going on than protest performances at the sites of 
solidarity activism. There are legal teams, journalists, and hosts of NGO staff who, though 
not activists, are equally involved in resisting the occupation. In addition there are particular 
bars and coffee shops where dissenters meet and a high degree of non-instrumental 
socialisation occurs.  In a critique of network approaches to the study of transnational dissent 
and macro level concepts like Global Civil Society, I argue that a transnational community is 
being produced by solidarity activism through this shared feeling of Wrongness. This 
argument addresses the transnational dimensions of solidarity activism and the equally 
complex and transnational dimensions which enable and legitimise the dispossession and 
disenfranchising of Palestinians. Drawing upon recent reassessments of community (Amit, 
2012; Amit & Rapport, 2002; Djelic & Quack, 2010) the proposition here is that solidarity 
activism manifests not as simply as an effective network but also as an affective community. 
I thus present something of a challenge to academia by asking how researchers may validate 
and enable global practices of resistance by recognising and re-imagining transnational 
activism as not merely an episodic and instrumental action but as a praxis of fluid, 
interconnected and self-reproducing affective collectives. 
This final proposition in Part III addresses a third dimension of emotion known as 
affective loyalty. As opposed to the intentional experiences of reflex emotions or moral 
interpretations of the lifeworld, affective loyalties develop and operate over long timescales 
as dispositions towards families, friends and nations. The ethnography here focuses on love 
and betrayal within these very intimate relationships as experienced by Israeli dissenters. 
Given that the hegemonic Israeli narrative demands that the nation is loved, the emergence of 
dissent from within its fold leads to reciprocal accusations of betrayal. While dissenters feel 
they have been betrayed by their upbringing in the nation, emotional tensions also emerge 
within the long-term concrete relationships between dissenters and their ‘non-aligned’ 
intimates. To understand how these relationships are maintained I turn to normative 
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discourses on kinship, in which intimacy is about love. The accommodation of betrayal 
within these affective loyalties is afforded by Gould’s (2009) observation that an emotional 
culture, or lifeworld, maybe be recast in times of crisis. As love comes to be accepted and 
understood as a complex process with an uncertain outcome Arendt’s notion of judging, as 
the production of intersubjective understanding, is enabled by the acceptance of plurality 
within long-term intimate relationships. This section follows the practice of dissent out of and 
beyond the boundaries of the social movement and its sociality and into the alternative 
socialites in which dissenters also belong. The experiences of Israeli dissenters reveal that 
intimate love not only has the power to overcome betrayal to the national collective, but that 
this capacity to endure also affects the validity of hegemonic interpretations in the lifeworlds 
of the non-aligned. No longer are dissenters ‘filthy traitors’ or ‘Arab fuckers’, they are sons, 
daughters, friends and loved ones. 
Conclusion 
From a theoretical perspective, the model of intentionality, lifeworld and experience as 
affective processes accords with the ethnography which shows that both human perception 
and interpretation are guided by a wordless knowledge which is felt. Weirdness, Wrongness 
and Love are all equally implicit in forming, appraising and adjusting the relationships 
participants have with intimates, fellow dissenters and public discourses on identity and 
conflict. Affect must be understood as a nuanced and sophisticated processes cascading 
through mind, body and the sensuality of a plural world. Methodologically, I assert that in 
order to access this world we must divest ourselves of pre-conceived categorisations of 
emotion and attune ourselves to the subtle and sometimes uncertain shifts signalled in the 
bodies and motions of our participants. The study of affect must move beyond the ‘passions 
which overwhelm’ and attend to the ambiguity of emotions, by thinking through and with our 
feelings and those of our participants. 
In terms of the study of protest and the paradigms of social movement theory, I assert 
that social movements cannot be properly understood if studied as social isolates or 
instrumental networks with specific aims or end-goals. The ethnography shows that solidarity 
activism both affords and involves a great deal of non-instrumental activities and 
relationships, which help the movement hold together and endure. Furthermore, each and 
every dissenter is also part of a meshwork of relationships outside of the boundaries of the 
movement. Far from the performances of protest, the formulations of tactics and the struggle 
for resources, the daily sociality of dissenters is intrinsic to their capacity to endure the 
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demands of their efforts. To this end Arendt’s work on political action, thought and judgment 
have proved particularly useful in understanding the implications of the ethnographic 
findings here. Though I attempted to integrate various traditional social movement theories to 
these findings the results often ended only in critique of their limitations. I believe that once 
the caveat of affect has been introduced to Arendt’s theories, the application of her more 
generalised understanding of innate human political faculties and conditions can greatly 
enrich our understanding of collective social dissent and action. 
Finally in relation to Palestinian solidarity activism itself, I believe that the protests at 
a dozen or so villages and neighbourhoods initiated and lead by no more than a few hundred 
people, has played a crucial role in the transnationalisation of dissent to Israeli policies and 
practices of dispossession and colonisation under military occupation. Though they may be 
maligned as ineffective, even from some Palestinian quarters, the insistence, proliferation, 
perseverance of popular committees in calling upon peoples of all creeds, colours and places 
to witness and experience the repression of these peaceful protests has galvanised a 
community of civilians across the globe. The tactic of emplacing others within the experience 
of oppression is then perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from these few hundred 
ordinary activists. I thank them and wish them the best in their endeavours. 
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1. Looking for Legitimacy 
Contesting transnational processes in the Israeli colonization and decolonization 
of the Occupied Territories since 1967 
Transnational Effects and National Legitimacy 
This chapter situates contemporary solidarity activism within a historical context which 
highlights how both colonisation and decolonisation practices have sought legitimacy in 
transnational dimensions. This is not to say that nationalism, nationhood and national actors 
are not major forces in this conflict – the idea of Two States for Two Peoples – but that such 
forces are increasingly situated within a transnational complex. Manifestations of 
transnationalism in Israeli and Palestine are observed in the migrations of people, diasporas 
and notions of ethnic identity, in flows of capital and the production, adaptation and adoption 
of ideas and ideals, and in global networks of civil society organisations and the local 
presence of major transnational and supranational NGOs. The chronological account given is 
not a theoretical analysis of transnationalism, social movement or Global Civil Society per 
se. Such discussions will be addressed in later chapters and in relation to the contemporary 
practices of dissent observed in fieldwork. The main concern here is to show how competing 
discourses on colonisation/decolonisation have always referenced ‘external’ norms, practices 
and knowledge to underwrite the validity of their narratives and how these externalities 
themselves wax and wane in the transnational processes of producing local legitimacy. What 
is important to understand is that this is a history referenced and interpreted by the dissenters 
themselves. 
The term ‘delegitimization’ is now in common use by journalists, security advisers 
and political society in Israel (Eldar, 2010; Hass, 2012; Ravid, 2011). It is framed as anything 
from a threat to particular state practices - such as how security forces can defend the nation – 
to being an assault on its very existence, on a par with nuclear annihilation, the indiscriminate 
carnage of terrorism, and the insidious and tenacious irrationality of anti-Semitism. The threat 
is seen seriously enough  that extensive national resources are being leveraged to fund and 
coordinate diplomatic efforts, media campaigns, national civil society and the Jewish 
diaspora to ‘explain’ Israeli perspectives and practices to purportedly ill-informed foreign 
public and policy makers (Molad, 2012). This initiative, officially named Hasbara 
1
coordinates several government ministries, the IDF Spokesperson Division
2
 and the Jewish 
                                                 
1
 Hasbara (Hebrew) meaning ‘explaining’. 
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Agency for Israel to produce and disseminate print, electronic media, television and internet 
video channels and to equip foreign civil organisation and Israeli citizens travelling abroad 
with the ‘tools and information to deal with questions and criticism’ arising from ‘prejudice 
and misinformation related to Israel’3. Counter to the Hasbara apparatus is an ‘anti-Israel 
network [which] includes many disparate organizations functioning without clear protocols 
and with little cooperation. It can be said that there is no coordination of various objectives, 
no unified communications strategy, and consequently, no unified – indeed, often completely 
inconsistent – Hasbara messaging’ (ibid, p. 45). Though these competing discourses are about 
the legitimacy of national self-determination their exchanges are transnational, involving 
flows of images, peoples, monies and ideas across the globe. 
Since their emergence, nation-states have legitimised their existence from and in 
reference to other similarly constituted entities. Initially the state was imagined and promoted 
as the ‘natural’ expression of peoplehood supposedly united by ethnicity, language or some 
timeless and unique mish-mash of traditional cultural practices. After the Second World War 
and with the establishment of the United Nations and other supra-national agencies and 
international conventions, legitimacy became increasingly claimed by reference to or accord 
with such agencies or regional-political blocs. Though born out of an international global 
order Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that the U.N. in particular is moving beyond this ‘old 
order’ and becoming the source of juridical and fundamental norms for ‘sovereign’ states. It 
is becoming a transnational entity. Alternative sources and adjudicators exist. Political, 
economic and military pacts or Blocs, such as the EU, NATO, OPEC or the Arab League, 
have also emerged and often compete, producing degrees of complexity, hierarchies and 
wiggle-room when it came to legitimate state claims-making.  The growth of neo-liberal 
trade, the power of private  networks of capital through business and the concurrent leverage 
of consumer practices must also be taken into account by states when deciding policy (Beck, 
2005). This latter constituency, oft posited as the Global Civil Society, has also seen 
remarkable growth in the formation of formal and informal civil society movements agitating 
for certain socio-economic practices across borders under ‘meta-narratives’ of democracy, 
justice and human rights (Appadurai, 2008). Appadurai also employs the notion of 
                                                                                                                                                        
2
 IDF – Israeli Defence Forces 
3
 Source: Ministry for Public Diplomacy and Diaspora website [available at] 
http://www.masbirim.gov.il [accessed] 10 Mar 2011. 
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transnational scapes of ethnicity, ideas, finance, technologies and media across and upon 
which such narratives are produced, disseminated and contested. Negri and Hardt go so far as 
to accord transnational civil society – or ‘the multitude’ - a revolutionary subjectivity with the 
potential to forge democratic alternatives in a global age (Hardt & Negri, 2000, 2005; Juris, 
2008b; Juris & Khasnabish, 2013).  
Examining such processes at the local level several authors have highlighted the limits 
of nation-state sovereignty: in transmigrant identity and remittance economies (Basch, Glick-
Schiller, & Blanc, 1994); by the investment, withdrawal or withholding of capital by 
international corporations, charities and institutions of global finance (Green, 2008); through 
the transmission of ‘foreign’ discourses into local living rooms by transnational satellite 
television companies and internet publications (Sakr, 2001); in the production of ‘universal’ 
values and socio-economic models and their dissemination  to local levels by international 
organizations and NGOs (Englund, 2006); and by the internationalist configuration of a wide 
variety of ideologies, such as democracy, neo-liberalism, anti-capitalism, environmentalism, 
politicized religion and global terrorism whose rhetoric necessitates that political action 
occurs outside national frameworks (Beck, 2005; Berglund, 1998; Cunningham, 2000).  
Thus, though inherently framed in nationalist terms, the legitimacy of Palestinian and 
Israeli claims and counter-claims are – and have always been - subject to transnational effects 
of both formally instituted organizations such as the U.N. and the Arab League, and by 
dispersed and informal collectivities, notably Palestinian and Jewish diasporas and variously 
aligned civil society movements. The following examines the various tactics and practices 
employed in legitimising either the colonisation or decolonization of Jewish settlements in 
the ‘occupied Palestinian territories’ (oPt) since 1967. There is of course much greater 
historical depth prior to 1967 but that topic is better served by historians (see Morris, 2007; 
Pappé, 2006; Sa’di & Abu-Lughod, 2013). Instead I focus on the period from 1967 when 
Israel took control of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai 
Peninsula in its astounding demonstration of military supremacy during the Six Day War. 
Though there have been many wars, mobilizations, military operations and acts of armed 
resistance since this time, my main focus in this period is on discursive and juridical attempts 
that have had to interpret and reinterpret the ongoing development of legitimate statehood.  
The purpose of this section is twofold. Firstly it provides context for the current state of the 
pro-Palestinian activism examined in this thesis. It identifies the major elements of the 
hegemonic narrative in Israel and the practices by which colonisation of the oPt was and is 
legitimised. Secondly, it demonstrates the historical continuity and transnational dimensions 
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of non-violent resistance to colonization, a fact that is often deliberately obscured by the fog 
(and smoke screens) of war and terrorism.  
State Foundations from the 19
th
 Century to 1967 
In the Israeli national narrative, Zionism sits centre stage. Zionism, or more precisely 
Political Zionism, is in the official discourse ‘the national liberation movement of the Jewish 
people, [that] emerged in the 19th century within the context of the liberal nationalism then 
sweeping through Europe’ (Neuberger, 1999). The main forum for debate on the form and 
implementation of the Zionist idea was the Zionist Organisation (ZO) formed in Basel, 
Switzerland in 1897. While pre-state Zionism has its own complex history, in terms of 
contemporary discourses the most significant division in the movement occurred in 1923 
when Ze’ev Jabotinsky left the ZO to form the Alliance of Revisionist-Zionists. Whereas, the 
‘mainstream’ of the ZO became the socialist orientated Labour-Zionism, which adopted a 
pragmatic-minimalist approach to establishing some form of state for the Jewish people in 
Palestine, the Revisionist-Zionists were maximalists who demanded a Jewish state on both 
sides of the river Jordan. The vision of what some call Greater Israel, would have included 
territory both on the west bank of the Jordan and in some part of what is now the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan (Shafir & Peled, 2002). While these two forms of 'Left-wing' and 'Right-
wing' Zionism have been the main proponents in the contest to define the hegemonic 
narrative, other forms such as Cultural Zionism and Messianic Zionism have also had 
significant impact and continue to impart legitimate meaning to the idea of Zionism for 
various groups or individuals. 
After 1948 the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip were under 
the control of Jordan and Egypt respectively from 1948. Estimates vary on the number of 
Palestinian refugees from 1948 territories of Israel from 500,000 to 950,000 (see McDowall, 
1987). Approximately one third of these found themselves in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem, another third in the Gaza Strip and the remainder to Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and 
beyond (PRRN, 2010). The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established in 1949 to provide for their needs 
across the region. The major political groupings and leaders which would come to represent 
the Palestinian nation emerged from the diaspora at this time. At the American University of 
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Beirut, George Habash, from the town Lydda
4
, helped found the Arab Nationalist Movement 
which would become the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (Kazziha, 
1975). In 1959 Yasser Arafat, the head of the General Union of Palestinian Students at Cairo 
University, helped found the Fatah political movement and in 1964, at its summit in Cairo, 
the Arab League initiated a Palestinian National Council. In May of that year at its first 
conference in Jerusalem, then under Jordanian occupation, the council proclaimed ‘the 
establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a mobilizing leadership of the 
forces of the Palestinian Arab people’ (POMSP, n.d.). 
1967 – 1977: Pragmatic Minimalism & Radical Activism  
Despite the often cited euphoria felt in Israel following victory in the Six Day War, the 
maximalist tendencies in Zionism were not sufficiently empowered to embark on an 
extensive settlement program of the West Bank. The most pressing issue was to name and 
define the territories in accordance with the ruling Labour government’s ‘pragmatic’ or 
minimalist Zionism. Seventeen days after the cessation of military hostilities, the Knesset 
passed two laws in summary proceedings empowering the government to: 1) extend the 
boundaries of any city or district at will by means of ordinances
5; and 2) expand Israel’s laws, 
jurisdictions and administration to ‘every part of Eretz Israel’ by means of ordinances6  
(IMFA, 2011a, 2011b). The following day the government extended the city limits of 
Jerusalem reaching up to the Arab population centres of Ramallah in the north, Bethlehem in 
the south and Abu Dis in the east, merging East Jerusalem with West Jerusalem to form a 
single administrative entity. 
The UN was ‘deeply concerned at the measures taken by Israel to change the status of 
the City [and] considers that those measures are invalid’ (UN, 1967, p. 4). In countering the 
view that the change of Jerusalem’s status in Israeli law was de facto annexation, the Israeli 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abba Eban wrote to the Secretary General. The unilateral 
change of status was legitimised by three arguments; protection of the city’s Holy Places; 
freedom of movement and civic cooperation; and the provision of municipal services to the 
entirety of the newly expanded city. The provision of services was an appeal to the pragmatic 
                                                 
4
 Lydda. A town between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem within the 1948 borders of Israel. Referred to as Lod 
in Hebrew 
5
 Municipal Corporations Ordinance (Amendment) Law (1967).  
6
 The Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law (1967).  
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aspects of Israel as a modernising force in the region, extending water supply, health-care, 
social welfare and educational infrastructure ‘to those for whom none have been available in 
the past’ (Eban, 1967)7. The civic cooperation argument presented a humanistic view of the 
Israeli administration as liberation for Arabs of East Jerusalem who were now ‘free to renew 
or initiate contacts with their Jewish neighbours…in the City from which the enduring 
message of human brotherhood was proclaimed’ (ibid). The larger part of the text legitimized 
Israel’s actions as designed to ‘furnish a legal basis for the protection of the Holy Places in 
Jerusalem’ (ibid). This evoked a power higher than that of national or international authority, 
what Eban called ‘the universal interest’. More than just transnational the universal interest is 
almost transcendental. Despite protest in international forums and an absence in the statutes 
of the term ‘sovereignty’ or ‘annex’, the discourse that Jerusalem had been ‘re-united’ gained 
significant purchase in the national hegemony and the imaginings of Israeli nationalism. If 
prior to 1967 mainstream Zionism  had concentrated on consolidating the 1948 state of 1949, 
the 1967 victory and the symbolic return of Jerusalem licensed more romantic and ambitious 
visions of the future Israeli state (Guyatt, 1998). Such visions would lead to the growing 
legitimization of maximalist narratives in the coming years.  
Naming the land 
The areas that fell under Israeli jurisdiction in 1967 were populated by residents of 
villages, towns and cities and the transmigrant population of Palestinian refugees. It also 
contained extensive tracts of cultivated land. The Israeli state, as a democracy with property 
rights encoded in legislation, found it necessary to construct a legal basis for the transfer of 
these lands to the state. Metzger et al outline several means by which this was achieved 
(Metzger, Orth, & Sterzing, 1983). 
 
State land: Israeli authorities obtained the power of disposition over the largest part of lands 
by taking over Jordanian ‘state land’. Jordan had adopted the Ottoman system of land tenure, 
known as meri land, which was given to villages for cultivation.  Although technically 
belonging to the state, the state had no right of usage to meri land which normally passed by 
inheritance through family lineages of cultivators. Israel denied Palestinian farmers access 
rights if they could not produce tapo certificates (land deeds) from the Ottoman period. Israel 
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 Numerous quotations in this text cite online resources, such as archive material and newspaper 
articles. In accordance with APA 6.0 standards, such citations do not include page numbers as these 
sources are not paginated. Full details of these sources are listed in the bibliography. 
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then nominated this land as ‘public domain’ and placed part of this land at the disposal of 
Jewish settlers.  
 
Purchase: Land in the occupied territories was also purchased from private individuals. The 
authority to buy land was the exclusive purview of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the 
Israeli Land Administration (ILA). Though the ILA is a state institution the JNF is a 
transnational organization which draws on the capital reserves donated from the Jewish 
diaspora and others and which allows the state to formally distance itself from certain 
acquisitions.  
 
Abandoned land: A number of laws from the 1950s, including the Absentees' Property Law 
1950, allows for title transference to public authorities over ‘waste land’ or ‘abandoned land’ 
or ‘absentee property’ and enables the expropriation of private land and property that could 
not be purchased or claimed as state land.  
 
Military restriction: Concerns of state security also provide legal alternatives for 
expropriation. Israel employs a combination of legislation from the two previous 
administrators of the West Bank. Under a 1945 law from the British Mandate
8
 the military 
commander of a region may declare a ‘restricted area’ for ‘security reasons’ thus barring 
access for cultivation.  After three years the administration can then utilize a Jordanian law 
according to which land that has not been cultivated for three consecutive years must be 
registered as state land.  
 
Destruction: A certain amount of territory came also into the hands of the occupying 
authority through the practice of destroying entire villages. The villages of Emmaus, Beit 
Nuba and Yalu which lay along the road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem were the only 
Palestinian villages to be destroyed after the 1967 war. The JNF planted trees on the sites and 
lands of these villages establishing a forested public recreation area called Canada Park.  
 
State expropriation of land and property is based largely on legislation. The combination of 
Ottoman, Mandate, Jordanian, Israeli civil laws and Military law in the oPt allows for 
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  Article 125 of the British Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945.  
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creative manoeuvring in legal application. However, the legitimacy of this practice is based 
on the notion of ‘rule of law’ in state practices, a narrative with significant traction amongst 
Israelis and sections of the international audience. This legitimacy is of course highly 
contested. Most notably while the Absentees' Property Law precludes Palestinian refugees 
from claiming property lost in 1948, no such prohibition exists for Jewish refugees who fled 
the oPt at that time. Jews can and do reclaim property in Hebron and East Jerusalem. 
Settling any Uncertainty  
Settlement activity initially focused on land of East Jerusalem with over 20,000 
dunams
9
 ‘expropriated’ by the state by 1970 and zoned for the construction of whole new 
neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem.  By 1972 over eight thousand Israeli citizens lived in 
these neighbourhoods (B’Tselem, 2011a, 2011b). Beyond East Jerusalem the appetite of the 
Labour government for construction was less than zealous, and no more than fifteen 
settlements had been established mostly in the Jordan Valley. This pattern was predicated on 
the Allon Plan, presented by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon in July 1967. In this the 
entire Jordan valley was designated a ‘security zone’ and many of the early settlements in this 
border region began as what former Prime Minister Golda Meir called “military agricultural 
outposts” (cited in Metzger et al., 1983, p. 30). The establishment of such outposts was 
institutionally facilitated by Nahal units, members of farming communities who also served 
together in the military. After a time civilian populations replaced the Nahal units in the 
settlements but in 1972 the settler population outside East Jerusalem was little more than one 
thousand. Though the planning for occupation and settlement of the West Bank grew out of a 
mixture of strategic and nationalist thinking in the 1950s among a group at the heart of the 
Labour party known as ‘the redeemers’ (Pappé, 2006) the maximalists, while growing in 
influence, were not yet in control of the institutions of state or dominant in the production of 
discourse.  
This raison d’être, an irredentist ‘Greater Land of Israel’ ideology, linked the 
pragmatics of political Zionism to the divine promise of messianic Zionism. The ideological 
legitimacy of the movement was provided by the theology of Rabbi Abraham Kook, who 
argued that the secular Zionist pioneers were unwitting actors in a grand Divine plan, by 
virtue of the fact that they were ‘building up the Land of Israel which would eventually bring 
about redemption’ (ibid, p.198). This Religious Zionism stood in contrast with the ambiguous 
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or even antagonistic attitudes of other brands of Judaic orthodoxy which had had an uneasy 
relationship to the political state-building project since its inception. The perceived weakness 
of the Labour government, the possibility that it was willing to cede the territories ‘liberated’ 
in 1967 as part of the Allon Plan, galvanised the movement into action. Against the wishes of 
the government, activists began a campaign of establishing  unauthorised ‘outposts’ in areas 
outside Allon’s security zone and deep within the zones planned for Palestinian autonomy. 
Continuous cat and mouse games of eviction and squatting continued for three years between 
Gush Emunim and a government who within certain constraints were prepared to tolerate 
these protests. This small group of national religious youth operated within the discourse of 
Zionism and pioneering and since they had no real access to the political elite they were not 
seen as a threat to Labour’s hegemonic order (ibid, p.219). Their position on the political 
periphery would change with the ‘upheaval’ (Ma’Hapach) of the Likud party’s election 
victory of 1977 and the empowerment of maximalist Zionism in the hegemonic discourse. 
Spectrums of early Dissent 
The major counter-hegemonic discourse espoused by Israeli-Jews at this time, and the 
most vociferous critique of the 1967 occupation, came from the Israeli Socialist Organization 
known as Matzpen
10
. Formed in 1962 Matzpen drew on the ideological thought of communist 
internationalism and elevated universal socialist principles over nationalist aims. A month 
before the Six Day War Matzpen publicly equated Zionism with Western imperialism and 
colonization, called for the right of Palestinian refugees to return, and demanded the de-
Zionization’ of Israel (Matzpen, 1969). Though never numbering more than a few dozen 
active members, the occupation galvanized the movement which held numerous 
demonstrations and disseminated overtly anti-Zionist critiques both in Israel and abroad. As a 
result of their head-on struggle with the occupation and Zionism ‘if you didn’t hate Matzpen 
you weren’t a patriot, you were garbage’ (Akiva Orr in Torbiner, 2003).  Transnational splits 
and conflicts along Trotskyite and Maoist Third World lines splintered this small group in the 
early seventies and their pariah status forced many of their number to emigrate.  However 
their radical analysis exerted considerable influence on the development of counter-
hegemonic thought in Israel and abroad through exiles activists and the magazine Israca 
(Israeli Revolutionary Action Committee Abroad). Prior to this few in western civil society 
were aware of a pro-Palestinian narrative. Founding members such as Akiva Orr, Haim 
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HaNegbi and Moshe Machover remain at the forefront of Israeli-Jewish anti-Zionist activism 
today (ILA, 2011c; ISRAC, 1969; Matzpen, 1968, 1969). 
Globally, the late 1960s and early seventies had witnessed an extraordinary rise in 
social radicalism. This period saw mass protest against racial segregation and the Vietnam 
War in the U.S., student protests in Europe, and guerrilla movements in Latin America. The 
idea that grassroots organizations could challenge the authority of the state through civil 
disobedience or violent resistance was in the air (Greenstein, 2009). The rise of the ‘New 
Left’ found several local expressions in Israel such as Smol Israeli Hadash (SIAH)11 
established in 1968 by a group of students in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In 1971 the 
Israeli Black Panthers sought a ‘Genuine Revolution’ to end the institutional Western 
discrimination and impoverishment of ‘Eastern Peoples’ (Black Panthers Israel, 1972; ILA, 
2011d). However, the power of nationalist aspirations proved too strong for movements such 
as Matzpen, SIAH or the Black Panthers to unify the Arab and Jewish masses under the 
universalist notions of the proletariat or even regional collectives of the ‘Orient’. Indeed these 
organizations were anything but massive or unified, and when the ‘Mizrahi revolution’ came 
in 1977 its constituency of oriental Jews threw their electoral weight behind the Zionist 
maximalists of Menachem Begin’s Likud party (Shafir & Peled, 2002). Israeli-Jewish calls to 
destroy the Zionist entity became untenable and counter-hegemonic activism turned towards 
specific issues relating to minority rights, poverty, selective conscientious objection and the 
occupation (Greenstein, 2009). Such tensions led to the disintegration of SIAH in 1973, but 
the following year CAMPUS emerged as a student led alliance of Jews, Arabs, Zionists and 
Anti-Zionist united in their fight for peace, democracy and social progress (ILA, 2011a). The 
creeping annexation in the occupied territories and the shift to the right of the Marxist 
parliamentary party MAPAM also led to the emergence of the Left-Zionists organizations, 
Brit HaSmol, Moked, Sheli and Smol Sheli. Though they remained loyal to Zionist principles 
they served as constant voices of dissent within mainstream politics (ILA, 2011b). The 
spectrum of Israeli-Jewish dissent from Matzpen’s meta-critique of Zionism through to issue-
based left-Zionist organizations differentially incorporated transnational notions of legitimate 
state practice into the Israeli national discourse. The predominantly Marxist, Internationalist 
perspectives and notions of race-class oppression were locally expressed as resistance to 
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Western colonialism, the ‘natural' affinity’ of the proletariat and co-identification of the 
second-class Mizrahim ‘Arab-Jews’ with the oppressed Palestinian-Arabs.      
The Transnational Production of Palestinian Nationalism 
The same period also saw major developments in the organisation of institutionalized 
Palestinian opposition in the form of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Founded 
in 1964 by the Arab League with the mandate of ‘organising the Palestinian people to enable 
them to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and determining their destiny’ (Hirst, 
1977, p. 273). To a great degree, the 1967 war all but did away with the idea of Nassarism’s 
ideology of pan-Arab unity and discredited Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the PLOs first chairman who 
resigned shortly sfter. In early 1968 Fatah, a Palestinian diasporic political organization 
which had adopted guerrilla warfare tactics as a technology of coercion, began to formulate a 
new concept of ‘liberation’. Up to this point vengeance and anti-Semitic tropes from the West 
coloured the Palestinian discourse, but liberation could not be built on vengeance and the 
existence of a Hebrew culture in Palestine had to be addressed (ibid, p.288-291).  
The history of Jewish persecution was studied by the PLO Research Centre in Beirut, 
and a distinction between Jews and Zionists was drawn. The power of the ‘Zionist machine’ 
in disseminating its discourse to Jewish immigrants was addressed, and the works of ‘Martin 
Buber, Issac Deutscher, Elmer Berger and Moshe Menuhin, all spiritual human Jewish 
thinkers, were read and re-read’ (Rashid, 1970, p. 16).  The result was the report Towards a 
Democratic State in Palestine published by the Research Centre in 1970. Though liberation 
still meant the destruction of the Zionist state its framing now acknowledged the presence of 
Jews in Palestine and imagined a future Palestine of non-sectarian equality. When in 1974 
Fatah’s leader Yasser Arafat, now Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Palestine Revolution, was invited to address the United Nations 
General Assembly it was this discourse that was presented to the world on behalf of the 
Palestinian people (Arafat, 1974). That such a prominent global conduit was made available 
to this Palestinian discourse resulted from a growing international delegitimization of the 
Israeli narrative at this time, which in turn provided important impetus to various counter-
hegemonic movements in Israel (Greenstein, 2009). 
Though living in a stateless, dispersed, transnational sphere the Palestinians were 
now, contrary to the declarations of Israeli leaders Golda Meir and Levi Eshkol, constitutive 
of people and nation. Like other nations they were represented by an institutionalized elite 
stratum, armed with tools of coercion and producing and disseminating its own hegemonic 
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narrative. Like other nations this discourse was challenged from within and without. Against 
PLO hegemony stood Dr. George Habash and the Popular front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) who de-territorialized the instrumental violence of liberation, hi-jacking 
planes and attacking and killing civilians across the world. Other Arab nations nurtured their 
own expressions of Palestinian ‘self-assertion’, both by design and blunder: In Syria the 
Baathists patronized the Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War, while the Iraqi Baathists 
had the Arab Liberation Front. Black September emerged from the violent expulsion of 
Fatah’s fighting forces from Jordan in 1970. Palestinian politics, practices and discourses at 
this time ‘were an Arab world in microcosm’ (Hirst, 1977, p. 305). With the rise of violence 
the transnational production and emergence of Palestinian nationhood would have to be 
directly addressed, at least by refutation, by the Israeli narrative which had studiously denied 
its existence up to this point. 
1977-1987: Maximalist Ascendancy & Revisiting the Nation 
On 17 May 1977, Menachem Begin and his union of nationalist and liberal parties, known as 
Likud, brought an end to three decades of Labour rule in Israel. The ‘right-wing’ Likud would 
dominate Israeli politics for the next fifteen years and represented the triumph of Revisionist-
Zionism after fifty years of struggle against Labour-Zionism. This struggle was embodied in 
the figure of Ze’ev Jabotinsky who in 1923 denounced the World Zionist Organisation’s 
piece-meal approach to acquiring land and building settlements during the pre-state British 
Mandate period and had demanded nothing less than ‘a Jewish state on both sides of the river 
Jordan’ (Shlaim, 1996, p. 279).  Jabotinsky regarded Arab hostility to Zionism as inevitable 
and concluded that only an ‘iron wall’ of superior military power could protect the Jewish 
state. ‘Distain for diplomacy and reliance on military power...characterised Revisionist 
Zionism from the very beginning’ (ibid, p.280), and Menachem Begin had been at the core of 
this movement since before the foundation of the state.  
Co-opting the Mizrahi Revolution  
Though Likud’s 1977 manifesto stated that ‘Judea And Samaria [the West Bank] 
shall...not be relinquished to foreign rule’12 its electoral mandate came in large part not from 
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 Judea and Samaria. Biblical names used for the area roughly contiguous with the West Bank. 
Maximalist discourse tends to use these two names for the regions, and it is also the official 
Israeli government term for the oPt of the West Bank. 
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popular support for expansionist policies, but a consequence of structural inter-ethnic 
tensions amongst Jews in Israeli. The sub-altern status of Mizrahi (Oriental) Jews within the 
or Ashkenazi (European)
13
 Jews hegemonic narrative is well documented. From the offset the 
Zionist project was a European phenomenon. The majority of the diaspora had lived in 
Europe, its vision of a modern democratic state for Jewish nationals grew from the European 
nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, it was the European powers that the WZO 
had first lobbied, and it was the decimation of European Jewry in the Holocaust that catalysed 
the West and the diaspora into realising statehood after the WWII. The Jews of North Africa 
and the Middle East living in partibus infidelium had no experience of persecution and 
genocide, or nationalist projects, indeed from the Ashkenazi perspective no experience of 
‘modernity’, and were considered lacking in the collective drives and dynamism of the 
Ashkenazim (Shumsky, 1972). They could however provide cheap labour and satisfy the 
Zionist mantra of ‘Jewish labour for Jewish land’. The Mizrahi were culturally, 
institutionally, economically and geographically marginalized being settled by state 
absorption dictate in municipal slums and ‘development towns’ far from the centres of power, 
employment and the valuable real estate held by the European veterans around the Tel Aviv 
and Jerusalem metropolitan areas (Dalsheim, 2008; Shafir & Peled, 2002; Shumsky, 1972; 
Smooha, 1993).  
Throughout the 1970s the Likud party had recruited several Mizrahi mayors from the 
development towns whose vote winning ability amongst Israel’s Oriental Jews became key to 
the party’s success (Sprinzak, 1993). Despite Likud’s overt maximalist ideology the Oriental 
vote was predicated not on settlement expansion but on Labour’s failure in incorporating 
Mizrahim. Thus though ‘never fully committed to the idea of the Greater Land of Israel 
[Mizrahi voters turned to Likud] for social, psychological and economic reasons’ (ibid, p. 
136). The legitimacy for settlement expansion was to a large degree based on a democratic 
mandate from an ‘anti-Labour’ disenfranchised and disaffected ethnic identity. Nonetheless, 
Menachem Begin immediately committed his government and the nation’s resources to the 
expansion of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and assisted in the construction of 
eleven new Gush Emunim settlements during their first year in office and helped ‘create the 
administrative and organizational structure for the future establishment of additional 
settlements’ (Newman, 2005, p. 195). However, in 1978 Begin also signed the Camp David 
                                                 
13
 Mizrahi (pl.Mizrahim) Jews categorised as originating from Oriental or Arabic regions. 
Ashkenazi (pl. Ashkenazim) Jews categorised as originating from Occidental or European 
regions. 
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Accords with Egypt's president Anwar Sadat. This instigated Israel's largest ever 
decolonisation by removing over four thousand settlers from the Sinai Peninsula returning it 
to Egyptian sovereignty.  
Expanding the Network 
By the early 1980s, at the beginning of Begin’s second term, about seventy percent of 
Israelis living in the oPt were in the new neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem. This reflected 
both the government’s ideological emphasis and resource allocations to the city and the 
pragmatic attraction of living in the national capital for many Israelis. In mainstream 
discourse these new ‘suburbs’ were not (and are not) settlements. Out on the frontier of the 
West Bank, the military security and Religious Zionism settlement discourses were proving 
too limited for legitimate large-scale expansion. The former had self-imposed security 
considerations, while the latter had exhausted its man/woman-power without significantly 
tilting the demographic balance of the West Bank in their favour (Shafir & Peled, 2002). To 
strengthen the settlement drive Likud devised a policy independent of Gush Emunim. The 
One Hundred Thousand Plan aimed to settle an additional 80,000 people in the West Bank 
by 1985. A new (second) settlement division within the Jewish Agency
14
, was created for this 
plan. The agency’s original settlement division, which had been created to expand the 
settlements in the Allon ‘security zones’ of the Jordan valley continued its work in these 
regions, while the new division ‘adopted radically new methods for the fulfilment of its aims’ 
(ibid, p.173), namely, the commercialisation of the settlement enterprise. 
In contrast to the state-centrist policies of the Labour party, Likud had from the 
beginning adopted the free-market economic policies being produced and disseminated from 
the U.S.. Neo-liberal ‘market forces’ were thus incorporated into the One Hundred Thousand 
Plan. For the first time in Zionist history settlement became a capitalist venture ‘encouraging 
the employment of private funds and private initiative in the construction of settlements’ 
(ibid). Expropriation practices were consistent with the past, but now land would first be 
targeted by ‘surveyors or prospectors’ who could turn a profit through property development 
(Guyatt, 1998, p. 10). The land would then be claimed by the state through the established 
means before being sold to private investors at rates heavily subsidised by the government. 
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 Jewish Agency for Israel. A diaspora NGO offshoot of the WZO that has been officially chartered 
by the 1952 ‘Zionist Organization-Jewish Agency for Israel Status Law’ to promote and affect 
Jewish immigration and settlement. 
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The state also invested heavily in the infrastructure networks to link the West Bank 
settlements together and to the metropolitan centres of Israel. The settlements were no longer 
isolated farming outposts connected to military bases, or pioneering ideologies, but desirable 
suburbs ‘attractive to middle-class Israeli’s seeking spacious yet affordable housing’ 
(Sprinzak, 1993, p. 125). Colonization was adapting to global trends in economic technology 
and aspirational living.  
In 1980 the Knesset had also passed the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel. In 
addition to stating that ‘Jerusalem complete and united [as expanded in 1967], is the capital 
of Israel’ the law also stipulated that the government ‘shall provide for the development and 
prosperity...by allocating special funds and shall set up special bodies to this end’ (Knesset, 
2011). East Jerusalem was thus further distanced from the notion of ‘occupied territories’ and 
settlements in the national discourse. The number of new settlements in the West Bank  grew 
from twenty-two in 1976 to one-hundred-and-nine in 1984 and the settler population 
increased ten-fold, during ‘the great settlement years of 1979 to 1984’ (Sprinzak, 1993, p. 
124). What had been ideological migration to self-sufficient agricultural settlements in the 
West Bank in the 1970s became an economic migration to sub-urban satellite towns of 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in the eighties, leveraging free-market capitalism and middle-class 
aspiration to drive and legitimise massive settlement expansion. 
Post-Zionist historiography and transnational trends in knowledge production 
Around the same time that the Mizrahi revolution had denied electoral legitimacy to 
Labour's hegemonic narrative and inadvertently promoted the maximalist tendencies, Israeli 
historians and social scientists began a process which would undermine the nation’s founding 
myths. This critical turn was part of the maturing of post-modernism, in which foundational 
myths and power were being sceptically deconstructed and reappraised (Foucault, 1977, p. 
see; Gellner, 1983; Said, 1978). Up to this point Israel's official history of the ‘War of 
Independence’ portrayed Zionism as a beneficent and progressive force whose every offer of 
compromise was rejected by Arab belligerence. Poorly armed and outnumbered the pre-state 
Yishuv community fought five Arab armies (who were armed and assisted by the British), and 
irregular ‘gangs’ of local Arabs. In the course of the war the enemy states called on the local 
Arab population to quit their homes to facilitate the invasion. In the IDF’s official History of 
the War of Independence (1959), the Arabs of Lydda (now Lod near Tel Aviv) were happy at 
the possibility given to them of evacuating the town (Morris, 2007). The idea that the Arab 
populations of what would become the state of Israel, had left voluntarily and at the behest of 
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neighbouring Arab governments had been carefully nurtured in the official narrative, 
absolving the Jews from any responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem. According to 
Morris, this version of history had shaped how Israelis, the Diaspora, and the West in general 
understood Israel’s foundation, and determined policy towards ‘Arabs’ in general and 
Palestinians in particular to this very day. 
The revolution in Israeli historiography and academia was occasioned by both 
national and transnational processes. Nationally, the social trauma of the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War
 15
, which saw an explosion of left and right-wing social movements, also helped foster 
an environment in which Israeli academics began to critique the veracity of ‘socialist and 
nationalist ideologies shaping the collectivist nature of the Zionist community’ (Likhovski, 
2010, p. 1). This endeavour was aided by the de-classification, after thirty years, of security 
and diplomatic documents in the national archives of Britain, the U.S. and Israel.  Thus 
beginning in 1978 a plethora of contemporary sources became available on the conduct of 
Israel in the 1948 war.  The revelations by these ‘New Historians’ ran counter to both the 
official history and the progressive, humanist, Israeli self-image. In one instance it came to 
light that in 1948 Lt. Co. Yitzak Rabin (the same Yitzak Rabin of the 1993 Oslo peace 
accords) gave the order that ‘[Arab] inhabitants of Lydda must be expelled quickly without 
attention to age’ (Morris, 2007, p. 11) The expulsions of fifty to sixty thousand Palestinians 
from Lydda and nearby Ramle in July 1948, accounted for one tenth of the Arab ‘exodus’ in 
what was now being called the ‘First Arab-Israeli War’. For some Israeli historians the forced 
removal of Palestinians was a deliberately planned ethnic cleansing of Palestine (see Pappé, 
2007). 
Many of the New Historians engaged purely in critique of the official historiography. 
Although possessed of new empirical sources this academic movement remained rooted in 
the accounts of elites and political history (Likhovski, 2010). Within the wider, transnational 
realm of Western academia, the ‘critical turn’ was having a profound theoretical and 
methodological effect in how knowledge was produced and used. The cultural turn emerged 
in Europe and the U.S. in the seventies as a challenge to positivist academia and instead 
placed the histories and social experiences of the non-elite at the centre of analysis. Works 
such as Hayden White’s Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe (1973), Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977), and Edward 
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Said’s Orientalism (Said, 1978) highlighted the nature and function of knowledge and its 
application as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Edward Said was particularly 
apposite to the old history and old historians of Zionism. Born in Jerusalem in 1935 to 
parents with Palestinian, Lebanese, Christian and American cultural identities, his work 
argued that the Western academic project of describing the Islamic Other was the 
handmaiden of imperialism. The search for and dissemination of the essences of ‘Arab 
society’ and the ‘Arab mind’ was political intellectualism, bent on the self-affirmation of 
superiority rather than objective study, and most damningly had been used to justify Western 
colonial projects (Said, 1978). 
The critical turn affected a profound change in the subject matters, methodologies and 
theoretical underpinnings of history and the social sciences that no Western academic 
department, Israel’s included, could ignore. In essence it became a transnational technology 
of knowledge production. Much of what became known as post-Zionist scholarship was 
carried out in the decades following 1978, coinciding with the First Lebanon War and the 
First Palestinian Intifada. These events themselves seriously shook public confidence in the 
country’s humanist self-image, of a small imperilled nation defending itself against an 
‘uncharitable, predatory world’ (Morris, 2007, p. 13). Scholarship moved from the critique of 
the foundational narrative to a critique of the contemporary social order and the ‘New 
Sociologists’ began to examine the internal tensions in the Zionist narrative. The study of 
Jewish unity and the sociality of Zionist in-gathering were replaced by the study of the state’s 
production and maintenance of difference. To some raised on the purity of hegemonic 
narratives the ‘New Histories’, of massacres and forced expulsion of Palestinians published 
in the 1980s and 90s, may have been shocking revelations but though many of their 
arguments have become mainstream in academia they stir little controversy in society at 
large. Certainly this has legitimised the Palestinian Nakba narrative across many borders but 
it did little to halt the colonial expansion in the West Bank, which accelerated greatly during 
this period. Its impact on Israeli society is thus debatable and Penslar argues that outside of 
academia many more have responded by ‘justifying Israeli aggression and brutality as 
unfortunate but necessary measures in an endless war against and unappeasable foe’ (Penslar, 
2012, p. 156). Indeed, in the new millennium with a succession of governments more right-
wing than the last it may be argued that neo-Zionism is now in the ascendancy. 
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Finding the Nation in Dissent 
Along with the continuing activities of the radical left and the emergence of the post-
Zionist critique, this period saw a huge rise in ‘consensual’ dissent, a position which 
supported the general Zionist project while objecting to specific events or practices. These 
movements, driven largely by the middle-class Ashkenazim and closely associated with the 
military, while assiduously Zionist in their core convictions began questioning the practices 
of settlement in the Occupied Territories and the legitimacy of warfare as Israel’s only chance 
for peace. Two movements in particular, Shalom Achshav (Peace Now) and Yesh Gvul (There 
is a Limit), seized upon the configuration of the Jewish State as a democratic entity to frame 
their narrative and have had a long term-impact on mainstream left-Zionist mobilization in 
Israel.  
Shalom Achshav was founded in March 1978 by the publication of an open letter to 
Prime Minister Begin calling upon him to reverse his “Greater Israel” settlement policy and 
finalize a peace treaty with Egypt. Significantly the letter was drafted and signed by 348 
reserve officers and soldiers from Israeli army combat units
16
. With the signing of the Camp 
David Peace Accords in September 1979 came the sense that public mobilization in the name 
of peace ‘could and would dictate the course of history’ (Peace Now, 1978). Shalom Achshav 
became Israel’s largest peace movement and its mainstream appeal enabled it to mobilize 
previously unseen numbers of Israeli-Jews for political protest. The invasion of Lebanon in 
1982, seen by many as Israel’s first ‘war of choice’ provided another cause for membership 
mobilization. Tens, even hundreds of thousands marched under its banner. The notion of 
‘mainstream’ is of course problematic. Shalom Achshav has always been careful to 
disassociate itself from the radical left, and its instigators, policy shapers and support base has 
always been predominantly secular, male, well-educated, Ashkenazi soldier-citizens who had 
traditionally voted Labour (Zemlinskaya, 2004).  
This self-perception of being the mainstream conflicts with the changes that had 
occurred in the political realm. The Labour party and its Ashkenazi constituency had been 
out-voted by an emergent Mizrahi political collectivity, and its ‘pragmatic’ minimalist 
approach to settlement replaced by the overt maximalism of Likud’s Greater Israel 
movement. The left-Zionists self-perception as mainstream Israel was ‘structural nostalgia’ - 
a yearning for a fictitious Edenic past when the purity of the nation was unpolluted by the 
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 Whilst military conscription is also mandatory for female (non-Palestinian) citizens of 
Israel, combat positions were not available to women until the late 2000 with the 
establishment of the Caracal Battalion.  
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corrupted institutions of the state (Herzfeld, 1997). This imagining, that ‘their’ pre-1967 
Zionism differed from the post-1967, remains the core dilemma of ‘mainstream’ Ashkenazi 
left-Zionists as it cannot be reconciled with the national imaginings of the radical left, 
Mizrahi collective memory, Palestinian experience, or the visions of Israel seen from Jewish 
Orthodoxy or the  Russian immigrants of the 1990s.  
Yesh Gvul which emerged in direct opposition to the 1982 First Lebanon War was 
also a patriotic movement driven by and directed towards this male Ashkenazi demographic. 
Their mode of activism, selective conscientious objection, was more radical than Shalom 
Achshav’s and struck at the heart of Israel’s civil-militarism contract. By refusing to 
acknowledge the state’s monopoly to define a ‘just war’ and by utilizing symbolic meanings 
and codes from the state’s own militarist and nationalist discourses of citizenship, the 
movement successfully politicized and mobilized conscientious objection for the first time in 
the state’s history (Helman, 1999). Though portrayed as radicals at the time this movement 
now holds a place of honour in Israeli protest movements (ILA, 2011f) and has provided 
organizational experience, financial and moral capital to subsequent generations of 
conscientious objectors (Helman, 1999; Zemlinskaya, 2004). However, the effectiveness of 
appealing to ‘mainstream’ European Enlightenment morality as the guiding principle for the 
Israeli citizen-soldier would be offset by the decline of the Ashkenazi recruitment to combat 
units as they sought out alternative status markers in wealth and high-tech industry. This 
move was matched by a rise in Mizrahi, Russian and Religious men opting for the lucrative 
military path to social mobility in Israel (Shafir & Peled, 2002).  
Both these organizations saw themselves as Zionist at their core, framing their 
critique in terms of the 1967 occupation, and not by the canons of exclusivity that physically 
and discursively removed the Palestinians from Israel narrative prior to 1967. Nonetheless 
they have both been serious partners in many of the ad hoc peace coalitions formed over the 
years and while often vilified, or worse politically ignored, the symbolic capital they inherit 
from their privileged position in society continues to legitimate the post-1967 de-colonization 
discourse. Such massive Israeli de-colonization mobilization completely disappeared after the 
assassination of Rabin, the collapse of the Oslo accords and the brutality of the second Al-
Aqsa Intifada at the end of the twentieth century. However, their major contributions, such as 
Shalom Achshav’s “two states for two peoples” have been formally incorporated into official 
government policy, and more significantly as the prevalent public framing of future peace 
and prosperity (Hermann, 2009). 
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1987-1997: Natural Growth & the Dissent of Others  
Transmigrant Strains 
Two separate transmigrant groups were soon to challange on the hegemonic structures 
that underpinned notions of legitimacy in the settlement programs. The first were the 
Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, who had become a transnational ‘trapped minority’ 
when the Israeli state ‘migrated’ its administrative sphere after the 1967 war (Rabinowitz, 
2000, 2001). The status of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories was determined 
by a contradiction in the settlement plans inherent in the desire to annex territory without 
making its residents citizens of Israel (Halper, 2008; Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 184). They 
remain the non-citizens of Israel. Though there had been various Palestinian agents and 
strategies countering the legitimacy of Israeli narratives and colonialisation, Israel had for 
twenty years largely been ‘able to maintain a low-cost, low-causality occupation’ (Shafir & 
Peled, 2002, p. 197). What ‘Arab’ violence there was in the territories between 1979 and 
1984 had been ‘instrumental in dramatising the “viciousness” of the Palestinians’ (Sprinzak, 
1993, p. 126) according them the status of foreign aggressors in the midst of the community, 
a security threat previously reserved for the surrounding Arab states. The First Palestinian 
Intifada which began in late 1987 was dissent on a far greater scale than previously 
encountered in the occupation. Prior to this the settlements had been economically beneficial 
to Israel. The availability of low-cost labour from the Palestinians had reduced production 
costs for Israeli business and the rebellion of these ‘labourers’, who were presumed to be 
grateful for the economic boom brought about by ‘benign occupation’, created a huge drain 
on state finances. The First Intifada is now recognised as being as extraordinary mobilization 
of grassroots civil disobedience rooted in popular committees, often steered by women and 
organizing economic boycotts, tax resistance, strikes and massive demonstrations (see Alimi, 
2006; Jean-Klein, 2000, 2003; King, 2007; Qumsiyeh, 2011). The protests were met not by 
police but by the Israeli military that monitored and maintained the occupation. Images of 
Palestinian youth’s throwing stones at tanks became iconic across the globe. Yitzak Rabin, 
the Defence Minister in 1987, is said to have ‘ordered’ his troops to ‘break the bones’ of 
Palestinians who confronted his tanks with these stones. Alongside such beatings and live 
fire, there was the collective punishment of house demolitions, prolonged curfews, school 
and university closures, curtailed social services, the banning of media and civil 
organisations, and tens of thousands of agricultural trees were uprooted and crops destroyed 
(UN, 2008, pp. 27–30).  
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The supranational ‘arbiter of right-and-wrong’, the UN Security Council, issued 
several resolutions severely chastising the occupation authorities which ‘strongly deplored 
those policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, which violate the human rights of 
the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and in particular...the killing and wounding 
of defenceless Palestinian civilians’ (UNSC, 1987 art.1). At around this time, Yasser Arafat 
read out the Palestinian Declaration of Independence at the closing session of the 19th 
Palestinian National Council in Algiers on 15th November 1988. In doing so he assumed the 
title of ‘President of Palestine’. In the violence of this period over 1,000 Palestinians and 
more than 100 Israeli civilians and 60 Israeli security forces personnel were killed (B’Tselem, 
2014). By the early nineties the ongoing executions of by now over 800 Palestinians 
‘collaborators’ by Palestinians and the widespread celebration as Iraqi Scud missiles overflew 
the West Bank en route to Tel Aviv in 1991, helped embolden the right-wing’s view that the 
‘Arabs’ were not to be trusted and that conceding land for peace was out of the question 
(HRW, 2001, p. 49; Sprinzak, 1993). Thus Palestinian dissent to the occupation was used to 
entrench the legitimacy of the settlements in terms of security. Nonetheless, the Intifada was 
a global media event which broadcast the image of Palestinian people and peoplehood across 
the world and regardless of where sympathies lay; it was even less possible to claim they did 
not exist.  
By 1991 an influx of migrants from states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), which 
began with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, had profoundly impacted on Israeli 
demographics. These immigrants were not Zionists in the classic mould, motivated by a 
desire to settle the land of Israel, and it has been argued that many would have opted to 
migrate elsewhere given the opportunity (Bar On, 1993). Nonetheless, what had been a 
steady stream of people in 1989 was a swelled by 1990 and the state had to accommodate 
250,000 newly arrived immigrants from the FSU. Suddenly there was a massive housing 
shortage and in June 1990 Ariel Sharon was appointed Housing Minister with a clear 
mandate to eliminate this shortage. The response was more ideologically than socio-
economically motivated, and the distribution of building programs was directed to peripheral 
locations in Israel mainly the Negev, Galilee regions, Jerusalem and the West Bank (Landau, 
1993). As a result the building of ‘new settlements, roads and infrastructure was tripled, even 
quadrupled. The scope and intensity of the building was unprecedented’ (Sprinzak, 1993, p. 
135). This tactic did not however engender the ‘Russian Israelis' to the maximalist narrative 
and by late 1991 unemployment was the most pressing issue for the new immigrants (ibid). 
The channelling of funds to building projects in the territories rather than absorption projects 
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would not win votes for Likud in the 1992 election. The Labour party, led by Yitzak Rabin, 
pushed Likud out of power for the first time in fifteen years. The Mizrahi constituency, so 
crucial in the 1977 empowerment of the maximalist’s electoral mandate, also deserted Likud 
in the 1992 election (ibid). Though often seen as a vote for the ‘peace-camp’ to a large degree 
Labour rode to power on a wave of socio-economic discontent caused by the economic strain 
of migrant absorption (Landau, 1993). 
Womanhood and Solidarity 
This First Intifada period also saw the emergence of a new Israeli de-colonization 
critique led not by the masculine military-nationalism of concerned combat soldiers, but by 
women employing a discourse which stressed a universal pacifist and empathic femininity. In 
1988 female members of Dai LaKibush
17
 (itself an Intifada solidarity movement) instigated a 
weekly silent vigil in Jerusalem. Calling itself Women in Black
18
 the movement dedicated the 
vigil to International Women's Day (ILA, 2011e). More than 24 organizations across the 
globe would eventually respond to their call for solidarity vigils in Europe, North America 
and South America. Women in Black (WIB) has become an international protest movement 
and symbol of feminist dissent to Palestinian oppression and the non-violent fight for peace. 
WIB’s cooperation with an emphasis on the plight of Palestinian women led to the formation 
of Reshet
19
 at a good-will conference of Israeli and Palestinian women in Brussels in 1989. A 
joint declaration, framed through the discourses of nationalism and internationalism, the 
women agreed ‘to share the land according to [UN] resolutions 181 and 242, based on the 
principle of territorial separation’ (Reshet, 1990). The relationship between the women’s 
alignment with the Palestinian cause and critique of chauvinistic citizenship discourses in 
Israel was part of the wider spectrum of emergent dissent in Israeli society at this time, one 
driven by transnational feminist discourses (Halperin-Kaddari & Yadgar, 2010; Helman & 
Rapoport, 1997). These women’s movements and their counterparts in the territories actively 
transgressed the territorial limitations of the state by adopting a unifying conceptualisation of 
womanhood produced (and critiqued) by the traditions and activism of Western feminism. 
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The period was characterised by a discourse of solidarity, not just between the Israeli and 
Palestinian women’s groups but across a spectrum of grassroots movements.   
Grassroots activism of this period was eclipsed by two major events, the First Gulf 
War of 1990 and the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993.  In the first case, official and popular 
Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein’s launching of over forty Scud missiles at Israel 
reinforced the archetype of the ‘Arab’ hell-bent on the destruction of Jewish State, 
undermining the legitimacy of Israeli decolonization efforts. Secondly, the Oslo accords 
transferred onus of normalising Palestinian self-determination and Israeli de-colonization 
from the dissenting masses of the Intifada and onto the political and bureaucratic elites of the 
Israeli and Palestinian state.  
The Ontological Argument
20
 
Discourses of national sovereignty dominated the Labour tenure under Rabin. Two 
States for Two Peoples. Many factors helped initiate the peace process which led to the 
signing of the Declaration of Principles (1993) and the Interim Agreement on the West Bank 
and Gaza (1995) between Israel and the newly established Palestinian Authority (PA). In 
addition to the tensions resulting from intensive expropriations for settlement and the 
Intifada’s success in attracting public support worldwide through global media coverage, 
geo-politically the US administration felt empowered to promote its ‘New World Order’ after 
its victory in the Cold War. One part of that new order was the promotion of economic 
deregulation and liberalisation, the opening up of markets for free-trade and capital mobility. 
For its entire history the Yishuv and Israel have been dependant on unilateral capital transfers 
from abroad in order to ‘aid the absorption of propertyless [sic] immigrants, maintain a 
European standard of living, and foot military bills’ (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 238). However, 
due partially to regional conflicts the level of corporate multinational investment in Israel was 
one of the lowest in the world, and potential foreign markets for Israeli goods were closed 
due to Arab boycott (ibid). The pressing need to expand the economy and absorb the Russian 
wave of immigration led the Israeli business community to move firmly into the peace camp 
and for the first time redefine peace issues as economic ones (ibid, p. 259). In this new world 
order the pragmatic minimalists of the Labour Party also came to power at a time when, 
having lost its Soviet patron, the PLO had also moved further towards a pragmatic solution 
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for its national aspirations. The prospect of the de-colonisation of the West Bank seemed a 
real possibility.  
One of Yitzak Shamir’s final acts before his Likud's defeat to Rabin’s Labour had 
been to approve 11,000 new homes which would house 50,000 settlers (Guyatt, 1998, p. 53). 
Despite having called for a settlement freeze during the election campaign Rabin approved 
the construction of these houses and exempted ‘greater Jerusalem’ from any freeze. Rabin 
explained that the construction contracts ‘had been signed by the previous government and 
would be hard to cancel’ (ibid). Indeed the freeze applied only to the establishment of entirely 
new settlements and not to the expansion of existing ones. Given that the Likud tenure had 
invested so heavily in establishing new settlements, the potential for expansion, or ‘natural 
growth’ within the existing infrastructure was huge. This form of ontological argument, that 
‘natural growth’ needed to be accommodated, would become a corner-stone of settlement 
legitimacy for the expansion of the status quo. Thus even though the 1996 Interim Agreement 
stipulated that ‘neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations’21, 
Rabin clarified his vision of ‘status’ in his speech ratifying the agreement to the Knesset. 
Territorial concession would not include; united Jerusalem, including the large settlements of 
Ma’ale Adumin to the east and Givat Ze’ev to the north, both of which lay outside the 
Jerusalem municipal boundary; the security corridor in the Jordan Valley; the satellite 
settlements along the 1967 border including (but not limited to) Gush Etzion, Efrat and 
Beitar; and settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria. This list included virtually all existing 
settlements in the West Bank, within which natural growth would need to be accommodated 
(ibid, pp.53-55). This period also saw the development of major road infrastructure servicing 
the settlements and by-passing Palestinian residential centres. Further land expropriation was 
carried out to realize this project (ibid, p. 31).  When Likud returned to power after Labour’s 
term of peace negotiations and ‘settlement freeze’, incoming Finance Minister Dan Meridor 
thanked Rabin and Peres ‘for having increased the number of Jews in Judea and Samaria by 
40% in the past four years’ (Meridor cited in ibid, p. 82).  
1997-Present day: After Peace & Transnational Agitation 
The years since have been marked by peace processes stalled and failed and by excessive and 
violent death. While no grandiose settlement plans were published, ‘natural growth’ of 
                                                 
21
  Article 31:7 
37 
 
existing settlement continued apace. In 1998 Likud's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
described the approach thus: ‘Our policy is to grow and expand...This issue must be 
coordinated behind closed doors with the army and not in front of the media’ (Philo & Berry, 
2004, p. 81). By 1999 the settler population in the West Bank overtook that of East Jerusalem 
for the first time. In the next ten years to 2009 the settler population of East Jerusalem grew 
13%, while ‘natural growth’ in the West Bank saw the population increase by over 68%. 
Since 2003, additional land in the West Bank has been appropriated for the construction of 
the separation barrier, a process which continues under the auspices of national security. The 
death of Yasser Arafat and a violent schism also broke the Palestinian political realm in two, 
between Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the PA in the West Bank. This schism was enabled and 
spatially accentuated by Israel's first de-colonization since the Camp David Accords when 
Ariel Sharon unilaterally removed over eight thousand settlers from Gaza in 2005. The lack 
of IDF presence in the Strip allowed Hamas to violently wrest control of the region from the 
PA in 2007. Subsequently severe restrictions on movement in and out of Gaza and the 
recurrent use of violent coercion there have all but isolated Gaza from the West Bank. 
Migration and the Israeli Right 
Since the beginning of this period the two veteran Israeli narratives of the Likud and 
Labour parties have had to accommodate the polyvocal expressions of politically and socially 
maturing migrant populations who now commanded particularist mandates, both in coalition 
government and social movements. Three of these groups represented significant sociological 
developments in the deepening of political fragmentation and instability in Israeli society 
(Shafir & Peled, 2002). Firstly a large constituency of the Mizrahi population has coalesced 
around the religio-political party Shas, who in 1996 became the third largest party in the 
Knesset and has regularly acquired ministerial portfolios in subsequent elections, including 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Housing and Construction up until 2011. This latter 
portfolio has a huge influence in the construction of settlements. Shas’s stance on the 
settlements was ambiguous. Its spiritual leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef on several occasions 
justified the return of territories. His halachic
22
 justifications have been based not on 
Palestinians’ right to national self-determination, or the moral dangers posed to Israel by 
continued occupation, but, instead, on ‘quietism’. This is a traditional Jewish notion that 
emerged in the Diaspora whereby ‘one should not provoke foreigners and thus endanger 
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Jewish lives’ (Yuchtman-Yaar & Hermann, 2000, p. 36). However, in a 2010 sermon Rabbi 
Yosef also preached that ‘Abu Mazen and all these evil people should perish from this 
world…God should strike them with a plague, them and these Palestinians’ (Haaretz, 2010). 
The party’s main concern was however to establish a nationwide welfare and educational 
network for Orthodox Mizrahi, reflecting the major concerns of its sub-altern constituency 
(Davis & Robinson, 2009). With the death of Rabbi Yosef in late 2013 the party’s future 
influence is uncertain and while Shas may have once held promise of a more ‘dovish’ 
religious nationalism its time in power was not marked by rapprochement.  
The second group are the immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU), who by 
2003 numbered about one million – one sixth of the Israeli population (excluding the four 
million Palestinians in the occupied territories). Though the Israeli ‘Russian’ community is 
not a single unit, but rather is politically and socially diverse, its sheer size has made it a 
potent political force since the migration wave began in the 1990s (Khanin, 2004). One 
political party, Yisrael Beytenu
23
, has emerged as a significant actor in the production of 
political discourse and two thirds of its 2009 electoral mandate came from ‘Russian speakers’ 
(Khanin, 2010). Formed in 1999 ‘as a national movement with the clear vision to follow in 
the brave path of Zev Jabotinsky, [the party] fulfills the three cardinal principles of Zionism: 
Aliyah (immigration), settlement, and defense of our homeland’ (Yisrael Beytenu, 2011). In 
2009 it became the third largest party in the Knesset and in 2013 ran on a joint ticket with 
Likud. The Likud-Yisrael Beytenu alliance emerged as the largest Knesset faction and the 
main party in the governing coalition. Yisrael Beytenu is overtly maximalist and forms part of 
a ‘new right’ or neo-Zionism movement that emerged in the post-Oslo period. Its vision of 
the West bank settlements is also one of permanence and the territorial concessions proposed 
by its leader Avigdor Lieberman, involve the transfer of Israeli Arab population centres in the 
Galilee and Wadi Ara regions of Israeli proper in return for the land appropriated for 
settlements. According to Lieberman ‘we need to create true political division between Arabs 
and Jews, with each enjoying self-determination […] Therefore, for a lasting and fair 
solution, there needs to be an exchange of populated territories to create two largely 
homogeneous states, one Jewish Israeli and the other Arab Palestinian’ (Lieberman, 2010). I 
have found no indication the Lieberman has asked these Palestinian citizens of Israel – one 
fifth of Israel’s population – whether or not they wish to swap countries. 
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The third group are the settlers themselves who, having migrated to the West Bank 
over a period of forty years, now have an young ‘indigenous’ population raised and 
socialized in the semi-autonomous, educational and economic institutions of the settlements 
(Weiss, 2010). Two consequences of the normalizing tendencies of growing up in the 
settlements have been observed; self-interested pragmatism and radicalization. In the first 
case, studies have found that 59.5% of second-generation settlers ‘choose to remain there 
[…] for good quality of life for themselves and their families’ (ibid, p.21). Weiss attributes 
this to neo-liberal economic management which, having reduced material security through 
the attenuation of  ‘state-sponsored safety nets [...] leads many a young family to live near 
parents who can help out, in the West Bank or otherwise’ (ibid). The second tendency, 
embodied in the ‘Hilltop Youth’ who establish unauthorised ramshackle outpost settlements 
far from the state sponsored communities, have become the public face of the settlement 
movement in the international media. In doing so they lay claim to the pioneering practices of 
the Gush Emunim movement of their parents’ generation who took matters into their own 
hand while the minimalist governments of the early seventies dithered. The legitimacy of 
their actions, heavily influenced by the rabbinical educational institutions of the West Bank 
and the experience of their own upbringing as indigenous settlers, is heavily based on biblical 
history and messianic worldviews. Little credence is given to the appearance of legality, 
indeed the movement ‘abounds in spiritualist, anti-establishment rhetoric’ (ibid: 29). 
Illegality is not confined to constructing outposts without a permit and for the past decade 
masked settlers have taken to physically attacking Palestinians and destroying their crops. 
Ta’ayush24 an NGO of Jewish Israeli and Palestinian volunteers, dedicates a great deal of its 
efforts to accompanying Palestinians in the West Bank as the farmers tend their lands or 
children walk to school. They too are often attacked, and usually in the presence of the IDF 
who are tasked with protecting the settlements (Taayush, 2014).  
The settler discourse currently has two high profile social expressions, Tag Mahir and 
HaBeit HaYuhudi. Tag Mahir, meaning Price Tag, emerged subsequent to the 2005 
decolonization of Gaza and is expressed as ‘retributive’ vandalism and violence against 
actions perceived to threaten or inhibit the settlement enterprise. In practice this has led to the 
vandalising of Christian Monasteries and Muslim cemeteries in Jerusalem, the torching of a 
number of Mosques around Israel, attacks on IDF bases and vehicles in the West Bank and 
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spray painting a slide in my children’s’ playground. This last incident, in which Tag Mahir 
and Kahane Zadak was written on a yellow slide with black aerosol spray paint, occurred in a 
remote Jewish and quite middle-class suburb of West Jerusalem. It illustrates how deeply the 
discourse has penetrated social awareness, so that (quite probably) bored teenagers adopt it in 
textual form and inscribe it upon forums far from its original intentional object. However, 
such atomised sympathy in the social discourse also facilitates a more coordinated and more 
sinister (un)civil society phenomenon. The text Kahane Zadak, meaning ‘Kahane was Right’, 
is commonly scrawled in Price Tag attacks and refer to Rabbi Meir Kahane whose Kach 
party was designated a terrorist organization by the Israeli state in 1994. The ‘folk-heroes’ 
Kahanist ideology include Yoel Lerner of the Jewish Underground who attempted to blow up 
the Dome of the Rock in 1982 and Dr. Baruach Goldstein who killed 29 in a Hebron mosque 
in 1994, wounding 125 others (Harel, 2008; Harel, Hovel, & Khoury, 2014). A second 
expression of settler society is the emergence of the HaBeit HaYehdi
25
, which though 
nominally a national-religious party now utilizes a strong settler discourse. Its leader Naftali 
Bennett was chair of the Yesha Council, which represents and coordinates the settlement 
communities of Judea, Samaria and Gaza – and is a successor organization to Gush Emunim. 
In 2013 Bennett and two other party members became government ministers in the Likud 
Yisrael Beytenu government. Bennett proposes to annex Area C as part of a program for 
‘managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ (Bennett, 2010). 
Multiple Imaginings in Transnational Realm 
Mainstream Israeli peace movements, Shalom Achshav in particular, became smaller 
and less vocal in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Hermann, 2009). A second and brutally 
violent Al-Aqsa Intifada began in 2000 whose international image was not the stone throwing 
youth but the suicide bombings of commuter buses. This killed over one thousand Israelis 
and three thousand Palestinians in five years sowing fear and rage and resulted in a further 
deterioration of life for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Reflecting on this period 
Fatah leader Dr. Sufian Abu Zaida asked: ‘Show me one achievement of [the second] 
intifada. We were afflicted by all the possible disasters - the separation fence, the 
checkpoints, the expansion of the settlements, the split in the Palestinian people. I'm trying to 
think of a benefit we received from this campaign and am unable to do so’ (Harel & 
Issacharoff, 2010). The collapse of the political process and the increase in military 
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intervention saw a new generation of Israeli combat soldiers experience the transition from 
civilian to military sociality, allowing them to contrast the hegemonic narrative with the lived 
experience of the Palestinians they encountered. For some the contrast was untenable and led 
to the mobilization of several Israeli-Jewish dissenter movements. 
Formed in 1998 by female activists Profil Hadash
26
 defines itself as a movement for 
‘the civilizing of Israeli society’. Its ideological orientation challenged the republican 
discourse which elevated and awarded military service and questioned the impact of 
militaristic culture on various aspects of social life (Zemlinskaya, 2004). Shministim, 
conceived of as an Israeli youth refusal movement emerged out of the publication of the 
Shministim Letter in the summer of 2001, signed by 62 high-school seniors. They declared 
their protest against Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, and their refusal to take part in 
oppression of the Palestinian people. The group consisted of youth from very different 
ideological backgrounds but some of the core activists were the children of refusers from the 
Lebanon War whose fathers were among the founders of Yesh Gvul (ibid). In 2002 fifty 
reserve combat officers and soldiers of the IDF published the Combatants’ Letter in which 
they contended that the commands issued to them in the Occupied Territories  ‘destroy all the 
values that we were raised upon’  and that the occupation had led to  ‘the loss of IDF’s 
human character and the corruption of the entire Israeli society’ (CTR, 2002). This group, 
which called themselves Ometz LeSarev,
27
 mobilized a selective conscientious objection 
movement similar to Yesh Gvul. This was not though a pacifist movement and the soldiers 
remained committed to serving in the IDF, just not in the occupied territories. With the 
Second Intifada raging there was also a dramatic rise in Israeli antagonism towards left-wing 
movements at this time, and these conscientious objectors were often vilified. Internationally 
however public opinion, including sections of the U.S. diaspora, was generally more 
sympathetic to their causes (Hermann, 2009).  
Driven by the media images of the Intifada, the renaissance of the universal human 
rights discourses, and the ability to produce, disseminate and coordinate alternative 
representations through the Internet, the transnational nature of decolonization discourses 
amplified in this period. In 2001 the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) was founded 
by a small group of primarily Palestinian and Israeli activists to support and strengthen non-
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violent popular resistance ‘by providing the Palestinian people with two resources, 
international solidarity and an international voice’ (ISM, 2011). In 2005 the Occupied 
Palestine and Syrian Golan Heights Advocacy Initiative (OPGAI), an alliance of eleven 
Palestinian and Syrian-Arab civil society organizations was established during the 
preparation for the World Social Forum in Porte Alegre, Brazil. There they presented a call 
for a Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) program against Israel, based on the South 
African model (BDS, 2011). The success of the BDS movement which operates is such that 
the Israeli state now considers that this ‘delegitimization’ program constitutes an existential 
threat to the nation (Eldar, 2010, 2011; Ravid, 2011). Some in the U.S. Jewish diaspora are 
now leveraging the resources, organizational capacities and lobbying technologies of the U.S. 
political process through the organization J-Street. J-Street ‘gives political voice to 
mainstream American Jews and other supporters of Israel who, informed by their progressive 
and Jewish values, believe that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
essential to Israel’s survival as the national home of the Jewish people and as a vibrant 
democracy’ (J-Street, 2011). Alongside the likes of Jewish Voices for Peace (JVFP) and Jews 
for Justice for Palestinians (JfJfP), J-Street is one of a spectrum of diaspora organizations 
across the West openly questioning and countering the legitimacy of the hegemonic 
maximalist narrative being produced in Israel (Landy, 2011). Such organizations are often 
opposed and sometimes denounced by veteran ‘pro-Israel’ U.S. diaspora organizations such 
as campus based Hillel, which aims to inspire Jewish students ‘to make an enduring 
commitment to Jewish life, learning and Israel’ (Hillel, 2104) and the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC). These latter ‘pro-Israel’ organizations are key transnational 
agents in the Israel state’s Hasbara program (Molad, 2012). Meanwhile, particularly since 
the Oslo accords, the occupied Palestinian territories have become a major centre for the 
global Human Rights industry. Relatively well funded and transnationally constituted 
agencies such as OCHA, OCHCR, UNSCO, UNTSO, UNWRA, UNOPS, UNICEF, ICRC, 
DCI, WorldVision and CARE are just a few of the localised expressions of the transnational 
third sector (Allen, 2013)
28
. The contestation in the transnational realm over how Israel 
should be imagined now includes terms such as ‘vibrant democracy’, ‘high-tech innovator’, 
‘threatened’, ‘justified’, ‘aggressor’, ‘occupier’, ‘coloniser’ and ‘apartheid’. These phrases 
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are not used in one voice but in polyvocal contestation of meta-narratives on nationalism, 
law, rights, justice and varied potential resolutions. 
Resistance in Local Fields 
One of the most persistent and transnationally manifest practices of decolonization 
over the last decade has been the local village protests organised by various Popular 
Committees. These protests began with the construction of the separation barrier in 2003-4, 
which both expropriated village lands for the security ‘seam’ of the barrier itself and in many 
cases cut villagers off from their lands on the other side of the wall. The Popular Committee 
protests in villages like Budrus and Bil’in, Nil’in organised the villagers, mostly on Fridays or 
Saturdays, to march down to the construction sites, sometimes attempting to halt work or 
access land on the other side. According to international human rights law, it is the obligation 
of the occupying power to allow residents of territories to protest. However, under Israel’s 
martial law, in the Order Regarding Prohibition of  Incitement  and  Hostile  Propaganda  Actions 
(Order 101), a permit is required for assemblies or marches of ten people or more in which a 
speech is made on a political subject – or a speech which may be ‘construed as political’ 
(ACRI, 2011). In practice almost no permits are issued and the protests are met by the IDF 
and Israeli Border Police. Marchers are dispersed, arrested, injured and some have been 
killed. These protests soon attracted Israeli and international activists who came in 
‘solidarity’ with the Palestinian villagers effecting a particular form of transnational ‘political 
tourism’ (Gordon & Grietzer, 2013; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009). A plethora of anti-Zionist, left-
Zionist, conscientious objectors, pacifists, and human rights activists coalesce around a space 
where the complexity of Palestinian grassroots representation stand in confrontation to the 
Israeli hegemonic discourse embodied in the form of its citizen-soldiers. Solidarity in the face 
of Israeli occupation is now fully transnationalised and demonstrates how such networks 
constitute innovative forms of sociality and interaction (Juris, 2008b; Koensler & Papa, 
2011). The growth of this global movement over the last decade is, I believe, a remarkable 
achievement that is entirely indebted to grassroots activism of Palestinians in villages of the 
West Bank and neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem. For years they have endured violence, 
arrest and death week-after-week in their insistence to non-violently protest against their 
oppressor. In doing so they have maintained social spaces which root transnational fluidity 
and inspire and affect those who come in solidarity. These people, protests and social 
practices are the core of this ethnography and parts of their story are told in the chapters that 
follow. 
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Conclusion 
It is clear that colonisation and decolonisation discourses and practices have both adapted to 
and adopted from changing national, international and transnational contingencies sketched 
out in this chapter. The macro transnational processes are manifest as Appadurai’s (2008) 
ethnoscapes of collective identities, technoscapes of material and knowledge production, 
ideoscapes of statehood and dissent and the explosion of mediascapes which promote and 
problematise the fractures between the stated ideal and actual practice of the latter two 
competing social projects. There is also the growing engagement of global NGO presence at 
the local level and increasing networking through Global Civil Society. The unfolding 
contingencies and emergent powers within this complexity of authorities continue to shape 
the constraints and possibilities of international, national and local forms of socio-political 
expression. However, throughout its history the pattern of colonial settlement that served as 
the basis of state building in the Yishuv has never been discarded and the dispute between 
minimalist and maximalist forces concerned the extent and goals of expansion and not its 
desirability. What change there has been in the colonisation project is characterised by the 
perceived legitimacy of its various manifestations and the discourses used to validate the 
practices in the eyes of multiple observers. However, there is also continuity in the 
decolonisation project which has also validated its practices with reference to both historical 
precedent and the adoption of emergent supranational discourses on legality and morality. 
The political momentum in Israel for the past fifteen or more years has been with the 
maximalists. By its nature overt nationalism is perhaps less concerned with the opinion of 
authorities outside its borders but it would be foolish to ignore the isolationist tendencies of 
such a policy. Globally, the Hasbara ideal that ‘Israel is a Western democracy in the middle 
of the Middle East [which] stands for freedom, equal rights for all’ (WUJS, 2002 attrib.) is 
losing traction even among traditional supporters of Zionism. As of late 2014, the Kerry 
Initiative, the latest round of Two State negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority, came to naught in and the Palestinian Authority keeps threatening to turn to the 
supranational authorities of the U.N. and International Criminal Court to legitimise its 
decolonisation discourse. Civil society resistance, which has been defined by solidarity and 
justice discourses for the past decade or more, is increasingly promoting an apartheid framing 
of Israel’s socio-political policy, equating the state with the infamous and failed regime of 
South Africa. To point to the recent rightward trend in mainstream politics as a result of a 
dilution or aberration of the noble intentions of liberal Zionist pioneers to for Israel to be a 
‘light onto nations’ would be wrong. Europe’s imperial splendour at the turn of the last 
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millennium was fully applauded by many a national liberal and Jabotinsky’s maximalism was 
as legitimate when proposed as was the minimalist approach, which was founded more on 
pragmatism than on aspiration. Both schools of Zionism grew from the European proclivity 
of the 19
th
 century for turning up in a far-away land and claiming the right to possess and rule 
somewhere else. This is a core and undeniable dilemma for liberal-Zionists today. The right 
is also said to be resurgent in Europe post-9/11 and after the austerities imposed on national 
tax-payers to pay for the corporate bailouts after 2008. One cannot ignore the fact that in 
England the blatantly racist English Defence League (EDL) is a grassroots social movement 
or that UKIP is winning by-elections. Such resurgence of the right in Europe never goes 
unmentioned by the Israeli press. There is a two-fold irony here in that firstly Israeli flags are 
flown at EDL marches – because they all hate ‘Arabs’. Secondly and much more profoundly 
while a UKIP gaining a seat in Rochester & Strood in 2014 is seen as an uncomfortable 
warning in English politics, the Israeli executive branch has a Foreign Minister who proposes 
to disenfranchise citizens who are not Jewish and a Minister for Economics who wants to 
‘manage’ the conflict by unilaterally annexing seventy-odd percent of the West Bank. As 
Neils Bohr pointed out - making predictions is very difficult, especially about the future – but 
just as the creation of the State of Israel relied on concerted transnational action so too will 
the realisation of Palestinian national self-determination be brought about by the cooperation 
of peoples both near and far. 
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2. A Phenomenology of Affect in Dissent 
This chapter develops an understanding of affective subjective experience in a social plurality 
of relationships and situates the subject within political thought and action. This explicates 
the role of feeling in shaping the actions, thoughts and moralities in the complex relationships 
of solidarity activism’s participants. I begin by outlining a relational perspective on 
intentionality based on Damasio (2000) which combines the body and world in the 
production of mind and subjectivity. This is followed by a more extensive discussion of 
Damasio’s understanding of emotion as a form of ‘wordless knowledge’ and Prinz’s (2007) 
positioning of affect at the core of moral judgment. This highlights the feedback nature of 
affect which is filtered and interpreted through an equally embodied lifeworld, a term I 
borrow from Husserl to describe the acculturated dimension of being (Husserl, 1936). I shall 
thus define intentionality as a fully embodied affective feedback experience, cascading into 
awareness through lower and higher consciousness of the equally embodied interpretive 
lifeworld. Expanding on the acculturated lifeworld I turn to Interactional Ritualism and 
Dramaturgical affect theories to describe the formation of affective loyalties, the long-
nurtured dispositions by which we come to feel to belong to families and nations. The 
discussion concludes with Gould’s (2004, 2009) observation that these dispositions, though 
deeply embedded in our lifeworld, are malleable and subject to change, a process which is 
crucial to understanding the emergence of dissent and political action. Though it is important 
to understand how these various dimensions of affect all contribute to a total experience, one 
that is at once both personal and social, it was through ethnographic fieldwork that I came to 
understand the degree of subtlety and sophistication of affective processes. Political protest is 
certainly infused with passion but the emotions of Weirdness, Wrongness and Love which I 
turn to in this thesis, contain degrees of ambiguity which are often felt as undercurrents and 
remain unexpressed in everyday exchanges. 
The second section turns to political action, thinking and judging in the works of 
Hannah Arendt (1958, 1971). Though not prominent in the canon of social movement theory, 
Arendt’s work has particular utility and relevance to the thesis at hand for a number of 
reasons. In the first instance Arendt also proceeds from the phenomenological perspective of 
subjectivity but firmly situates the intentional observer within the ‘plurality of the human 
condition’. It is from within and through this plurality that action, as the ‘potentiality in being 
together’ emerges as political power. The emergence of concerted political action is aided by 
the innate human capacity to think, so that the received conventions of the lifeworld fall 
subject to doubt. However, Arendt argues that doubt is all that thinking produces and so the 
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equally fundamental activity of judging is required so that understanding may emerge from 
within the condition of plurality. Judging is ‘the ability to see things not only from one's own 
point of view but from the perspective of all those who happen to be present’ (Arendt, 1968, 
p. 221). Secondly, and most significantly, the relevance of Arendt’s theories is supported by 
the fact that the participants in this ethnography were clearly acting, thinking and judging 
within the plurality of transnational dissent. This is the major contribution that the 
ethnographic experience brought to the theory detailed in this chapter. While the first section 
aims to present a coherent understanding of multiple dimensions of affect – experiential, 
cultural, discursive and so forth – Arendt’s work had to be brought into this thesis subsequent 
to fieldwork, so as to account for the political processes and practices that emerged in the 
field.  Nonetheless, two critical adjustments are made to this model. Firstly, action is not 
confined to the plurality of the public realm but may also be found in the equally plural 
private realm of intimate kith and kin. Secondly, Arendt’s rationalist perspective harshly 
delineates between body, mind and the soul where the ‘passions reside’. Whilst Arendt sees 
emotion as an impediment to the political activities, this thesis argues that acting, thinking 
and judging are enabled and aided by embodied processes. In concluding that the mind is of 
the body and that the soul is the feeling of mind I assert that thinking about and with our 
feelings can be more insightful than the ‘clarity’ of objective rational thought. 
To properly situate the development of this theoretical model, I must first outline my 
positionality as a researcher. This is important for transparency but also because my 
experiences as a solidarity activist and my personal feelings towards the socio-political 
situation, were both implicit in the forms and categories of affect that emerged through 
fieldwork.  In terms of experience of political activism prior to entering the field, I had almost 
none. Aside from some part-time participation, with Greenpeace and access rights with the 
Irish Mountaineering Council, I had almost never stood with a crowd of people demanding 
socio-political change or highlighting injustice. This stands in contrast to a style of 
ethnographic engagement, exemplified by anthropologists such as David Graeber and Jeffery 
Juris, who leverage their knowledge and expertise to assist and even help organise the social 
movement they are studying (Graeber, 2004; Juris, 2008a). In the methodology chapter that 
follows, I will discuss more fully the form of ethnographic knowledge produced by different 
levels of engagement, but here I wish to highlight how I felt entering the field as a novice 
activist; uncomfortable and alone. 
Most of the demonstrations I joined are weekly events, with a core group of attendees 
showing up time and again. The demonstrations I began with in Jerusalem were usually quiet 
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affairs and familiarity amongst core activists leads them to congregate in small groups, 
chatting intimately. Thus, while I was introduced to participants by individuals I had known 
previously, I often found myself alone and trying to look involved. This had two immediate 
consequences that helped shape the ethnography; it gave me time alone, to think about how I 
was feeling and it gave me an affinity with other newcomers, mostly international visitors.  
At protests like Sheikh Jarrah and Women in Black, I would usually take up one of 
the placards provided for the event and stand quietly, holding the sign for display at the side 
of the road. I found this quite uncomfortable. I felt foolish and somewhat fraudulent. I had 
not been driven to demonstrate by matters of conscience, I was been paid to be here. I also 
wondered about the efficacy of this form of protest, which had been going on for years whilst 
achieving little in terms of substantive change in Israeli policy. Though I was already fairly 
convinced that Israel’s intentions towards the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West 
Bank were cynical and exploitative, I was not a dynamic and driven champion for universal 
rights with inspirational ideas of how to move a campaign forward. I was sceptical, 
uncomfortable and quite inept. Standing there quietly at the side of a road holding a sign, 
affords one time to wonder at feelings, that might otherwise go unnoticed in more intense or 
violent circumstances. It was in the lonely doubt and discomfort of the hot sun (and in later 
reflection while I wrote up my fieldnotes) that I began to notice the ambiguous but definite 
presence of feelings of weirdness and wrongness. 
Being awkward and inexperienced also afforded me the opportunity to share and 
compare my uncertain feelings with other newcomers at protests. There was a regular 
turnover of international visitors and I found that many of them were also unsure of what to 
‘think’ about the complex situation they found themselves in. Even within a few weeks, I 
could recognise such newcomers, standing aside looking a little hesitant. I found these 
individuals or small groups easy to approach and more importantly, I could empathise with 
and discuss the subtle emotions that were a far cry from the passion and certainty often 
associated with (or expected from) protesters and protests. Beginning from this position and 
with the guidance of my participants, I learnt to become a solidarity activist and to understand 
some the complex emotions that shape that process. 
Quite aside from being paid to be an inept activist, I am a husband to a Jewish Israeli 
woman and father to our two young children. We all moved to Jerusalem in 2011, at the start 
of the fieldwork year. I had been regularly visiting the country since 2002, when my wife and 
I moved to Tel Aviv as newlyweds. There I met my wife’s cousin, who had just become one 
of the Sarvanim, a conscientious objector movement of reserve combat soldiers who refused 
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to serve in the occupied territories. This was in the middle of the random brutality of the 
Second Intifada and was my first introduction to Jewish Israeli political dissent. We became 
and remained close friends over the years, I met with many of his friends on the activist scene 
and from these Israelis I learned stories which ran counter to the mainstream Israeli narrative. 
However, the majority of my in-laws are middle-class, left-leaning individuals, who would 
have considered themselves part of that mainstream. At many an evening meal over the past 
decade, I have been privileged to hear their interpretations of unfolding events. These 
experiences and relationships, prior to my academic career, were fundamental in shaping my 
interest in Love and the intimate affects of dissent discussed in this thesis.  
More generally, by the time I began my doctorate, I had serious doubts as to the 
sincerity of the ‘security discourse’, which is often adopted by both centre-left Israelis and 
the international community, to legitimise the suppression and disenfranchisement of 
Palestinians. I was definitely opposed to the occupation, which in some way helped alleviate 
my discomfort with the practice of public protest.  
But I was not simply a foreign researcher with affine kin relations in the field. I was 
the father of two young boys who were to be raised as secular Jews in West Jerusalem. As a 
social scientist I was aware of how early the sense of belonging can formed. I had read Don 
Handelman’s (2004) Nationalism and the Israeli State, in which he states that acculturation to 
the Zionist mythology begins in kindergarten. I was also aware that, if things don’t change, 
my sons will someday face conscription into the Israeli Defence Forces. When, after about 
six months at pre-school, my two-year-old pointed to a flag and said in Hebrew hineh, deleg 
eretz Yisrael, I persuaded my wife to move the children out of the state pre-schools. The 
toddler had not just identified the ‘Israeli flag’, he had used the official (and semantically 
more sophisticated) term ‘Look, the flag of the Land of Israel’. From that point onwards the 
children attended ‘bi-lingual’ education institutions, first the nursery at the YMCA and then 
the Yad-b-Yad primary and secondary school. These are the two main institutions in the city 
where Jewish and Palestinian children learn together, using both Arabic and Hebrew, and 
which celebrate Christian, Judaic and Islamic religious festivals. For my ethnography, this 
brought me into contact with a sociality of dissent that extended beyond the network of the 
solidarity activists.  However, these admirable institutions are not perfect havens and I 
worried about how and when my children would be exposed to the conflict, one which I was 
engaging with on a daily basis. This moment came violently close in 2014, when my six-
year-old’s classroom was burnt down one Saturday night by Jewish extremists. I was relieved 
when he told me later, ‘you know, it wasn’t an accident – no, robbers did it’. I have genuine 
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fears about the growing level of intolerance and lack of compassion required to support 
contemporary Zionism, a fear which arises from my hopes for my children’s future. The 
following thesis is also framed by these feelings of hope and fear. 
A Phenomenological Framework 
At their core the various strands of phenomenology are concerned with ‘life as lived and 
human consciousness in all of its lived realities [...] an attention to the indeterminate and 
ambiguous character of everyday life’ (Desjarlais & Throop, 2011, p. 92). Intentionality, as a 
key concept in phenomenology,  is widely debated and understood but may be generally 
described as ‘the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties 
and states of affairs’ (Jacob, 2010). Here I expand this definition so as to understand ‘mind’ 
as an embodied product, ‘representation’ as a relationship, and that relationship to be 
culturally situated and interpreted through an equally embodied lifeworld.  
To begin with the emergence, formation and constraints of the intentional subject, 
Damasio (2000) contends that representation resides not in a disembodied mind but is 
inscribed upon the ‘theatre of the body’ in the form of the organism’s emotions. Secondly, he 
contends that representation is not about or of ‘things’ and ‘properties’ themselves but about 
the relationship between ‘things’ and the embodied subjective organism. As such, 
intentionality is not some innate property of mind as distinct from body nor of body as 
distinct from environment. Finally, this process of feeling our relationships to the world is not 
free-form but always what Heidegger referred to as ‘situated being’ (Heidegger, 1953). The 
intentional representation is potentially constrained by acculturated interpretations, ‘one’s 
submission to the prevailing or standard social definitions of the situation’ (Evens, 2008, p. 
54). Thus intentionality is a product of the acculturated human organism’s interaction with 
the world. This understanding is a fundamentally relational perspective, combing the body 
and world in the production of mind and subjectivity.  
Though Evens calls these standard social definitions a ‘socio-epistemological prison 
house’ (ibid), the human capacity to break out and transcend the constraints of a lifeworld is 
evidenced in the history of dissent, for if not slavery, patriarchy and violent coercion would 
still be widely regarded as the natural order of things. This capacity was also clearly evinced 
by many younger Israeli activists, some of whom had finished high school and entered the 
army with strongly nationalist outlooks, only to end up as anti-Zionist activists with 
Anarchists Against the Wall (AAtW) or the Boycott, Divest and Sanction (BDS) movement. 
The ambiguity inherent in intentionality is crucial for such transcendence and is a product of 
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both the limitations of the subjective gaze and the received structures of the lifeworld. In the 
first instance, the nature of potenital objects (and the potential nature of objects) in the 
intentional relationship is expansive. The objects of intentionality are not limited to the 
manifest or mentally recalled visual or auditory realms of wolves or thunder, but include the 
full sensual spectrum of experiences both banal and intense. While the alarming or the 
euphoric may be moments which we recall with intensity and point to as formative, the 
majority of lived experience relates to what Stewart calls the emergent creativity of ordinary 
things (Stewart, 2007, 2011). The ethnography of being a dissenter in West Jerusalem, where 
the greater portion of the weekly routine occurs far from protest performances, reinforced 
Stewart’s observations on the ordinary affects of daily life, as dimensions of community 
formation and practice discussed in the section on Wrongness. More generally, it is 
impossible for a temporally situated subject to experience the actual world in its entirety and 
to understand one’s self in the immediacy of the moment, experience is always subjective, 
incomplete and ambigious. In the words of Merleau-Ponty there is ‘the absolute certitude of 
the world in general, but not of anything in particular’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 347).  
Ambiguousness is also implied in Damasio’s model. In his opinion there is no 
evidence to suggest that we are consciously aware of all the embodied sensations at play in 
the theatre of the body, adding another degree of ambiguity alongside our limited ‘view’ of 
the moment. Below the horizon of conscious intentionality in which an object becomes 
salient to the subjective mind, there may be a wealth of sensorial engagements not attended to 
at a given moment in time or under certain circumstances may escape the constraints of a 
lifeworld which supresses the appearance of inconsistancies. In this thesis the section on 
Weirdness examines this capacity to escape the prison. It is important for our purposes to 
recognise that there is also ambiguity inherent in the hegemonic elements of the lifeworld. As 
ideals and abstract knowledge structures, they also produce a specific kind of ignorance in 
their inability to describe the fluid unfolding world of plurality in which we exist. However, 
that ambiguity works both ways and Herzfeld (1997) points to ‘social poetics’, the 
manipulation of normative codes and supposed cultural traits, as a way of maintaining the 
hegemonic order.  
With added affect 
Building upon the phenomenological framework outlined above I present here an 
understanding of affect not as distinct from cognition, mind or reason but as integral to their 
formation and functioning. Furthermore, I argue that affect is not a purely independent 
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subjective experience but rather, just as how we think and speak is shaped by discourse, how 
we feel and emote is also a highly acculturated sociological experience. Both the intentional 
experience and the lifeworld by which we order these experiences are fully embodied 
affective processes. I thus develop an understanding of affect as a continuous relational and 
recursive feedback process moving through levels of consciousness and knowledge which is 
intrinsic to body, mind and sociality. 
To do so I draw upon a number of authors whose work pertains to three of Jasper’s 
(2011) five categories of affect; reflex, moral and affective loyalties. I begin with Antonio 
Damasio’s neurological investigation into the emergence of consciousness through the 
embodied organism’s interaction with the world. The general reflex model of affect which  
Damasio expands on is known as the James-Lange theory. Independently proposed by 
American phenomenologist William James and Danish physican Carl Lange in the late 19th 
century, the basic premise is that physiological arousal instigates the experience of a specific 
emotion (James, 1884; Lange, 1887). The sequence is important here for it is not that 
emotions instigate physiological arousal so as to prepare us for some action (like running 
away), rather the body changes prior to such cognition or judgement and so tell us how to 
feel. For James, we do not cry because we are sad; we are sad because we are crying. Though 
by no means uncontested, contemporary refinements of the James-Lange theory ‘has been 
hard to disprove, and most modern anxiety researchers think that the ultimate answer lies in 
feedback loops between the brain and the body’ (George et al., 2002, p. S60). I then discuss 
the theories of Jesse Prinz who expands on the perceptual dimension of affect to propose that 
subjective moral judgments on the rightness or wrongness of actions are instantiated as 
affective processes (Prinz, 2007). The idea that something is wrong is central to dissent and 
moral shock and outrage have been highlighted by a number of authors as a compelling factor 
in mobilization. But following on from Prinz I argue that the embodied judgement that 
something is wrong also outlasts the intentional moment and subtly shapes how we think 
about complex issues.  
In Jasper’s categorisation the body of affective experiences is not however limited to 
these two so called reflex and moral emotions and to properly understand their underlying 
logic they must be situated within other embodied sensations - urges, moods and most 
significant to this thesis the affective loyalties felt towards families, friends and nations. As 
opposed to the intentional experiences of reflex and moral emotions, affective loyalties 
develop and operate over long timescales and are normally conceived as dispositions towards 
people and things and the feeling of belonging. I thus turn to a number of sociological 
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theories of emotion by which such loyalties are created and structured, most notably 
Interactional Ritualism and Dramaturgical theory (Durkheim, 1912a; Levy, 1973). These 
social processes constitute the affective dimension of a lifeworld and so shape subjective 
reflex and moral emotions. As such affect is tied to and supportive of culturally constructed 
epistemologies. We are though dealing with dissenters and in the case of the Israeli 
constituents in particular, raised on the tenets of Zionism, we must admit that such constraints 
are neither fixed nor insurmountable. To understand how the conflict between different 
affective loyalties may be managed and given new meaning in the intimate lives of 
dissenters, I turn finally to the work or Deborah Gould in which confusion emotions can be 
given new and productive meaning (Gould, 2004, 2009).  
Perception, affect and meaning 
Consciousness, according to Damasio, is ‘an entirely private, first person 
phenomenon which occurs as part of the private, first person process we call mind’ (Damasio, 
2000, p. 12). Its emergence ‘consists of constructing knowledge about two facts: that the 
[human] organism is involved in relating to some object, and that the object in the relation 
causes a change in the organism’ (ibid, p. 20). This is an inherently phenomenological 
perspective of the intentional subject situated in an unfolding world. Damasio distinguishes 
between three stages along a continuum of affective processes by which consciousness 
emerges: a state of emotion, a state of feeling and a state of feeling made conscious. Emotions 
are the organism’s patterned neural and chemical responses to the object which are 
responsible for changes in the ‘theatre of the body’, altering its internal milieu, visceral, 
vestibular and musculoskeletal systems. The neural devices which produce emotions occupy 
a fairly restricted ensemble of sub-cortical regions (white rather than the grey matter) and are 
part of a set of structures that both regulate and represent body states. The purpose of these 
representations of the organism and all of its internal states is to monitor and maintain the 
organism within the narrow environmental band in which the organism can survive. These 
representations are continuously mapped in ‘pulses’ in the organism’s brain as what Damasio 
calls the ‘proto-self’. The sensory and motor structures activated by the interaction of the 
organism with the object are also mapped on the proto-self. These two ‘first-order’ neural 
patterns are nonverbal representations or images in the mind, pertaining to the proto-self and 
the object. Consciousness in this model emerges when the maps pertaining to the object cause 
changes in the maps pertaining to the organism, these changes producing further ‘second-
order’ maps, images and representations. These second-order maps represent the relationship 
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of the object and organism, ‘a specific kind of wordless knowledge – that our organism has 
been changed by an object’ (ibid, p. 168). The mental images that describe the relationship 
are what Damasio calls feelings. We, the human organism, know we are conscious and feel 
we are in the act of knowing, for in relating to the world around us not only is our ‘proto-self’ 
changed by the emotion, we also feel that change which:  
 
‘arises in the re-representation of the nonconscious proto-self in the process of being 
modified within an account which establishes the cause of the modification … 
Knowing springs to life in the story’ (ibid, p. 172 orig. emph.) 
 
This perspective of emotion as a form of perception and always involving the apprehension 
(or recall) of an object, combined with the salience of that object as a form of appraisal is 
now widely applied in many disciplines. Emotions are a form of information processing and 
evaluation which is often faster than or prior to the operations of our conscious minds 
(Leventhal & Tomarken, 1986; Nussbaum, 2001; Prinz, 2004). However, emotions also call 
out to consciousness to request salience to a busy mind and affect must be understood as a 
cascading of relational, recursive formulations of feeling as doubling back on itself in 
constant reappraisal. Damasio calls this the feeling of the feeling and for Massumi affect is an 
emergent and autonomous ‘two-sided field’ of feedback of continuous nonconscious self-
reflection by which the human organism ‘attains the level of conscious reflection’ (Massumi, 
2002, p. 31).  
Affect is therefore not equated with emotion; rather it denotes the continual feedback 
emotional processes of embodied meaning-making in the intentional experience of life. It 
cannot be understood as distinct in itself or wholly distinguishable from cognition or other 
dichotomies of mind-body, conscious-unconscious, subject-object, interior-exterior, nature-
culture. Aside perhaps from deep sleep, meditative states, some psychotropic states or 
pathology, affect is an unceasing process of experience which flows across common 
categorical dichotomies. It must be understood merely as a starting-point in the exploration of 
experience which extends outwards before folding back in on itself,  as if on a Möbius strip 
or the ‘Ascending and Descending’ of Escher’s impossible stairwell. This is not to say that 
affects are meanings per se, rather they are embodied intensities which make thoughts and 
feelings possible (see Stewart, 2007). Moments in which affect’s wordless knowledge 
emerges from pre-conscious to the salience of the self - what Damasio calls the ‘hint half-
hinted’ - may be suppressed by the constraints of a lifeworld’s acculturated knowledge or 
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crowd of other signals we constantly produce. A world of wordless knowledge awaits below 
the surface of awareness. 
Before continuing it is important to highlight Damasio’s insight that human 
consciousness is not a monolith but occurs along a spectrum from simple to complex kinds. 
Core consciousness is its simplest kind and relates to the intentional immediacy of the now, 
that which has formed the discussion up to this point. ‘Core consciousness does not 
illuminate the future, and the only past it vaguely lets us glimpse is that which occurred in the 
instant just before’ (Damasio, 2000, p. 16). Similarly, the sense of self which emerges in this 
kind, is the ‘core self, a transient entity, ceaselessly re-created for each and every object with 
which the brain interacts’ (ibid, p. 17). Perceptual or reflex emotions emerge in core 
consciousness in these intentional moments. However, feelings like weirdness and wrongness 
would not exist nor have meaning without some referent to a past ‘normality’ and critical 
thinking is impossible without a future orientation. Such processes are only possible through 
extended consciousness and its corresponding autobiographical self which ‘places that person 
in individual historical time, richly aware of the lived past and of the anticipated future, and 
keenly cognizant of the world beside it’ (ibid, p. 16). Damasio asserts extended consciousness 
as being a complex biological phenomenon with many levels and grades evolving across the 
lifetime of the organism, dependant on conventional and working memory, possessed of 
identity, enhanced by language, and capable of reasoning. This evolving entity is what I refer 
to as the lifeworld. Though the lowly earthworm may elicit core consciousness it is only by 
cascading through the extended kind that human intentionality and its prodigious capacity for 
the abstractions of sociality emerge. 
Affect and moral judgment 
The James-Lange model focused on emotions as bodily states which inform cognitive 
and affective understanding of the subject’s relationship to the immanent (or absent) material 
object, such as the reflex fear of the wolf or sadness at the loss of a loved one. However, 
Jesse Prinz contends that it is a mistake to interpret the content of emotion as lacking in 
outward intentionality by representing the bodily states alone. Drawing on a wide range of 
studies his ‘embodied appraisal theory’ asserts that emotion and affect is also instantiated by, 
and represents judgements on, cultural abstracts such as flags or the adherence to or 
transgression of moral codes (Prinz, 2007).  Considering together the perceptual dimension of 
affect and the notable affective dimension of feeling that something is wrong or right, Prinz 
applies Dretske’s (1988) theory of general mental representation to emotional states. Dretske 
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states that any mental representation represents that which it has the function of reliably 
detecting. In this, mental representations of ‘red’ are made by the activation of devices with 
the function of detecting ‘red’ and so equally emotions, like fear or sadness, are instantiated 
by ‘that which it was set up to be set off by’ (Prinz, 2007, p. 61) – fear represents danger and 
sadness represents loss. Prinz further argues for the existence of embodied affective devices 
to represent rightness and wrongness as being essential to the sociality of human existence. 
As such, the so called moral emotions like anger, contempt, disgust or pride specifically 
represent the apprehension of an act where cultural moral precepts have been either 
transgressed of adhered to. The significance and influence of the affective dimension of 
moral appraisal in relation its codified and cognitive processes is evidenced in the 
phenomenon of ‘dumbfounding’, in which rational arguments justifying acts of moral 
transgression have little effect in swaying subjects’ sense that the act was wrong (Murphy, 
Haidt, & Bjorklund, 2000; Sneddon, 2007). Prinz’s observation that ‘people don’t usually 
revise their moral assessment when their reasons are debunked’ (Prinz, 2007, p. 31) is 
particularly relevant to this dissertation’s discussion of the role of Wrongness in the practice 
of transnational dissent. While dumfounding can act as an affective bulwark preserving a 
lifeworld perspective in the case of transnational dissent, where participants have already 
undergone at least a partial transformation, the underlying feeling that something is wrong 
overrules the varied and ‘reasonable’ discursive counter-arguments that attempt to mitigate 
oppression as just or necessary. 
Ambiguous feelings 
An innate ability to detect transgression and adherence to moral proscriptions does not 
imply the existence of a universal moral code. We are though moving now from the general 
process and towards specific affects. As such we must first attend to how specific feelings 
and emotions are linguistically labelled. There have been a great deal of cross-cultural studies 
on the subject of primary, secondary and tertiary emotions, most notably those stemming 
from the work of Paul Ekman (1972) and Robert Plutchick (1991). There have also been 
studies on the possibility that certain ‘types’ of moral emotion are widely elicited by 
violations of certain types of moral code. In the CAD Triad hypothesis contempt, anger and 
disgust are respectively aligned with transgressions of precepts of autonomy, community and 
divinity (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). 
However, this thesis does not relate to or attempt to address or distinguish between specific 
linguistic emotion concepts, such contempt or disgust or their Arabic/Hebrew equivalents. 
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Not only is this is a notoriously difficult task further complicated by the transnational 
research subject (see Wierzbicka, 1986, 2003) but essentialised definitions of emotions run 
contrary to the ambiguous, emergent and cascading nature of intentionality I employ. I shall 
discuss the problematics of the relationship of feeling and language more extensively in the 
methodology section, but in an effort to focus on the pre-linguistic dimension of affect, I 
follow Jesse Prinz’s lead by adopting Wittegenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblance’. In this, 
I group together emotions through ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and 
criss-crossing’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 66). Thus, my usage and understanding of Weirdness, 
Wrongness and even Love eschews the utility or necessity of applying folk or academic 
taxonomies to emotion and highlights how family resemblance exhibits ‘the lack of 
boundaries and the distance from exactness that characterize different uses of the same 
concept’ (Biletzki & Matar, 2014).  Secondly, though there may be a universal capacity to 
detect and experience wrongness or rightness, Prinz acknowledges that historical and 
ethnographic record show that morality is highly relativist social construct. What one feels to 
be wrong or right (or indeed weird) is entirely dependent on acculturation. Lifeworlds are 
therefore also constituted through and by emotion and so this discussion on affect concludes 
with the following discussion on how social practices produce the affective loyalties of 
belonging, dictate what emotions are felt and how they are expressed through dramaturgical 
codes, and how such constraints may be transcended in times of stress. 
Belonging & affective loyalty 
The focus up to this point has been on intentional experiences, filtered through 
acculturated interpretations. While I brought much of that theoretical knowledge with me to 
the field, the emphasis on lifeworld as an embodied construction is an inclusion demanded by 
the ethnographic experience. Given that it was fieldwork which produced important insights 
into this dimension affect, I shall go into more detail on the form and consequences of the 
embodied lifeworld in the methodology section to follow, particularly Pink’s notion of 
‘emplaced sociality’ and Ingold’s concept of meshwork (Ingold, 2011; Pink, 2008). What 
follows is a discussion of well established understandings of how social processes leverage 
and shape emotional experiences, to foster collective identity and shared affective meanings. 
Whilst these theories have been developed from observations of a variety of social 
interactions, I found that many of my participants went through similar social experiences, in 
the processes of becoming and being solidarity activists. The formation of the embodied 
lifeworld is a social experience and, as such whether one is becoming a nationalist or an 
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anarchist, one is subject to the constraints and proscriptions of the group’s particular framings 
of affect and the practices by which they enforce them.  
The role of emotion in producing collective identity has the longest pedigree in social 
sciences. Interactional Ritual theory derives from Durkheim's (1912a) observations of 
heightened emotions attendant in religious rituals in which a common focus of attention on a 
totem is orchestrated and practised by and for the group. Durkheim's analysis is that of an 
emerging sense of an external power ultimately directed at the collective's totems, which 
itself being a representation of the group and evoking ‘collective emotion’ becomes central to 
the generation of cohesion and identification (J. H. Turner & Stets, 2006, pp. 33–34). Such 
emotional processes are not limited to ‘primitive’ societies or a belief in transcendental 
worlds or beings. All nation-states adopt totemic symbols and orchestrate collective rituals 
for the purpose of cohesion and identification. Handelman's (2004) study of the practices in 
Israeli nationalism expands the concept of ritual to apply to any ‘public event’ in which 
Israel’s national mythology of destruction, sacrifice and redemption is told and re-told 
through a series of codified emotional triggers in events ranging from kindergarten parties to 
Independence Day celebrations. So impressed is Handelman by the extent and penetration of 
bureaucratic organisation of public ritual and emotion in Israel that he sees it as structuring 
and constituting a cosmology. Extending on this observation, Smadar Lavie contends that 
Israeli public ritual forms a divine cosmology that includes ‘rituals that must be enacted, 
symbols that must be heeded, and dictums from higher authority that must be followed 
without question’ (Lavie, 2014, p. 19). 
While there is certainly intentional affect for the subjective individual in attendance at 
public ritual, the notion of ‘collective emotion’ is problematic if it is assumed that the 
collective experiences the same emotion. Rather it must be understood that participants 
develop both ‘shared emotions (toward people, objects and ideas outside the group) and 
reciprocal emotions (toward each other), aiding in the development of collective identity’ 
(Jasper, 2014, p. 342). However, it cannot be assumed that all participants in a given ritual 
subjectively experience the same and intended affects. In reality individuals may feel a sense 
of entrapment, a lack of power, or an awareness of their position in the social hierarchy which 
can instantiate negative emotions, such as fear, anxiety, shame or guilt (T. D. Kemper, 1990; 
Lawler & Thye, 1999; Ridgeway & Johnson, 1990; Summers-Effler, 2002). Nonetheless, 
public ritual and its acculturation of affective meaning is part and parcel of the construction 
of imagined national communities and is central to the creation and reproduction of group 
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boundaries, dangerous others and ‘political belonging’, so much so that Mabel Berezin 
considers that the business of the Nation is emotion (Berezin, 1999, 2001).  
Such emotions leave their imprint long after the public event is over ensuring 
persistent dispositions towards the symbols and mythology of the collective. Often expressed 
as collective identity formation in group theory, affect theorists refer to these imprinted 
dispositions as affective loyalties. Through publically orchestrated affective processes 
hegemonic norms become reinforced to such an extent that individuals come to ‘feel’ their 
sense of belonging and to react intentionally in socially valorised affective forms towards in-
group/out-group objects in the world. Affective loyalties are therefore not of the immediacy 
of the reflex emotions in intentional experience. They are relatively stable, long-term 
dispositions of ‘attachment or aversions: love, liking, respect, trust, admiration, and their 
negative counterparts’ (Jasper, 2011, p. 14.3). They are not in themselves the intentional 
assessment but part of the affective component of a lifeworld through which intentionality 
must pass. The role of affective loyalties and the emotional conflicts that arise between Israeli 
dissenters, the nation and the equally affective loyalties they hold towards their intimate 
circle of friends and families comes to the fore in the discussion of Love in this thesis. 
The culture of affect and the affect of culture 
The impetus in Interactional Ritual is not as Durkheim suspected towards a frenzy of 
unspecified emotional state fuelled by liminality, adrenaline or narcotics but rather to 
associate specific emotions with specific objects. The inference of acculturated emotion and 
affective embodied lifeworld is further supported by the school of Dramaturgical theory 
which recognizes the importance of culture in defining which emotions are to be experienced 
and how they are expressed, not just in ritual event but in all social situations (Lawler & 
Thye, 1999). Cultural ‘scripts’, including ideologies, behavioural norms and rules, logic and 
stocks of knowledge guide which feelings should be experienced and how they should be 
expressed in face-to-face interaction. The dramaturgical code is a normative construct that 
forms part of the hegemonic structures. It not only defines what should cause anger, joy or 
pride but also how such emotions should be expressed, be it with stoicism or passion. Robert 
Levy found that acculturation can have impressive effects on both the embodied experience 
of affect and the subjective interpretation of those experiences. In his studies in Tahiti, his 
participants complained of feeling ill when they suffered some form of loss  - though 
normatively speaking loss should be represented by sadness. Levy thus suggested that certain 
feelings may be hypercognized if strongly emphasized and valued or hypocognized if dis-
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valued and repressed by the dominate cultural view (Levy, 1973, 1984). Theorists thus speak 
of ‘emotion cultures’ (A. R. Hochschild, 1979, 1983) or emotional habitus (Gould, 2009). 
These cultures need not refer only to hegemonic national codes and have also been observed 
in sub-cultures, peripheral groups and anti-hegemonic collectives and in the intensity of 
social protest movements which also produce and valorise their own particular dramaturgical 
code (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006; Juris, 2008b).  
In her exploration of the American LGBT community Gould defines emotional 
habitus as a social grouping’s ‘collective emotional, and only partially conscious emotional 
dispositions, that is, its members’ embodied, axiomatic inclinations towards certain feelings 
and ways of emoting’ (Gould, 2009, p. 32). Following Bourdieu, Gould argues that one’s 
acquired habitus, including its affective or dramaturgical component, is so deeply 
incorporated that it makes the social in us ‘common sense’. To a large degree a socially 
acquired habitus ‘becomes one’s “nature”, one’s dispositions, one’s axiomatic orientation 
toward action in the various fields that one traverses’. (ibid, p. 34 orig. emph.). However, in 
relation to the theoretical concepts utilised in the present thesis, the correlation of habitus 
with lifeworld seems initially problematic, in that the ‘durability’ of external objects and 
structures in Bourdieu’s thinking seems incompatible with phenomenology’s subjectivism. In 
this Bourdieu argued that the world of objects is not the product of the ‘sovereign’ 
functioning of consciousness and felt that phenomenology is mistaken in its view of society 
as an emergent product of subjective intentionality. According to Throop and Murphy the 
overall theoretical framework in Outline of a Theory of Practice ‘explicitly holds that habitus 
is a non-intentional and non-conscious product of internalized structure’ (Throop & Murphy, 
2002, p. 193;  see also Bourdieu, 1977). However, they go on to argue that the two theoretical 
models overlap in many ways and that habitus ‘is often little more than a materialistic 
rendering of Husserl’s life-world’ (ibid). 
For the purposes of this thesis we may thus pursue Gould’s emotional habitus as being 
equivalent with an affectively embodied lifeworld, all the more so since in Gould’s 
understanding though durable, a habitus is dynamic, malleable and always subject to 
alteration. Furthermore, in demonstrating the transformation of the emotional habitus of the 
American LGBT community during the 1980s AIDS epidemic, Gould considers that the 
malleability of habitus may be instrumental in generating social change. In her study of the 
ACT UP social movement of the time, repeated articulations by community activists altered 
the prevailing emotional culture of the gay and lesbian community. These public ‘speech 
acts’ renamed the complex, confusing and immobilising mix of shame and fear as legitimate 
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‘anger’ towards the government's inaction to the AIDS crisis. This renaming changed the 
meaning and interpretation of the embodied experience and galvanised the LGBT collective 
with moral righteousness and a sense of pride (Gould 2004, 2009). The outbreak of the AIDS 
epidemic was the crisis by which the LGBT emotional habitus was exposed as being 
dysfunctional to the needs of the community, so necessitating its reformation. The 
understanding that the lifeworld is a fully embodied, emergent and affective deeply seated 
structure of human experience is of central concern to the discussion of Love and Betrayal in 
this thesis. 
 
At this juncture we have a model of intentionality as a product of the acculturated human 
organism’s relationships to the world. This interaction is fully embodied in that affect is 
fundamental to that process. Affect is not simply emotion but a continual feedback processes 
of embodied meaning-making cascading through the interpretive filter of the lifeworld which 
is itself a fully embodied structure shaping both how we think and feel. Though felt to be a 
natural component and extension of the self, a lifeworld is in large part a received social 
construct often reliant on hegemonic codified interpretations. However, it is not a fixed entity 
in that it is an ongoing process of construction and may also undergo radical deconstruction 
and transformation. However the model is overly passive in that it lacks attention to the 
plurality and intersubjective potential which Arendt (1958) characterised as a fundamental 
human condition. Most phenomenologists acknowledge that the world before us is held to be 
the same sharable and mutually inhabited world, where the bodies of others are objects and 
subjects for us, and so argue that ‘even our most basic experiences of physical objects both 
evidence and entail a foundational intersubjectivity’ (Desjarlais & Throop, 2011, p. 91).  
To address the intersubjective nature of transnational dissent as practiced in the field, 
I turn to Hannah Arendt’s notion of action as a political activity in the plurality of this shared 
world. Alongside labour as the need to sustain life and work the production of material things 
to furnish our world, action was for Arendt the third fundamental activity grounded in the vita 
activa which describes ‘the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man’ 
(Arendt, 1971, p. 7). Arendt also posited the contrasting realm of the vita contemplativa, the 
life of the mind, as also having three basic activities, thinking, willing and judging. In the 
following I also attend to her understandings of thinking and judging because she also saw 
them as political faculties of the mind and more importantly because these were also 
activities frequently encountered in the ethnography. As such Arendt’s body of work offers a 
coherent framework with which to analyse political thought and action. Arendt’s model is 
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more akin to the notion of ‘revolutionary subjectivities’ discussed by a growing number of 
authors (see Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Pleyers, 2013a, 2013b) but offers more critical depth 
to describe and analyse the intersubjective character of both intentionality and practice in 
dissent.  
The turn to Arendt is a direct consequence of fieldwork findings. Whereas I had 
reviewed much of the literature discussed in the proceeding prior to fieldwork, I had not 
come across the writings of Arendt, neither in relation to emotion nor in the canon of social 
movement theory. Arendt’s work, drawing extensively from Kant, is in the rationalist 
tradition and it is not surprising that she excludes emotion from the ‘proper’ practice of 
thinking, action and judging. On the other hand, given the overtly political nature of her 
work, the scant attention paid to her by theorists of protest and social movement is notable 
and my use of her work here is, in part, an attempt to rectify this oversight. However, to a 
much greater degree, her inclusion was necessitated by my findings in the field. I first 
encountered Arendt’s work through Michael Jackson (2009), whose interpretation of judging 
I use to expand on the form of knowledge the ethnography produced, which I describe in the 
methodology section. I also quickly realised that solidarity activists were going through the 
same difficult process, of trying to see the world from the perspective of another. Compelled 
to know more, I reviewed the literature, first on thinking and then on action. The correlations 
I found, between the affective processes I had chosen to discuss in this thesis and Arendt’s 
understanding of innate human practices and faculties, were striking and illuminating. The 
discussion in the second part of this theory section, indeed of the thesis as a whole, is thus an 
attempt to generalise a theory of affect and political dissent through the particulars of its 
ethnographic case study. 
Arendt’s model does however require some adjustments. The notion of action as 
occurring in the ‘public’ realm is problematised by the observation of tensions within the 
intimate ‘private’ realm of the family which I discuss in the section on Love. The emergence 
of dissent within Zionist families starkly highlights the potential plurality within the private 
domain. More fundamentally Arendt seems at best suspicious of affect or as she refers to 
them the ‘the passions’. She posited strict delineation between the body, the soul where the 
passions rule and the mind where thought resides. This stands in opposition to the idea of the 
embodied mind and the knowing body described above. However, I believe that the 
ethnography in this thesis shows that the embodied mind does not necessarily inhibit the 
faculties of thinking and judging as supposed by rationalist thinkers like Arendt. On the 
contrary I aim to show that affect can aid and enable the positive outcomes that Arendt 
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believed came with the application of these faculties: action may be held in concert through 
feelings, feeling like thinking can also lead to doubt, and judging which produces 
understanding is enabled by love.  
 
Hannah Arendt and the Human Political Faculties.  
I address only three of the six activities which Arendt believed corresponded to the 
fundamentals of the human condition which she described in The Human Condition (1958) 
and The Life of the Mind (1971). Arendt’s work is laden with distinctions, value and 
hierarchical arrangement of both the worldly and mental activities and is often focused on the 
critique of the emergence of European totalitarianism in the twentieth century. In The Human 
Condition she critiques this latter phenomenon as a product of ‘the modern age—which 
began with such an unprecedented and promising outburst of human activity [though] may 
end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known’ (Arendt, 1958, p. 322). 
This dangerous political passivity of modern society she believed arose from an inversion of 
the classical Greek notion polis where political engagement was lauded in the vita activa and 
the vita contemplativa valorised over all else. The contemporary inversion, she argued, is a 
product of the modern age in which the scientific process, nationalism, modes of production, 
capitalism, consumerism and individualism lead to the pursuit of ‘life itself’ as the highest 
goal. An unthinking existence solely concerned with the labour of self satisfaction.  Arendt’s 
belief was that the evils of totalitarianism could be restrained by a more politically engaged 
populace – action – and which has practiced to doubt received interpretations – thinking – 
and can come to understand the radical other – judging. 
Action in the Vita Activa 
A key consideration for Arendt’s concept of the vita activa  was that the realization of 
a complete human life only occurs within the plurality of humanity’s social condition, ‘the 
reality that comes from being seen and heard by others’ (ibid p.58). Of the three activities it is  
action which she considered most political for it is  ‘the only activity that goes on directly 
between men without the intermediary of things or matter [and] corresponds to the human 
condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world’ 
(ibid p.7). This inescapable diversity is both the because of and the through which of political 
life. In the intersubjectivity of action, which both includes and is enabled by speech, is the 
potential for natality – the creation of something new ‘affecting uniquely the life stories of all 
those with whom he comes into contact’ (ibid p.184). Action is therefore the realization of 
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freedom in which individuals disclose their identities, who they are as distinct from what they 
are. Furthermore, given that this freedom only emerges from within, and acts upon, a 
plurality of other actors and reactors, the capacity to create the new in, albeit loose and 
uncertain concert, is where the potential for public political expression exists. This polis 
acting in concert and speaking with each other in the public space is for Arendt power, the 
‘potentiality in being together’ (ibid p.201). 
The freedom and power of action also comes with the potential for frustration and 
even danger for its consequences are boundless, unpredictable and irreversible. Action in the 
public realm cannot be contained by the dyad that initiated the new, for there is always a 
reaction which itself is a new action ‘that strikes out on its own and affects others’ (ibid 
p.190). Boundless growth and multiplying consequences carries the ‘burden of irreversibility 
and unpredictability, from which the action process draws its very strength’ (ibid p.233 
emph. added). Arendt admitted that the unknowable consequences of action could be reason 
enough to hold action in contempt. To avert the dangers whilst maintaining the potential for a 
politically engaged polis Arendt highlighted two further human faculties - forgiving and 
promising. Forgiving is the ‘possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of 
being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what 
he was doing [whilst the] remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the 
future, is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises’ (ibid p.237). 
For contemporary social movement theory, there is both a descriptive and prescriptive 
quality to this model of engaged action. It reflects a call for a return to the direct and 
participatory politics unconstrained by institutions, which Arendt felt characterised the Greek 
polis. The emergence of contemporary leaderless grassroots dissent protests, such as the 
Occupy X, Tahrir Square, and Hong Kong’s Umbrella movement illustrate how power can 
spring up as if from nowhere when people act in concert. The solidarity activism described in 
this ethnography is also an exemplar of plurality acting in sometimes tense and uncertain 
concert. Its transnational dimension, whereby its ‘community’ footprint extends far beyond 
the villages and neighbourhoods where protest occurs, is also reflected in Arendt’s vision of 
action in a plural world as unbound by space or place. ‘The polis, properly speaking, is not 
the city-state in its physical location [but] the organization of the people as it arises out of 
acting and speaking together…living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen 
to be’ (ibid p.198). Most of all the activism in this ethnography represents the refusal to live 
in the condition of sterile passivity and to actively resist the dominating political structures. A 
testament indeed to the innateness of the human faculty for action.  
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Thinking and judging in the Vita Contemplativa 
There is more ambiguity in the political nature of her three mental activities in the vita 
contemplativa. Judging she considers ‘the most political of man's mental abilities’ while 
thinking ‘has no political relevance unless special emergencies arise’(Arendt, 1971, pp. 191–
2). The special emergencies in which thinking becomes a political act is of particular 
relevance to the study of dissent, for when ‘everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what 
everybody else does and believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding because their 
refusal to join in is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of action. In such emergencies 
[thinking] is political by implication’ (ibid). In the case of dissent versus being swept along, 
both thinking and judging are political activities. If the human condition of the vita activa is 
realised through the plurality of a shared world it is the ‘common-sense world of 
appearances’ which dominates the life of the mind as experienced by the intentional subject. 
Though appearances can never be fully overcome thinking and judging are faculties which 
transcend appearances in different but complementary ways.  Thinking is generalised 
destructive abstraction, judging is particular productive reintegration. Whereas judging 
produces understanding, thinking is destructive leaving only doubt in its wake. 
The outstanding characteristics of thinking for Arendt are ‘its withdrawal from the 
common-sense world of appearances, its self-destructive tendency with regard to its own 
results, its reflexivity, and the awareness of sheer activity that accompanies it’ (ibid p.88). 
Thinking stops all the fundamental activities of the vita activa – we literally stop and think. 
Thinking is not knowing which she related to the cognition of the world of appearances. It 
does not produce knowledge in itself and comes to no judgement on what is right or wrong 
but rather leads to ‘a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, 
measurements of good and evil, in short, on those customs and rules of conduct we treat of in 
morals and ethics’ (ibid p.175). It is thinking’s destructive tendency, its capacity to create 
doubt that Arendt believed ‘regardless of results and specific content, could […] be among 
the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually "condition" them 
against it (ibid p.5). The self-awareness that accompanies this activity creates a conscience 
out of self-consciousness and it is the conscience which Arendt believed enabled the faculty 
of judging. 
Her thesis on judging was not fully developed before she died and appears only in 
fragments through a number of texts which do not present a unified theory and are perhaps 
somewhat at odds with each other (d’ Entreves, 2014). In contrast to the isolated inner world 
of thinking, judging has an endemic connection to the world of appearances and the plurality 
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of the human condition. Judging ‘does not leave the world of appearances but retires from 
active involvement in it to a privileged position in order to contemplate the whole’ (ibid 
p.94). By maintaining a link to the particular, that which is experienced in the sensual world 
of appearances, judging is the ‘gift’ of the mind which resolves the destructiveness and 
inapplicability of thinking’s generalisations. Whilst the thinking ego ‘remains forever 
concealed’ from others in the world of appearances, judging manifests to the plural condition 
of that world and is thus politically more applicable. Grounded by the plurality vita activa 
judging is ‘the ability to see things not only from one's own point of view but from the 
perspective of all those who happen to be present’ (Arendt, 1968, p. 221).  
 
As with action, it seemed clear that many of the participants in this ethnography were 
engaging the mental faculties of thinking and judging, in the sense that many have come to 
doubt the interpretations which legitimise oppression and through the practice of solidarity 
have come to divest themselves of those interpretations in an effort to understand the world 
from the perspective of others. However despite these convergences there are major 
theoretical and methodological differences between Arendt’s work and this research. 
Methodologically Arendt drew her understandings from the ‘professional thinkers’ of the 
Western rationalist tradition, from Socrates to Kant, who preceded or had transcended the 
modern condition of passivity. In contrast this research proceeded from the phenomenon of 
dissent and relies largely on the testimonies of ‘amateur thinkers’, the activists. The 
convergence is thus more poignant, pointing to the utility of her framework to the study of 
social movements and supporting Arendt’s assertion that most anyone can think, though she 
wondered if perhaps Adolf Eichman was incapable of this (Arendt, 1963). More 
problematically, the thesis at hand takes emotion as its central object of analysis and Arendt 
is particularly at pains to stress that the passions and ‘concerns of the body’ are an 
impediment both to thinking and judging. My contention is that Weirdness, Wrongness and 
Love are to some extent all relevant to the activities of thinking, judging and action and thus 
we need to address and resolve the differences between Arendt’s theoretical framework and 
the one I utilise here. 
Thinking with feelings 
The fundamental issue is not that thinking without feeling is impossible, for certainly 
professional thinkers trained in the Western rationalist tradition may well be able to fully 
disconnect themselves as in a form of meditation. The problem is that Arendt’s ontology 
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harshly delineates between body-mind-soul, leading to a compartmentalised understanding of 
the form and processes of consciousness, affect, cognition and thought. This stands in 
contrast with the model presented earlier of a fully embodied cascading feedback in 
intentionality. Both models do share a phenomenological starting point as being grounded in 
a world of experience. Damasio’s organism-object relationship is Arendt’s world of 
appearances as presented to the five senses but Arendt argued that mind is a different kind 
from both body and soul and based this reasoning on their potentials for authentic appearance 
in the world. 
To achieve this she ties the soul to the body. Her definition of body is not fully 
expanded upon beyond the hidden functioning of the ‘inner organs’ necessary for the 
sustenance of life, though notably there is no discussion of the brain as an inner organ. Her 
notion of the soul (or inner psyche) is more developed. It is ‘where our passions, our feelings 
and emotions arise […] a more or less chaotic welter of happenings which we do not enact 
but suffer […] and which in cases of great intensity may overwhelm us as pain or pleasure 
does’ (ibid p.72). Arendt lists a number of feelings which indeed are passionate, such as love 
which she asserted would not be possible without the sexual urge, and fear as being 
indispensible for our survival. Far from constituting part of a subtle and complex meaning 
making system, Arendt’s emotions are purely functional and ‘seem to have the same life-
sustaining and preserving functions as our inner organs’ (ibid p.35). Arendt concluded, quite 
rightly, that emotions are not formed in the mind but are ‘bound’ by the body. The primacy of 
appearance (or non-appearance) helps convince her of this, for the invisibility of both the 
inner bodily organs and the soul can never ‘authentically’ appear. The expression of emotion 
is a filtered representation of the authentic feeling and though ‘love or joy overwhelms me, 
and similar physical sensations take possession of me with anger, wrath, envy [their outward 
expression is a] transformation and transfiguration through thought’ (ibid p.33). The body 
and soul are therefore of similar kind in that their workings are functional, uncontrollable and 
do not manifest authentically in the world of appearances. In contrast the life of the mind, she 
argued, is wilful activity that manifests itself authentically through speech. Though the ‘only’ 
outward manifestation of the act of thinking itself ‘is absent· mindedness, an obvious 
disregard of the surrounding world’ (ibid p.72), they become authentically manifest through 
speech. This authenticity is guaranteed because ‘mental activities … are conceived in speech 
even before being communicated’ (ibid p.32). Because we think in words, thinking’s activity 
can be authentically manifest through speech in the world of appearances and is made 
meaningful in the plurality of the human condition. 
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Arendt’s reasoning here is problematic and at times self-contradictory. She admits 
that the interconnectedness of thinking and speech ‘obviously do not apply to civilizations 
where the written sign rather than the spoken word is decisive’ (ibid p.100), and cites the 
examples of Chinese script and the Hebrew tradition of ‘hearing the truth of God’ as 
alternatives to thinking in words. Again she is inconsistent when she states the inner life of 
the soul, emotions, can be adequately expressed in ‘a glance, a sound, a gesture’ yet feels that 
appearing absent-minded is a different quality of expression. Most observers understand and 
distinguish what is happening in a friend’s ‘inner-world’ when they look pensive. The 
reasoning that such similar outward expressions are of a different order rests on the 
assumption that mind and soul are of a different order. Her separation of mind from body and 
soul relies on what she admits is the ‘metaphysical fallacy’ of inner and outer worlds and the 
triad of being she employs is inherited from classical Greek philosophy. 
There are other difficulties. Her conceptualisation of consciousness as simply self-
awareness and the notion of ‘common-sense’ (which may be some form of lifeworld or may 
be the world of appearances we sense in common) are also undeveloped in this work, but it is 
her understanding of affect that is most limiting. The ‘passions’ (the term itself is revealing) 
are intense, brutish uncontrolled things which intrude upon the mind. This rationalist distrust 
goes as far back as Plato and its adherents tend to list affects like anger, fear, lust, envy as 
base things to be suppressed and transcended. And I would tend to agree on that point, but 
limiting emotions to a realm of intense and irrational phenomena ignores the subtlety and 
nuance of human affective experiences in order to promote a particular agenda for proper and 
rational being. However, if we understand affect as a perceptual, sociologically shaped and 
shareable human capacity we can see that emotions both follow a logic of sorts and are full of 
meanings that are often more insightful and concise than spoken reasoning. We must at the 
very least acknowledge that Arendt’s assertions that we think in words and that there is no 
chiasmata (crossings) between body and mental phenomena (ibid p.33) are now basically 
unsupportable - though perhaps not uncommonly held.  
In contrast to Arendt’s compartmentalised model, I argue that the mind is of the body, 
and what may be referred to as the soul is the feeling of that mind in its emergence and 
sensation of self. This totality emerges from and within a world of plural relationships, to 
both the minds of others and the sensuality of experience in this shared world. Experience is 
the unavoidable condition of being, from which the interpretations of lifeworld become 
embodied. The following chapter on methodology expands further on the sensuality of 
experience of the world but for now we may begin to formulate certain questions for the 
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ethnography of affect and being. What activity is taking place when I stop all other activities 
to reflect upon the affective signalling occurring in my body? Is this not thinking about 
emotions, not simply to find words which describe them, but to promote their salience in my 
consciousness so as to better interrogate their forms and meanings? Moreover, rather than 
wilfully suppressing subjective feelings so as to gain the ‘clarity’ of objective, scientific and 
so rational thought, if I pause to consider why I am feeling so, am I not gaining deep insights 
by thinking with emotions? I believe that for researchers and participants  alike, affect neither 
negates the utility and importance of thinking and judging nor does it undermine the 
overarching aims and hopes of Arendt’s body of work, the belief that  emergence of evil in 
society can be resisted. On the contrary one of the aims of the following thesis is to 
demonstrate that feelings also furnish the political mind in ways Arendt would deem positive. 
For just as Weirdness causes us to doubt, Wrongness affords concerted action by 
transcending plurality and Love affords the endurance needed to judge. I argue that if we stop 
to think about, through and with the feelings that our body furnishes our minds with we may 
actually augment our understanding of ourselves and the lives of others.  
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3. Methodology, Methods & Ethics 
The main focus of interest in this thesis is on the emotional processes of being a dissenter. 
Since my understanding of affect has been dealt with in the preceding chapter what follows 
relates to the specifics of the sociality of fieldwork in and around Jerusalem and beyond. This 
is the social, sensual and imagined dimension in which the affective emerges through the 
movements of its participants. The discussion contains both reference to ethnographic theory 
and a substantial amount of description and self-reflection on my experiences as a 
fieldworker. This is not then a description of a methodology by which I approached fieldwork 
but my current understanding of the processes and forms of knowledge which ethnography 
produces subsequent to undertaking the endeavour. This chapter is divided into two main 
sections. I begin with two methodological concerns which to some extent were qualified prior 
to fieldwork. Firstly, I explain the pragmatics of distilling and dividing the complexity of 
identities in transnational research into the four categories of Israelis, Palestinians, 
Internationals and the ‘non-aligned’. Secondly I consider the possibilities of practicing 
politically ‘engaged’ ethnography as a means of establishing trusting relationships and a 
potentially richer way to participate in and with the lives of others. However, on a practical 
level my own lack of experience dictated that this thesis falls somewhere between cultural 
critique and activist research (Hale, 2006). This is followed by defining the ‘fieldsite’ in 
transnational research, a problem which came to the fore during fieldwork as a consequence 
of adopting Iris Jean-Klein’s ‘lateral’ approach to ethnography. In this, rather than selecting 
particular social places, groups or institutions to study, the lateral ethnographic approach 
follows the movements of participants (Jean-Klein, 2003). I find the resulting ethnography to 
be in accordance with Ingold’s (2011) understanding of the meshwork of the movement of 
myself, the participants and countless others from transnational dissent who proceed along 
‘lines’ between particular places defined by sites of practice of solidarity activism. Though 
this transnational field is unbound, moving far afield with the bodies of its participants and 
into and through the pervasive digital realm, the focus of the fieldwork is its localised 
moments in Israel-Palestine. 
The second section turns to the question of how ethnography can access the emotional 
lives of its participants and what form such an understanding takes. To a large degree this 
addresses the validity of the assertions I make in this thesis. Again I found myself turning to 
the work of  Ingold (2008) who understands anthropological knowledge as emerging from the 
practice of working with people in their world. In this he asserts that the researcher’s 
immersion in the world of participants’ activities and lives, the method of participant 
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observation, allows the anthropologist to ‘see, hear and touch’ the world from their vantage 
point. Building upon this through the work of a number of authors I conclude the human 
condition as described by Arendt is not only plural, it is entirely and incessantly sensual. 
There is a particularity to the sensations of this sensuality which is guided by structuration of 
movement along specific lines in the meshwork of solidarity activism. To be a dissenter is to 
move not only between sites of weekly protest but to and through particular sites of leisure, 
labour and everyday life. In doing so participant observation leads to a recognisable 
patterning of dissent on the meshwork of the embodied lifeworld of the researcher. Thus in 
moving along the lines of the research site with participants I came to understand the field of 
transnational dissent because I came to feel it too. 
To refine the form that such an understanding takes I employ Michael Jackson’s 
interpretation of Arendt’s faculty of judging as producing understanding in the third position 
(Jackson, 2009). Though as researchers we may come to feel from the vantage points of our 
participants we neither become the participant nor lose our researcher self. Jackson argues 
that the ‘imaginative displacement’ the ethnographer must adopt in order to reconsider one’s 
own world from the standpoint of another entails Arendt’s activity of judging. However, the 
understandings it produces are reducible to neither the researcher’s nor the participants’ but 
emerge from within the shared space of intersubjectivity itself. The tension between 
researcher and participant is never lost, nor is it necessary for it to disappear altogether for 
such would be a completely unnatural intersubjective experience. The differences remain and 
are productive, for it is the requisite for the active engagement and conversation of judging, 
in which understanding is collaboratively produced with both researcher and participant. I 
argue that having learnt to feel as a dissenter often feels, the acts of displacement are not 
merely imagined but are also affectively experienced as empathy. The emotions discussed in 
this thesis are thus neither definitively my participants’ nor my own but the product of our 
genuine attempt to reveal their meanings. 
Transnational identities  
Having found both a spectrum of activities and historical continuity of peaceful resistance in 
the literature review, I decided prior to fieldwork to not focus on a particular organization, 
form of practice, or specific political aims with regard to the conflict. Furthermore, having an 
interest in the transnational dimension of contemporary sociality, I did not limit myself to 
working solely with Israelis or Palestinians. The research population would include anyone 
who was or had been in some way involved in agitating against the discourse that violent 
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coercion are legitimate means to either maintain or resolve the conflict in Israel and Palestine, 
the categorical imposition I call transnational dissent. This encompasses activists, journalists, 
academics, professional NGO staff and other agents regardless of ethnic, religious or national 
affiliations whom I have encountered during fieldwork. However, to understand the contours 
of dissent one must also explore the discourses and practices which it opposes, the sociality 
of consent if you will. Since the Israeli state and society are both major producers and 
consumers of these discourses and the primary agents of their practice my fieldwork also paid 
close attention to radical, mainstream and uncertain support of Israel’s politics and practices. 
This latter end of the spectrum are referred to by one participant as ‘non-aligned’, a term I 
also adopt. To a great degree this was achieved simply by living in West Jerusalem where 
everyday activity predominantly occurs within a Jewish Hebrew speaking population, a 
positioning which necessarily weighs the ethnography towards being a dissenter in ‘Israel’ 
rather than ‘Palestine’ or say Canada.  However, the ‘field’ of transnational dissent will be 
defined in a later section as a confluence of movements on a meshwork of lines largely 
structured by sites of solidarity activism. 
Through my Israeli wife’s network of family and friends I was already familiar with a 
form of Israeli hegemonic identity well before fieldwork. This is a mostly secular, native 
born, Ashkenazi Jewish, middle-class, well-educated, Hebrew and English speaking, and 
mostly liberal, left-wing or uncertain Zionists. Through this family centred network, I came 
into personal contact both with the conflict and the practice of dissent and two of my long-
term Jewish Israeli acquaintances served as gatekeepers to the research field. When not ‘in 
the field’ with participants and demonstrations or meetings, I attended to the busy ‘ordinary’ 
life of a father and husband. I lived in West Jerusalem where my wife worked and my 
children went to nurseries accredited by the Israeli state. Most every day I bought milk at the 
nearby petrol station where Mohammad, a young Palestinian man from Silwan in East 
Jerusalem, would greet me in Hebrew with a smile. I did my main shopping in the nearby 
Super Sol, where all the prices are in Hebrew, and visited and holidayed with my in-laws. I 
studied Hebrew in a state-run ulpan along with about twenty newly arrived immigrants, 
known as olaim, who were mostly grandparents from the former Soviet Union. The quotient 
practices of everyday life are a component of any ethnography and essential and sensual 
component of fostering Herzfeld’s (1997) cultural intimacy and understanding of the social 
field.  
The field of activism in Israel and Palestine was thus pre-conceived as transnational 
by my preparatory academic training and literature review, and pre-prepared for me through 
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family relations and personal experience that pre-dated my engagement with social science. 
As a result I entered that social mix through and with something of both an Israeli and 
foreigner’s perspective but almost no experience of local Palestinian life. These identity 
terms are problematic in that they cloak subtleties and differences in their generalisation but 
to avoid endless hyphenation in this text I have found it necessary to use them and so the 
thesis utilises four main categories of identity: Israelis, Palestinians, Internationals and the 
‘non-aligned’.  The non-aligned mostly refer to the intimate acquaintances of Israeli 
dissenters whose opinions on the practice of dissent range from those unconvinced of its 
utility, its legitimacy or are even vehemently opposed to its premise. Internationals are in the 
simplest sense ‘foreigners’ who come to protest in solidarity. Palestinians are Arabs. Israelis 
are Jews. I physically wince typing these last two categories in particular. Such terminology 
is not only conflated and contested but is also a central component of the local and 
international hegemony of nationalism and ethnicity reproducing the violent and oppressive 
conflict which in many ways defines this dissertation.  
In reality there are many Israeli-Palestinians involved in this research, often referred 
to (by activists and Palestinians) as 48ers, in reference to the Arab population who found 
themselves within the Israeli state after the 1948 war. This demographic includes other 
formal categories of the state such as Druze, Bedouin and Christians. There are of course also 
Palestinians from the occupied West Bank and Gaza who are considered by themselves and 
most authorities as definitely Palestinian, the only exception being some Zionist discourses 
who think all Palestinians are just Arabs. Similarly, despite being dissenters, Internationalists 
are Jewish and have often been raised with a strong positive connection to Israel and Zionism 
(see Landy, 2011). According to Israel’s the Law of Return they can automatically become 
citizens of Israel if they so choose. There are Israeli-Americans in this ethnography, or 
regional variants thereof, and one in particular who goes to prison for his conscientious 
objection to his Israeli-mandated side of military conscription. I have met diaspora-
Palestinians from California at protests in East Jerusalem along with Communist 
Internationalists and as broad a spectrum of personal and collective identity markers one 
could ever hope to meet in a relatively constricted physical locality. Indeed for many Israeli-
Jews and Palestinian-Arabs the practice of solidarity dissent entails a profound reassessment 
and movement towards the normatively antagonistic other. These four meta-groupings are 
more than a just a necessity in order to avoid incessant qualifications and caveats, for better 
or worse these categories are also commonly used amongst dissenters to describe with 
reference to themselves and others. When clarity is required individual participants in this 
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text are qualified according to their own needs and desires. Such taxonomic ambiguities are 
part and parcel of transnational research.  
Engagement with dissent  
Before moving on to the fieldwork methods through which ethnographic knowledge emerged 
I must address the general issue of objectivity in research and the notion of ‘engaged 
ethnography’. The idea that academic research should be applicable to wider society is not 
unique to anthropology. Acknowledging the overt political orientation of social protest 
Bevington and Dixon have called for the production of ‘movement relevant theory’ to go 
beyond the traditional concerns of social movement theory, such as the deconstruction of 
framing processes or the identification of political opportunity (Bevington & Dixon, 2005; 
see also Goodwin & Jasper, 1999). The debate revolves around whether this is best achieved 
through the discovery of objective truth or through some system of ethics. Probably the best 
known early anthropological proponent of the ethical school is Nancy Scheper-Hughes who 
advocated a ‘militant anthropology’ based on values (D’Andre, 1995; Scheper-Hughes, 
1995). There is no consensus on this position but given the tradition of working with sub-
altern populations, and its recent history of radical critique, many anthropologists are open to 
her call to ‘speak truth to power’. The anthropology of social movements in particular has 
seen an increasing number of researchers taking an engaged stance, through cultural critiques 
of power structures, participation in protest actions and in some cases organizational input in 
struggles (see Graeber, 2004; Hale, 2006, 2008; Juris, 2008a; Juris & Khasnabish, 2013; 
Postill, 2013). However, movement relevant theory requires a critical examination of the field 
not a fawning retelling of its ideals. Despite this sympathetic bias and the effort at full 
immersion in ethnography, the awareness of the researcher-participant power relationship is 
not just crucial, it is also hard to forget. Between the related practices of participation and 
observation exists an ‘unnatural’ tension which the critically trained researcher should find 
productive. Despite the difficulties inherent in such an overtly aligned approach, to which I 
myself subscribe, its potential lies in ‘research outcomes that are both troubled and deeply 
enriched by direct engagement with the complexities of political contention’ (Hale, 2006, p. 
96).  
There are many practitioners and forms of engaged, activist, public or applied 
anthropology in many social spheres. In social movement theory and practice, as George 
Marcus points out, there is currently an increasingly mutual identification between 
anthropological research and social-movement activism, involving increasingly closer 
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engagement and collaboration (in Juris & Khasnabish, 2013). In a trend that owes a great 
debt to the decades of politically committed feminist research, authors such as Geoffrey 
Pleyers, Phillipe Bourgois, Jeffery Juris, David Graeber, Alex Khasnabish and Manisha Desai 
are closely involved with homelessness and drug addition, anti-capitalist and Occupy X 
movements, the Zapatista struggle, and the World Social Forum (Bourgois, 2003; Bourgois & 
Schonberg, 2009; Desai, 2013; Graeber, 2013; Juris, 2008b, 2012; Pleyers, 2013a). Hale 
(2006) makes a distinction between activist research and cultural critique as forms of 
engagement based largely on methodological grounds. The former Hale describes as, a 
collaborative method involving explicit alignment with a politically organised group or a 
struggle and involving strategy planning and advice, advocacy and resource mobilisation, 
direct action activities and ‘a creative process of collective theorization and knowledge 
production carried out from inside social movements’ (Juris & Khasnabish, 2013, p. 24). For 
Hale, engagement in the form of cultural critique is a poorer approach in that political 
alignment is expressed through the content of the knowledge produced, not through the 
relationship established with an organised group of people in a struggle. If ethnography is 
about establishing trusting relationships, which I believe it to be, then methodologically 
activist aligned research is potentially a richer way to participate in and with the lives of 
others.  
However, my own ethnographic practice in this project is somewhere in between and 
certainly at the beginning of fieldwork was closer to the critique end of the spectrum. This 
was more a matter of pragmatics and experience rather than personal desire or ethical 
considerations. From the outset I must state that I had serious reservations as to the policy 
and conduct of the Israeli state towards Palestinians under its jurisdiction. Though I knew that 
the Israeli state is and has always been subject to ideological opposition and instrumental 
violence since its inception, perhaps most horrifyingly in the random explosive murders of 
the Second Intifada, I was unconvinced by the ‘security discourse’ which I felt was cynically 
invoked to justify decades of ongoing and often valorised processes of oppression, 
dispossession and colonisation on the backs of an entire people because they exist external to 
the hegemonic understandings of Zionism. My sympathies thus lay with the people engaged 
in dissent to this situation. I began fieldwork thus disposed to my imagined understandings of 
its aims.  
That said, my capacity for activist research was limited for a number of reasons. As a 
junior researcher I found myself in a complex field of delicately maintained relationships in 
which participants had a much more profound knowledge and experience of local dissenting 
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practice and theory than I did. I had neither the expertise nor authority to provide insight or 
strategy. As time went on, my closest participants or newly arrived Internationals did begin to 
ask for my thoughts and a degree of collaborative knowledge production occurred, but these 
were interpersonal exchanges and not strategy meetings per se. I also limited myself by not 
directly participating in activities whereby I might get arrested. In the Occupied Territories in 
particular, getting arrested at demonstrations in lieu of a Palestinian protester is an important 
and strategic practice. Known as ‘de-arresting’ this normally involves holding onto a member 
of the security force so that a Palestinian, whom are usually the first targets of security forces, 
can flee across the fields. This is more than just a nicety or token sacrifice, for an Israeli or 
International protester will most probably be held in detention for only a few hours whereas a 
Palestinian is likely to face three months in a military prison. Being arrested in this way is 
something of a (not unproblematic) rite of passage for certain sections of Israeli and 
International dissenters but in my case this may have entailed deportation and so jeopardised 
my research project.  Despite these limits I was most often positioned and welcomed as a 
sympathiser. Yet the tension in researcher-participant relationships remained and the 
intersubjective space of understanding was also described by a critical distance formed by my 
obscure interest in affect, ambiguity and sociality, which in many ways stood in opposition to 
useful tactical insights often sought by social movements (see Juris & Khasnabish, 2013). I 
shall turn to how this intersubjective space of understanding produces ethnographic 
knowledge in a later section but for now I shall turn to how the ‘fieldsite’ of transnational 
dissent is defined. 
Lines of enquiry as the transnational ‘field’ of dissent 
I began fieldwork on a sunny Friday afternoon in September 2011 by walking down to Kikar 
Paris in Jerusalem city centre where the Women in Black (Neshim B’Shakhor) have been 
holding a silent vigil against the occupation every Friday at 1pm for over twenty-five years. 
Later that same afternoon we walked across the city centre to join the weekly Sheikh Jarrah 
protest in East Jerusalem at 4pm.This routine was repeated for a year. No formal method for 
finding participants was applied as Philippe Bourgois said in at a Manchester University 
lecture on his ethnography of heroin addicts - you just go up and ask people (see Bourgois & 
Schonberg, 2009). However, rather than observing the flows of sociality through these two 
sites, I adopted Jean-Klein’s (2003) ‘lateral approach’ to ethnography in which my 
participants would lead the researcher through the field. In this way I travelled the city and 
beyond to locations and events throughout Israel and the occupied territories, for the most 
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part not in search of experiences which I thought would be ethnographically useful, but 
because I was invited by participants. In contrast to an ethnography of a given place, such as 
Whyte’s (1943) Street Corner, the methodology used here could be seen as multi-sited 
(Marcus, 1995). However, it is not for the sake of comparison that different sites are visited 
but because movement reflects the ordinary practice of transnational dissent in Israeli and 
Palestine.  
The lateral approach was fortuitous and, upon reflection necessary, for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the solidarity protest cycle is weekly, with demonstrations regularly held 
each Friday or Saturday. It would have been possible to live for instance in Sheik Jarrah so as 
to observe community life and activist organisation in the intervening six days. Certainly 
there is activity that continues after the protest, court cases and the potential for altercations 
with the settlers. However, this would have focused in-depth on a single site of dissent, where 
in fact most of the people are engaged with the weekly protests. This would be an 
ethnography not of transnational dissent but a site where transnational dissent takes place. 
Secondly, there is no ‘neighbourhood’ at where a community of dissenters reside. The very 
notion of ‘coming together’ in solidarity infers extant distances of space and identity. There 
are however certain bars, cafe’s and other public venues where dissenters pass through and 
encounter each other, which are as much on the political tourist map as are the village 
demonstrations of the popular committees themselves. Indeed new cohorts of EAPPI
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observers, who come from abroad for a three month placement in Jerusalem, are given tours 
by a departing observer where they are brought to the Educational Bookshop near the 
Damascus Gate in East Jerusalem. With an excellent collection of books on the conflict in 
various languages, regular film screenings and lectures this small quiet place serving cake 
and cappuccinos is a node of transitional dissent. Ask practically anyone from anywhere who 
has been involved in dissent in the city and they will point you the way. 
From this sketch we can see that Solidarity Activism entails movement to and from 
specific sites of protest. There are also specific sites of commerce and leisure associated with 
dissent, offices, shops, cafes and bars. I have thus come to understand the research ‘field’ to 
be not just these sites of protest and ancillary services, but also the ‘lines’ along which 
dissenters move between them. This understanding builds upon Ingold’s concept of the 
meshwork. In this he asserts that anthropology proceeds along ‘observational paths of being’ 
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with their participants (Ingold, 2008, p. 87). Life, he asserts, is lived along such lines of 
movement through the unfolding world which become inscribed as experience in a 
meshwork, a texture of interwoven threads’ (Ingold, 2011 loc. 177)30. The meshwork for 
Ingold, is not merely an abstract network of connections but the totality of the affective 
experience of movement through the sensual world, in effect a dimension of the embodied 
lifeworld. In her work with Cittaslow gardening communities, Sarah Pink has highlighted the 
productive sociality of such sensuality through what she calls the ‘emplaced sociality which 
occurs when the sensual world is shared in collective activity. These ‘sensory socialities...the 
shared tastes, smells and textures of residents’ barbeques or sharing coffee prepared in 
someone's home brought out into the garden to drink while chatting’ (Pink, 2008, p. 181) 
form part of the collective’s common knowledge. The meshwork is shifting and subjectively 
unique to the individual’s experience, yet when one engages in solidarity activism the paths 
along which one proceeds are defined by specific sites of dissent and their sociality. Just as 
generations are acculturated to a national collective by similar public rituals decades apart, so 
too must we realise that co-presence is not required for the sensuality of emplaced sociality to 
affect collectivity. For dissenters who move through Jerusalem and Hebron, Al-Massara and 
any of the village protests a pattern of experience emerges in their meshwork which is 
recognisable and sharable by others who have also followed along such lines. Though still 
unique to each individual the various patterns begin to elicit a family resemblance. The 
‘fieldsite’ as such is a not a particular place or places but a convergence of patterning in the 
meshwork of participants movement though the world of transnational dissent in Palestine 
and Israel. 
Sensually emplaced sociality is key to my understanding of this field, where the heat 
and the cold and humidity are affective experiences shared with (and compared by) the 
participants with whom I practiced dissent in protests. On one occasion it snowed at a protest 
in Sheikh Jarrah, a particularly rare event in Jerusalem, and the freezing grim pointlessness 
of twenty people protesting in front of no one was written and recognised in the grimly 
grinning faces of all. Such is camaraderie. However, I stress that copresence in time and 
space is not a requisite for such shared, or more precisely sharable, sensual experiences by 
which this field is produced. Even if one walks alone one Friday from Women in Black past 
the Old City and the Educational Bookshop to Sheikh Jarrah you are following a path 
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trodden by a myriad of other dissenters at other times. The drive through the checkpoints into 
the West Bank, the sound of stun grenades on a hot day and the welcome winter breeze which 
disperses the tearing wretch of tear-gas are all sensual experiences which can be re-called, re-
felt and recognised in subsequent exchanges with others. Such is the patterning process of 
transnational dissent on meshworks. Just as a state’s public rituals pattern the affective 
lifeworld so too do the ‘lone’ experiences of sensual movement through particular public 
places. The research field of transnational dissent in this ethnography lies along well trodden 
pathways under the parching heat of the sun, the coolness of a breeze, the smell of jasmine or 
tear-gas, the steepness of the hill or the sharpness of a cold beer after a tough day. This is part 
of the experience of dissent in which I participated sometimes by myself and often with 
others. Notably, such movement is not shared equally by all and in particular the Palestinians 
of the West Bank are not free to simply visit the Educational Bookshop – or even Jerusalem. 
No one in solidarity activism is unaware of this distinction and indeed the transnational flow 
is largely defined by constraints on Palestinian movement. Israelis and Internationalist go to 
Palestinian villages where locals attempt to walk to a given destination in space. Israeli 
security specifically aims to prevent this Palestinian movement by drawing some invisible 
line. This is the paradox of this transnational field. It is at once unbound, moving and 
reproducing far afield with its participants and through digital representations on social 
media, yet at the same time the logic of occupation actively limits the movement of 
Palestinians at the micro level. Israeli flesh, concrete and steel constrain movement on a daily 
basis on a scale measured in mere metres. This field thus understood, though unbound, is 
being experienced by myself from the privileged perspective of a non-Palestinian observer 
localised and reflexively less constrained by their residency in a West Jerusalem suburb. The 
human condition within that unbounded space is not only plural, it is entirely and incessantly 
sensual. 
Research constraints of the transnational field: On Language & Gender 
Before addressing the methods of ethnographic fieldwork and the forms of knowledge it 
produced, two significant omissions must be explained. In general, this thesis pays only 
passing attention to the issues of language and gender. These are both highly significant 
factors in the experience and understanding of emotion and are subjects of extensive 
theoretical consideration in anthropology and other sciences of humanity. Their exclusion 
from this thesis is more of a methodological constraint than a theoretical oversight. Put 
simply, the complexity of the transnational field encompassed both a multitude of tongues 
80 
 
and a diversity of cultural, generational and ideological attitudes towards gendered 
differentiation. Furthermore, given the fluidity of movement of this field, the constellation of 
participants at particular meeting points is forever changing. Under such conditions any 
attempt at generalisation would be fraught with caveats and the subject of the thesis would 
become the role of either language or gender in transnational dissent.  
To begin with, proficiency in the ‘local’ language has long been an important 
component of ethnography, both enabling effective and subtle communication, fostering 
trust, respect and a cultural intimacy with the field and folk. It is seen as essential to 
intersubjectivity (Fabian, 2014). Having decided to enter this field from the Israeli 
perspective I undertook six months Hebrew training, beginning in September 2012 at one of 
the state’s ulpan language courses. I would say I am more efficient than proficient in the 
language. I had insufficient resources (or talent) to learn Arabic as well, beyond a few 
common phrases and greetings. I speak (or have spoken) a little French, German and Spanish, 
which was sometimes helpful in establishing rapport but the majority of this research was 
carried out in English. The question of language, power and communication in transnational 
practice of dissent has been highlighted by a number of authors and is an issue of great 
concern at events such as the World Social Forum (see Desai, 2013; Dörr, 2008, 2009; Juris 
& Khasnabish, 2013). More pointedly, when discussing emotions, the assignation of textual 
labels to embodied experience effects the experience itself. Language is part of both the 
dramaturgical code and the embodied lifeworld, through which experience becomes known 
and understood. Following on from Arendt’s (1958) contention that the private life of the 
mind can only be revealed through the transformation of ‘storytelling’, Jackson argues that 
speech not only transforms private experience into a form fit for public consumption, but that 
public discourse also transforms private experience. In what he calls the ‘politics of 
experience’ Jackson points out that, ‘the range of experiences that are socially acknowledged 
and named is always much narrower than the range of experiences that people actually have’ 
(Jackson, 2002, p. 23). 
Language is clearly an important component of subjective experience and the section 
on Love in this thesis does address the impact of discursive ideals on the meaning of 
emotions. However, the joint emplacement of Israeli-Palestinian-International dissenters in 
clusters of small, interconnected, performances of dissent, presents an interesting and 
challenging instance of ‘language as local practice’ (Pennycook, 2010). The ‘local’ 
performance of spoken communication, in the convergence of highly fluid transnational lines, 
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is one in which communication is fraught with tied-tongues, stumbled sentences and 
misunderstandings, and speech acts are expressions of power, oppression, pride and shame. 
To take the two largest local languages, Hebrew and Arabic, the former is imagined 
and institutionally implemented as a shibboleth of hegemonic national identity, spoken only 
in one country in the world, the Jewish National Homeland. This ignores Palestinian-Israelis, 
Russian speaking immigrants, Yiddish speaking orthodox communities and a significant 
number of others for whom Hebrew is a second language.  The impressive revival of Hebrew 
is intimately tied to the building of the Israeli state and Israeli culture. Several participants 
have confided that they would not move abroad because, ‘Hebrew is how I think, how I 
express myself’. However, from my balcony in central Jerusalem, I am as likely to hear 
passing conversations in English or, because of the Maghrebi
31
 synagogue beside our home -  
French. If I walk fifteen minutes north from my apartment, throughout the Jewish Orthodox 
neighbourhoods of Mea Sharim  and Beit Israel, most of the residents are speaking Yiddish. 
As I turn East and leave Beit Israel, I cross the main road running north through the city. In 
doing so I cross ‘no man’s land’ and Green Line of the 1948 armistice, to enter the East 
Jerusalem neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah, where Arabic is the language of the street. This 
was my weekly walk to ‘work’, at the Sheikh Jarrah protest. It takes me less than half-an-
hour and attests to the everyday contestation of hegemonic norms of language in the city of 
Jerusalem.  
The majority of my Israeli participants spoke English better than I spoke Hebrew. 
There is a significant cohort in the older generation, from liberal or even communist 
traditions, who left the United States during the McCarthy witch-hunts or later in protest of 
the Vietnam War and its draft. Many of the younger generation are well educated, well 
travelled, dual passport holders, who grew up in homes speaking both English and Hebrew. 
Of my key participants, Vered was born and raised in England and came to Israel with her 
family when she was fifteen. Oz was born and raised in Israel but his parents came from 
Canada and the United States, where he himself lived and worked after his military service. 
Oz co-directs an NGO staffed by Palestinians and Internationals where English is the ‘office’ 
language. Moses was born in Israel but raised the US, returning to fulfil his national service 
duties - by refusing military conscription as a conscience objector and going to prison. 
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Though they dissent and speak perfect English, these individuals see themselves as Jewish 
and feel no less Israeli than anyone else. The linguistic talents of these participants without 
doubt fore-grounded their roles in this ethnography and my own lack of talent excluded 
others who may have shaped this text in a different way. 
The place and use of Arabic in the field is equally complex. Though Arabic is an 
official state language, very few Jewish Israelis have any real grasp of the language. Many of 
East Jerusalem’s Palestinians, those over the age of twenty, speak Hebrew but restrictions on 
movement and access to the Israel labour market over the last twenty years have greatly 
diminished the level of Hebrew for the younger generation and Palestinians in the West 
Bank. There are two notable exceptions to this linguistic otherness, both linked to conflict. 
Many Palestinians who have spent prolonged periods in Israeli military prison speak Hebrew 
and conversely, many Israelis who served in military intelligence units in the army are 
proficient in Arabic. However, as part of the deconstruction of the self, that accompanies the 
process of political dissent, some Israelis strive to become proficient in Arabic. ‘Learning 
Arabic completely changed how I saw this place [Jerusalem]’, Mayan a Jewish Jerusalemite 
told me. For Israeli dissenters, learning and speaking Arabic is not just a question of 
pragmatics or gaining an understanding of the Other, it is also a question of power and a 
discomfort with employing the ‘language of the oppressor’.  
At the same time many of the Palestinians I met, at the forefront of the popular 
committee protests, are proficient in English and utilise this skill to disseminate news through 
websites and communicate with international visitors. English is also commonly used in 
exchanges with Israelis, both to welcome those who come in solidarity and to berate Israeli 
soldiers who obstruct them. At demonstrations, such Al-Maasara and Beit Ummar, were 
protestors stand face-to-face with Israeli soldiers, I have almost never heard Palestinians 
address Israeli soldiers in Hebrew. Arabic however, is leveraged as ‘local’ power and 
identity, in the slogans and chants, for passing on tactical manoeuvres and in snide comments 
delivered to the ears of the ‘clueless’ soldiers. Arabic used in this way is both a symbol and 
tactic of resistance but in terms of communication between Israelis, Palestinians and 
Internationals the use of English is pervasive. It is not that English is simply the lingua 
franca, it seems that between Israeli-Palestinian relations it also offers a degree of 
independence from the oppressor-oppressed paradigm, which is linguistically paralleled in 
Hebrew-Arabic.  
English is the dominant language of the spoken exchanges which contributed to this 
thesis and shapes it conclusions. In-depth participation grew out of (or withered) because of 
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interpersonal rapport, which was greatly enabled by the fluid and productive ambiguity of 
spoken exchange. The question of discursive linguistic practices in transnational networks is 
challenging and complex, but is not the central concern of this thesis and the effort here is 
directed towards the ‘wordless knowledge’ of affect. My use of the categories of Weirdness 
and Wrongness are the result of the intersubjective nature of this ethnography. These 
categories neither fully describe the subjective experiences of my participants, nor are they 
captives of the particular textual labels they normally use to describe those experiences. They 
are products of the ‘third position’, a concept that comes once again from Arendt and form of 
knowing which I shall detail in the section on participant observation that follows. 
  
Similarly, gender is not only recognised as a significant shaper of affective processes, it also 
often presents real challenges to the practice of transnational solidarity activism. One of the 
most important observations on gendered affect differences is Arlie Hochschild’s work on 
‘emotion work’; the management of discrepancies between actual feelings and the dictates of 
an emotion culture. In this, Hochschild highlighted the particular constraints and 
expectations, of how female flight attendants should emote, constraints which reflected 
socially structured ideals of womanhood (Hochschild, 1979). Similarly, Kemper and Collins 
(1990) have documented the dynamics of power and status, or ‘prestige’, on the expectations 
and social exchange of emotion. As part of the wider social structure, which defines 
acceptable masculinities and femininities, any dramaturgical code necessarily reflects and 
reinforces gender roles. We may also point here to Gould’s (2004, 2009) work on the 
LGBT’s own particular emotional (sub-)culture in the US. There is also a substantial body of 
work on the role of gender in activism in general (see El-Bushra, 2007; Naples, 1998) and on 
various dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict I nparticular. Much of this has focused 
on women’s practices of resistance; in the occupied territories (Jean-Klein, 2000, 2003), in 
the Palestinian diaspora (Peteet, 1991), amongst Israeli Palestinians (Sa’ar, 2006) and on 
Palestinian and Israeli Jewish co-resistance (Mayer, 1994).  
The problem of integrating such work into this thesis is, once again, comes from the 
methodological decision not to engage with a single group or organisation within the wider 
community of transnational dissent. As such the ethnography reflects an impressive array of 
cultural, religious, generational and ideological understandings of gender. Take for example 
the Women in Black, an organisation consciously formed and practiced as a female 
expression of dissent, standing in silence in opposition to ‘injustice, war, militarism and other 
forms of violence’ (WIB, 2014). Though some of the original women approach the 
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occupation with sophisticated socio-political critiques others like Tali who features in the 
section on Love, by her own admission, ‘doesn’t know much about politics’. She sees herself 
as a woman but not a feminist. On the other hand, Vered is an activist with the Anarchists 
Against the Wall (AAtW), a collective which consciously struggles with gendered power 
imbalances within its own numbers. During fieldwork something of a crisis emerged in 
AAtW, when one of its female members was accused of sexually harassing one of the men in 
the organisation. Though there is a forty-year aged gap between Tali and Vered, they are both 
key participants in this work and they have often stood beside each other at the silent vigil in 
West Jerusalem, watching the Israeli men, who hurl disgusting sexual insults at them as they 
drive by. 
Leaving the Women in Black and walking down to Sheikh Jarrah, many Israeli and 
International women join the Friday protest in this East Jerusalem neighbourhood. The 
current organisers, and authorities, of this protest are three local Muslim Palestinian men. 
Rarely do local Palestinian women join the roadside demonstration, but they do make 
themselves available to visitors down in their homes. Younger Palestinian female activists, 
from the Hebrew University do sometimes attend as does Amany, a confidently assured 
Muslim woman from Ramallah who chats easily with everyone. There are often young 
Jewish Jerusalemites who are also involved in the city’s small LGBT scene, who struggle for 
equality and justice both as members of the gay community and as solidarity activists. This 
stands in contrast to the large and vibrant LGBT community in Tel Aviv, which mostly 
disassociates itself from the politics of the occupation. In terms of international visitors, the 
female contingent varies in age, origin, sexual orientation and political critique from week-to-
week, month-to-month.  Sheikh Jarrah was a largely quiet affair during fieldwork and the 
dynamics of social interaction was causal. The hour-and-a-half  that the protest lasts involves 
political conversation but not deliberation or tactical planning  and affords little opportunity 
to encounter or confront gendered power imbalances. 
Such differences do become more pronounced in the West Bank, where conservative 
Islamic attitudes are stronger. On one occasion in Beit Ummar, I met Vered and greeted her 
with a friendly hug and a kiss on the cheek, as we had become accustomed to doing. ‘Don’t 
kiss me here’, she whispered in my ear, ‘we’re in a Palestinian village now’. Such 
inappropriate actions occur on both sides and I have heard reports (though never direct) of 
young international women being sexually harassed by Palestinian men. I have never 
encountered local female Palestinians at the village protests in either Al-Maasara or Beit 
Ummar. These protests come eye-to-eye with the Israeli military. Though officially Jewish 
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Israeli women are conscripted, they do not generally serve in the combat units that police the 
Palestinian population in the territories and as such, there is a greater frequency of physical 
confrontation between opposing groups of men at these protests. Several female activists 
have lamented to me the underlying machismo that often accompanies this kind of dynamic.  
However, women do not hide away. The annual Resist for Change Women’s 
Conference has brought Palestinian, Israeli and International women together in Beit Ummar 
since 2010. I also met with a group of female students from Scotland at Beit Ummar, who 
were impressing all with their fearless confrontations with the Israeli forces, physically 
grabbing the arms and legs of soldiers who were attempting to arrest male Palestinian 
protestors. The driving force behind protests and other actions in Al-Walaja, was Fayrouz, an 
unmarried Muslim polyglot in her early thirties. Frustrated by the apathy of the men in the 
village, she once threatened to take off her hijab in their presence, inferring that they were not 
really men so she had no need for modesty in front of them. There are many other instances 
where gendered power is both leveraged and contested, from ‘Slut Walks’ in Tel Aviv to 
Jewish women being arrested in Hebron - for being dressed as Palestinians in the hijab and 
the traditional embroidered dress (see Rothman-Zecher, 2012). I believe that a few of these 
women were at both protests. The problem of including gender in this thesis is thus two-fold; 
the multiplicity of different cultural constraints that come together and the variety of 
instrumental, social and private contexts in which such meetings occur. None of the female 
participants in this research were unaware the pervasiveness of chauvinism in almost all 
contexts. However, as I shall discuss later in this thesis, the practice of transnational dissent 
subsumes or at least sublimates multiple aspects of endemic difference, through a shared 
feeling of Wrongness. 
 
Ways and knowing with participant observation  
My understanding of participant observation and the forms of knowledge it produces 
primarily references the works of Tim Ingold and Michael Jackson. As a practice the validity 
of its method is underwritten by its occurring within the sensuality and sociality of the field 
of study, which grounds ‘knowing in being [and] means that any study of human beings must 
also be a study with them’ (Ingold, 2008, p. 83 orig. emphasis). In Ingold’s world of 
continuous motion there is a comingling of mind and world in which any particular 
phenomenon to which we may turn our attention enfolds within it constitution a totality of 
relations. It emerges in the moment of unfolding and so any given experience is not 
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comprised of the individual but of the world itself as experienced from a particular 
observational path. ‘It is a world not so much mapped out as taken in from a particular 
vantage point’ (ibid p.81). For Ingold, by immersing herself in the world of participants’ 
activities the anthropologist learns to see, hear and touch things from the vantage points of 
her teacher participants. I would add that as I moved along the lines of dissent with my 
participants its patterned threads became inscribed experiences in my own embodied 
lifeworld, and I also began to feel things from the perspective of my participants. This is not 
to say that I felt what they felt at synchronous moments in some sort of collective emotion 
but that I began to feel things that they would recognise in their own affective lifeworld.  
To understand the meanings of these feelings I had to turn to my teacher-participants. 
This intersubjective practice of understanding is for Jackson (2009) the essence of 
ethnographic knowing and he adopts Arendt’s (1968) concept of judging as relating the 
particular to the form of knowledge ethnography produces. Though in learning to become a 
dissenter and moving along its lines with the guidance of others, I yet remained an academic. 
Such a tension, Jackson argues, exists whenever any two people engage in the activity of 
judging in the attempt to understand one another. Judging entails the attempt to see the world 
from the perspective of another, to distance oneself from the bias of our own lifeworld. One 
can never completely lose one’s self nor entirely become the other and so for Jackson judging 
requires ‘imaginative displacement’ from the self, the creative self estrangement of the 
ethnographer. Judging’s understanding, he thus considers, ‘implies a third position, reducible 
to neither one’s own nor the other’s: a view from in-between, from within the shared space of 
intersubjectivity itself’ (ibid p.238). However, in combining Ingold’s belief that we may 
come to see and feel like others with Jackson’s understanding in the third position, we see 
that the act of judging need not merely be an act of imagination – a mental exercise. The 
following section expands on these two concepts, the practice of participant observation of 
affective worlds and the form of knowledge it produces. In a very real sense I came to 
understand the field of transnational dissent because I came to feel it too. 
Learning with others to become another 
Because I had a car I regularly provided transport to and from events. 
Methodologically, the car proved a valuable resource. Jerusalem has no public transport on 
Shabbat, from sun-down on Friday till sun-down on Saturday, which crosses the times when 
most of the regular demonstrations are held. The Palestinian villages in the West Bank are not 
easily accessed by Israeli public transport even outside Shabbat and the wonderful little 
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Toyota Starlette with over 300,000km on its clock became a stalwart of ethnography. With 
this car not only did I provide a valued activist resource but the confines of the automobile on 
the way to and from protests proved to be an excellent and intimate environment in which to 
have and to hear informal conversation. Outside of the automobile protests and prayer groups 
are public rituals of dissent, they are intermittent and short-lived, but repetitive expressions of 
dissenting practice with the potential for the affective intensity of Interactional Ritualism. 
However, the experience of being a dissenter is not described by attendance to protest alone. 
For most of the week people are not engaged with such activities nor, from an ethnographic 
perspective, do they reside in some dissenting village or neighbourhood in which the 
researcher can live and observe and participate in their daily rituals. Dissenters are dispersed 
within a society that is at best apathetic to their distress and at worst hostile to the point of 
aggressive vitriol. Part of my participant observation thus included simply living in West 
Jerusalem, going to the shops, to Hebrew lessons, reading the paper, collecting kids from 
nursery, taking the bus to town or going to celebrate family occasions. This also formed part 
of my understanding and empathy with being a dissenter in this particular place. One need 
not be actively performing protest to be experiencing feelings of dissent. All participants 
spoke of sensing the occupation and inequality everywhere, in the non-citizen Palestinians or 
East Jerusalem working on construction sites, pumping your gas, stacking shelves in super-
markets, and in the apparent ease with which Jerusalem Israelis ignore the situation. Whilst 
the occupation is certainly not the sole object of intentionality, the lifeworld of dissent comes 
to shape how the entire city is experienced and becomes a background disposition whose 
potential for affective emergence is hypercognized.   
These are what Stewart (2007) calls the ‘ordinary affects’ of being, the particular twist 
here is that dissent constitutes a particular way of being. Far from the rush and fear and 
retching at protests in the occupied territories, participant observation also included all the 
mundane encounters and experiences that would be almost banal were they not so difficult 
for the dissenter to accommodate. I too began to feel the isolation participants spoke of within 
the flowing crowd of the city where almost no one is aligned with your views. I learnt that 
my tongue is sometimes best held and felt the relief and small joy when I met a fellow 
dissenter on the street. For a moment the griminess of the situation is freely expressed and 
laughed off before we continue on our separate ways. Aside from protests we would find 
ourselves at dinner-parties, birthdays, evenings out, holiday celebrations, sharing foods, 
laughs, backgrounds, reflections and hopes. These rich social exchanges are the stuff of 
ordinary sociality and are also always fully sensual experiences. Participation is experiential, 
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embodied, social and intentional. Sometimes intense and often banal, more than any other 
method it is through participant observation that I came to feel and to be recognized as 
belonging to the research field.  This is the long process of learning with that leads to a 
certain kind of knowing, one which for research purposes is relatively close to the ordinary 
and fluid (un)certainty of living. The purpose is to become intimately and experientially 
acquainted with being and becoming part of the field of inquiry (Odland Portisch, 2010; 
Venkatesan, 2010). You don’t have to be an ethnographer to go through the process of 
learning with other people. Observing and engaging with people is how people generally 
become practicing dissenters themselves, which in essence manifests the intersubjective 
understanding of others which Arendt (1968) calls for through the application of judging. The 
participant observer merely goes through this process with an awareness of her academic 
lifeworld. This leads one to reflect upon dissenting practices in particular ways while the 
daily routine of needing to observe, remember and record, to write journal reflections and 
supervision reports maintains a critical tension between participation and observation. So it 
was that I didn’t just enjoy and take comfort from the sociality produced by dissent, I also 
began to develop a thesis around its social processes and the role emotions play in shaping 
those processes. 
Knowing of feelings in the Third Position 
Interpretation of experiences in the field began with issues that emerged in that field 
and the process of interpretation is not separate from but overlaps with ‘data collection’. 
Repeated encounters with a phenomenon began to shape the line of inquiry, such as with 
weirdness, and were discussed with participants; did they see or experience these phenomena 
in the same way as I did? Did they feel these are significant experiences and what meaning 
do they assign to them? In this process the inputs of key participants were – well, key. I 
openly began to discuss my thoughts on weirdness both with individuals and in groups where 
my intuition that this was a significant dimension of affect was reinforced. As one participant 
said to me, ‘If you’re looking at weirdness you’ve come to the right place’. With regards to 
emotion the question must be asked though as to the extent to which the embodied and 
subjective affect experiences of others may be recorded, analyzed, interpreted and 
represented with academic rigor and validity. The wonderful contention of Durkheim and 
Mauss (1903, p. 88) that ‘emotion is naturally refractory to analysis […] defies critical and 
rational examination’ is no longer an acceptable proposition. If the validity of the knowledge 
on affective experiences of others presented here is underwritten by having immersed myself 
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in their world and learnt with my participants, the form that knowledge takes is a product of 
ongoing intersubjective exchanges between myself and participants – our attempts to 
understand each other. Such knowledge, Jackson (2009) argues, resides neither in complete 
knowledge of the self nor the other but in what Arendt called the third position which 
emerges when people engage the faculty of judging in the attempt to truly understand each 
other.  
In the first instance subjective experiences, though experienced in the body and mind, 
can be expressed and discussed verbally.  Ricoeur (1991) pointed to the ‘derivative character 
of linguistic meaning’ and for Csordas such textuality not only represents but ‘discloses’ 
Heidegger’s Dasein, the process of embodiment and intersubjective experience of the world 
(Csordas, 1994, p. 42). Thus, if a participant says ‘this is bizarre’ or ‘it’s just not normal’ they 
are most likely genuine linguistic components of affective phenomenon. This is not to say 
that people do not hide or manipulate the affective meanings they ‘report’ to the researcher 
(A. R. Hochschild, 1979)  but the long-term nature of ethnography fosters an intimacy which 
helps overcome misunderstandings. Firstly, there is interpersonal intimacy with key 
participants from which genuinely reflective and honest exchanges proceed. Secondly, there 
is cultural intimacy where one learns the ‘emotional culture’ of the field, its affective 
structures as it were (Herzfeld, 1997). As the researcher participates in being and becoming a 
dissenter she also feels the uncertainty, fear, anger, dejection, and fatigue. She laughs at the 
ironic in-jokes and looks forward to seeing her fellow dissenters next weekend. I came to 
understand the subtleties of the field and see the unvoiced emotions in the faces and bodies of 
people I knew. And they of course also read me. With a growing intimacy comes the capacity 
to empathize. This is true for any social field, indeed any sense of belonging or attempt to 
understand another necessitates the attempt to empathise emotionally (Arendt, 1968; Berezin, 
2001; Hollan, 2008).  
So emotions of others whether overtly expressed, clearly seen or half-sensed can be 
recorded and transcribed by the researcher with a relatively high degree of reliability. There 
are numerous systematic methods which can be applied to its analysis. Anthropology has 
various intricate and robust variations of semiotics, discourse, network or situational analyses 
and other modes of analysis which may be applied to such eminently codifiable qualitative 
data, as the where, when and why of given feelings. However, as Ingold (2008) points out, 
analyzing data and representing processes in such a fashion would be to deconstruct the 
whole in order to rebuild an abstraction and Jackson argues that the subjugation of ‘the bodily 
to the semantic is empirically untenable’ (Jackson, 1989, p. 122). On what basis then can I 
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claim the reliability and validity of my abstractions about the affective lives of my 
participants? How can I be certain that their experience of weirdness, wrongness and love are 
not merely my simplistic impositions on their complex and unfolding subjectivity? The 
simple answer is that for a time I too became a dissenter, moved along its paths, empathised 
with the plurality of its peoples, experienced the sensuality of its world in a particular way 
and became a trusted sounding board for the hopes and confusions of people I came to know 
well.  
In this the positivist ‘flaw’ of reflexivity is inverted and the researcher must be 
affected by the field. Affect is an unavoidable consequence of the unavoidable relationships 
of ethnography and part of the process by which we all experience and make sense of the 
world and its plurality. For Jackson to realise this ‘eventfulness of being’ is to discover that 
what emerges in the course of human interaction confounds discursive labels such as male or 
female, Israeli or Palestinian. So for the ethnographer (or anyone else) to truly understand the 
subtle and ordinary complexity of others requires ‘distance from subjective private conditions 
[...] through imaginative displacement – reconsidering one’s own world from the standpoint 
of another’ (Jackson, 2009, p. 237). However, despite the wilful act of imaginative 
displacement which occurs when we try to understand the lifeworld of another, we do not 
lose our own being nor can we suppose to know the minds of others. Our thoughts are 
influenced by the thoughts of others and the knowledge is produced, ‘reducible to neither 
one’s own nor the other’s: a view from in-between, from within the shared space of 
intersubjectivity itself’ (ibid, p. 238). This is true of any intersubjective attempt of judging, 
regardless of whether or not this occurs within a researcher-participant relationship. 
However, Jackson argues that the ‘creatively estranged attitude’ which ethnographers are 
trained to adopt is inimical to its knowledge and understanding. If we allow that in learning 
with people we come to see and feel as they sometimes do, then the ethnographer has moved 
beyond ‘imagination’ and towards empathising. Nonetheless, this attempt to lose the self and 
see the world from another’s perspective always remains incomplete but the effort itself is 
Jackson asserts, the practice of Arendt’s faculty of judging. The tension between researcher 
and participant is never lost, nor is it necessary for it to disappear altogether for such would 
be a completely unnatural intersubjective experience. The difference remains and is 
productive, for it is the requisite for the active engagement and conversation of judging in 
which understanding is collaboratively produced in the third position of intersubjectivity. 
The knowing and understanding upon which this thesis is based comes both from my 
own experiences of being and moving along the lines of dissent and from relationships 
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developed with participants whose movements intersected with the trajectory of my particular 
lines. The emotional lives described are reducible to neither the researcher’s nor the 
participant’s but are a product of the intersection of academic and activist lifeworlds, a 
collaborative understanding created in the third position. I learnt by being ‘here’ to feel and 
attend to the shock of concrete at checkpoints and slabs cutting the countryside, to lament the 
heat of summer and unexpected winter snow, to walk the steepness of the city hills at a 
laconic pace and to check over my shoulder at the sound of a gas grenade being launched 
while leaving a protest site. Such sensuality was also in the company of others, affecting both 
the communality of Pink’s (2008) emplaced sociality and enabling the intersubjective 
production of understanding through judging as elided by Jackson (2009). I would stress that 
such understandings are not limited to people who have walked together at the same specific 
place and time, for more than frequently my memories of such experiences have been 
recognisably shared by people encountered far from protest sites whom have also travelled 
along similar lines along which dissent is practiced and experienced in Israel and Palestine. 
Such an understanding of participant observation and the form of the understandings it 
reaches is I believe a valid and productive method by which the uncertainty and ambiguity of 
any social experience becomes knowable and sharable.  
Ethics  
Fieldwork was carried out in line with Loughborough University's code of practice (LU, 
2012) and the Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK ethical guidelines (ASA, 
2011). The physical, social and psychological well-being of participants is paramount and 
every effort was made to ensure their continued safety. All participants were explicitly 
informed of my role as a researcher in the field and consent to participate was requested prior 
to inclusion in the ethnography. In large groups or impromptu one-off conversations with 
individuals consent was often verbally sought and given, as handing out information sheets 
and consent forms was sometimes impractical. With formal interviews and in-depth 
participation over an extended period, written consent was sought and received. This process 
included issuing participants a project information sheet, a discussion of the protection of the 
individual's privacy and anonymity, and their right to withdraw from participation at any 
time. Informed consent was (and is) an ongoing process of negotiating the needs of the 
research and the trust and safety of participants.  
Protests in Area C of the West bank are carried out in contravention of Israeli military 
law, and the activities of activists are overtly and covertly monitored by agents from the 
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police, the military and the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal secret security service. Several 
participants have been arrested or contacted directly for ‘casual conversations’ by the Shin 
Bet. As such pseudonyms have been used throughout the research project in all forms of 
recording, including fieldnotes and in the following ethnography. I remain vigilant and open 
about possible harmful repercussions of discussing sensitive issues or situations. This concern 
extends to representations presented in the ethnographic descriptions and to the safeguarding 
of the original fieldnotes. It is common practice in ethnography to also use a pseudonym for 
the place in which fieldwork was carried out. The use of pseudonyms for locations does 
however present both practical and ethical issues for using fictitious names in place of 
Jerusalem (al-Quds), Hebron (al-Hallil), Ramallah or Tel Aviv would so radically 
decontextualise these cities as to render their description and relationship to the practices of 
dissent unfeasible. It could have been possible to use pseudonyms for the various 
neighbourhoods and villages where dissent is practiced. However, these protests are not only 
well known but also most Palestinian activists are very concerned that their particular local 
struggle is publicized, and from an ethical point of view the engaged ethnographical approach 
taken in this project is also an attempt to do just that. 
While it is imperative that no harm is done to research participants, to Loughborough 
University nor to the discipline of anthropology itself, the efforts outlined in the preceding 
are ethical minimalism. Such an approach is as much designed to protect or ‘bullet proof’ 
academia institutions (Strathern, 2006). As I write it is the end of 2014 and though fieldwork 
ended two years ago I remained in Jerusalem with my family. Since the end of the fieldwork 
period there had been the heavy munitions exchanges of Operation Pillar of Defence in 
November 2012. The following year saw the first official negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority since Annapolis in 2007. The process went nowhere and collapsed in 
April 2014 and the logic of this small coastal nation filled that void and descended into a 
brutality that is both depressingly familiar in form, yet more venomously expressed than 
previously experienced by many participants with whom I was still in close contact. Some 
Palestinians and Israelis came to feel it is legitimate to kidnap and kill children. On June 12, 
2014 Eyal Yifrach (19), Gilad Shaer (16) and Naftali Frenkel (16) were abducted in the West 
Bank. Prime Minister Netanyahu blamed Hamas and launched Operation Brothers Keeper to 
find the boys during which the IDF arrested almost 300 Palestinians in the West Bank, most 
of them Hamas affiliates. Some of my participants told me they had not seen the IDF acting 
with such severity since the Second Intifada. The bodies of the three boys were found after 
eighteen days. It is now clear that the government and security officials knew the boys had 
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been killed immediately. It also seems highly unlikely that Hamas planned or sanctioned the 
kidnap and killings. I was aghast at the cynical exploitation of the tragedy and the vitriol of 
certain government officials. Two days later Mohammed Abu Khdeir (15) from Shua’fat in 
East Jerusalem was kidnapped, taken to a forest in West Jerusalem, doused with petrol and 
burnt alive. Jewish Israeli mobs took to the street chanting Mavat Aravim (Death to Arabs), 
attacking Palestinians and Left-wing activists. Yet another Israeli ‘operation’ called 
Protective Edge began in Gaza and its death toll managed to exceed Pillar of Defence. During 
this time people are being shot and killed in places I used to demonstrate. In Beit Ummar 
where I regularly attended the weekly demonstration 3 people were shot dead. It seems that 
this demonstration differed in size and not tone to the ones I participated in. On three 
occasions air-raid sirens rang out over Jerusalem as rockets from Gaza approached. I took my 
children to stand in the stairwell with the neighbours on one occasion but my fear of been 
attacked in the street by Israeli right-wingers was most palpable. At the same time a family 
birthday brought me together with extended members who live in a Moshav just seven 
kilometres from the Gaza border. The mother, whom I’ve casually known for a decade, was 
at her wits end with the constant barrage of missiles and mortars. Though she lived in a 
proximity to the dangers, which the mobs of Jerusalem did not, her feelings were much more 
nuanced – and compassionate. ‘Hamas is one thing’ she argued with her father, ‘but how can 
one million people live like that?’. Personally speaking, as an academic, as aresident of 
Jerusalem and as a father of two Israeli children, I am frankly disgusted by what came to pass 
in 2014 and I find it difficult to theoretically address ethical considerations. What is clear is 
that it is entirely insufficient that research ethics is understood as doing no harm. Something 
must be done to help.    
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Part I 
Weird 
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4. Strange Things: Ethnography of the Unexpected 
As with each of the three parts to this thesis, this section on weirdness is divided into two 
chapters. The first chapter begins with a general introduction to the forms and practice of the 
solidarity protests I engaged with in the fieldwork period. Though as mentioned before much 
of my ethnographic encounters involved the sociality of transnational dissent away from the 
schedule of demonstrations, these weekly rituals constitute fundamental anchor points which 
shape the recognisable pattern in the meshwork and socially emplace participants in a 
shareable sensual world which is particular to solidarity activism in Palestine and Israel. 
Indeed, though there are many other factors, I would argue that without the decision of the 
local committees in the various villages and neighbourhoods to invite Israelis and 
Internationals to participate in their acts of non-violent resistance, the global pro-Palestinian 
movement would have neither the same scale nor affective depth as it does today. These 
events are also where the ‘logic’ of Israel's military occupation is stressed and begins to seem 
weird. The second half of this chapter is an extended ethnographic account of a single protest 
in the West Bank city of Hebron. The aim of this account is to reveal, by inducement of this 
feeling in the reader, how weirdness also permeates the lives of Palestinians and their 
attempts to resist the daily impositions of occupation. The following chapter then develops a 
theory of weirdness and its relationship to hegemonic elements of the lifeworld, the faculty of 
thinking and social movement mobilisation. I submit that weirdness emerges in intentional 
experience as a feeling, a pre-cognitive form of wordless knowledge. What that affective 
knowledge represents is the failure of our acculturated expectations to accord with the 
intentional experience of the world. It is not an immediately motivating affect like fear and 
can be easily dismissed as a momentary aberration or trick of the eye, not something we need 
to think about too much. But sometimes the weirdness lingers, it can persist like a 
background mood almost unnoticed, it may recur or be recalled as almost forgotten in a 
different context at a later time. The initial intentional appraisal may thus turn to niggling 
doubt as to the validity or veracity of our received interpretations which failed to describe 
experience. This is not doubt as caused by Arendt's notion of thinking, but by a simple and 
sometimes subtle feeling. It this capacity to cause doubt that makes the encounter with the 
weird so potentially important to the emergence of dissent and the movement towards 
concerted political action.  
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Scary, boring, crazy: Forms of demonstration in the field  
In truth I did not travel extensively during fieldwork and most of the demonstrations I 
attended were not ‘hot’, neither in the sense of being heavily attended nor in terms of having 
a reputation for lethal levels of suppressive violence being used by Israeli security agencies. 
From reports I received from participants and through social media Nabi Salah and Kafr 
Kadum seemed to have been both well attended and sometimes lethal. There was a death at 
Nabi Salah just before I began fieldwork and another just after I finished. Mustafa Tamimi 
and Rushdi Tamimi were both Palestinian, both from the same family in this small village of 
less than 400 people on a remote hilltop in the West Bank. I never felt in mortal danger, for 
you are much more likely to be killed if you're Palestinian for two main reasons. In the first 
instance, it is the local activists that conceive of, plan, mobilize and lead all actions and so 
they present a vanguard to Israeli forces. Israelis and Internationals are invited to protest in 
solidarity and most of them feel that their primary role is to bear witness to the proceedings. 
However, in doing so they also triple the size of the protest group for I would say that most 
actions I attended were made up of one third Palestinians, one third Internationals and one 
third Israelis. The Israelis in particular feel that their presence reduces the likelihood of 
excessive violence on the part of IDF or police. I would call this the lesser reason that it is 
mostly Palestinians who are killed, for it is difficult not to conclude that the greater reason is 
that they are primary targets and easier to kill in terms of consequences. It is Palestinians who 
get arrested first and the military courts have a 90 percent conviction rate. It is the homes of 
the popular protest committees that get raided at night and 90 percent of fatalities at protests 
are Palestinian. Most killings occur because of ‘improper’ use of non-lethal dispersal 
weaponry, tear-gas canisters being fired directly at the head or chest at short range and 90% 
of the military's investigations into fatalities are dropped because of insufficient evidence. 
Though I have read various sources using these numbers I don't cite sources here for 
though 90 percent seems like an incontrovertible statistic to throw about, it contains enough 
ambiguity which strangely seems to serve the forces of occupation more than those who resist 
it. 90 percent of the time no one is killed, for which I feel gratefully relieved, but one can also 
say that most of the time soldiers are not gunning down unarmed protesters and so they are 
showing restraint. Often arrests are made in the West Bank because the IDF deems 90 percent 
of protests there are in direct convention of Military Ordinance 101 which prohibits 
‘political’ gatherings of ten or more people. The use of stun grenades, gas, water cannon or 
physical restrain during arrests occasionally incurs injury, but only ten percent of the time 
and only for people clearly refusing to accord with the rule of law. In cases where the injury 
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is fatal the IDF conduct an investigation and very occasionally, they can publicise 
disciplinary measures against one their own as grave transgressions of military terms of 
engagement. Though in fairness I would guess this happens probably less than one percent of 
the time but such ruling receives at much more publicity in the mainstream Israeli press than 
the ‘legal’ killing of Palestinians – which basically isn’t reported. That Ten-to-One can 
encompass such certain ambiguity seems strange to me, but then again statistics and 
probabilities are dark arts to me so I can't be certain of anything at all and I have no figures to 
back up this feeling. The question thus becomes one of faith in the authority of the provider 
of what are said to be ‘facts’ about the world but are more often what Mills called the 
received interpretations of others (Mills, 1967). 
Such are the given conditions of protest in the West Bank in particular and in the 
course of demonstrations I was witness to scuffles and shovings, stun grenade at my feet, 
some gas in my lungs, the odd 'skunk' cannon spraying nearby and also arrests. The grim 
brutality which soldiers and police are trained to instinctively employ when called upon 
always disturbed me. Though many soldiers often looked unsure and on-edge, there always 
seemed to be some in the armed line eager to unleash their training. Visibly frustrated by 
simply holding their ground they glared with the confidence of contempt at protesters, 
singling out an individual Palestinian with the unspoken but unmistakable threat of violence 
to come. The Israelis they would address more directly, asking them where they lived: “Ah 
you live in Tel Aviv? I live there too. I'll see you there”. I witnessed such intimate exchanges 
at Al-Massara and Beit Ummar, both of which are about forty minutes drive south of 
Jerusalem and were the West Bank weekly protests I attended most frequently. Unlike Nabi 
Salah and Kafr Kadum north of Jerusalem, where the protesters rarely get near security forces 
before the gas grenades are launched, the smaller demonstrations in Al-Massara and Beit 
Ummar are met by a line of soldiers with riot-shields. I was always behind the line of 
Palestinians - or even behind the soldiers which didn't seem to bother them. But when the 
order to break up the demo and arrest people came there was often a confusion of scattering 
bodies and I would run in self-preservation through some rocky olive grove while others got 
knocked to the ground with blood running from their heads. I was never of interest to the 
soldiers, except once towards the end of fieldwork. The protest at Al-Massara had finished 
and as we walked back to my car, the senior officer, a young and intimidatingly composed 
lieutenant with the Border Police, was walking beside us with one of his colleagues. “I've 
seen you before, haven't I – Beit Ummar?”, he asked me in Hebrew. I admitted it, smiling 
with forced nonchalance and trying to maintain a leisurely pace.  I barely missed a beat when 
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he asked me where I lived. “Ah”, he said “Moshav Ora, I know it. Maybe I'll see you there”. 
I didn't go back to Al-Massara. 
I made many other more sporadic trips to the West Bank. I was at Susiya in the South 
Hebron Hills a number of times but only once during a demonstration. I visited Ramallah 
three times, twice for salon-type discussions on books about the systems of occupation and 
once when I was ‘deported’ from the Qalandiya checkpoint for irregularities in my paper-
work. I often visited Hizme just over the concrete wall north of Jerusalem, where Salah, a 
Palestinian promoter of non-violence, lived with his family. Salah would also bring me to 
‘coexistence’ type events in Jerusalem, where Israelis and Palestinians would meet. 
Sometimes he was the only Palestinian there. There were also a couple of larger events in Tel 
Aviv that were on the scale of thousands of people rather than hundreds or dozens. 
Combatants for Peace organised an alternative Remembrance Day event attended by maybe 
three thousand Israelis and a large and loud march through the Tel Aviv which encompassed 
a broad spectrum of Israeli dissent, from Anarchists Against the Wall, Shalom Achshav to the 
left-wing parliamentary party Meretz. All these trips were integral to my initiation and 
integration to the meshwork movements of dissent but the majority of fieldwork occurred in 
Jerusalem where I lived.  
Two large and disturbingly frightening demonstrations occurred in Jerusalem during 
fieldwork. These were both annual calendar events, one marking Palestinian Land Day and 
the other Jerusalem Day. The former commemorates events of March 30
th
, 1976 when Israeli 
security killed six and wounded about one hundred Palestinian citizens at demonstrations 
across the state against government expropriation of Arab lands for Jewish settlement 
development. The latter celebrates Israel’s ‘re-unification’ of Jerusalem after the Six Day 
War in 1967. In the first a few thousand Palestinians gather across from the Damascus Gate, 
the social and commercial heart of East Jerusalem, and after holding mid-day prayers attempt 
to march through the gates and into the Muslim Quarter of the Old City. This attempt is met 
with formidable police resistance with stun grenades, batons and mounted units charging 
down Nablus Road and Salah HaDin Street. The muscular momentum of enormous police 
horses bearing down on me was more frightening than anything else I experienced and the 
barriers and narrow streets made it difficult to find safety in the mayhem. In contrast, 
Jerusalem Day, which occurs in June, is a family event sanctioned and promoted by the 
municipality and marked by state ceremonies and memorial services. It draws tens of 
thousands of Israelis waving huge Israeli flags heading for the Western Wall Plaza for the 
Dance of the Flags. This celebration also enters the Old City through the Damascus Gate and 
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proceeds through the Muslim Quarter. It has become a triumphant nationalist annual event, 
which for an Irishman like me was reminiscent of the Orange Order marching through 
Catholic neighbourhoods in Northern Ireland. A protest of maybe several hundred 
Palestinians and a few dozen Israelis and Internationals was organised and met just as with 
Land Day, by muscular policing, charging horse and all. The two events are only a few 
months apart. Two categories of people desire to march into the Old City via its most 
majestic (and most Palestinian) portico. One event allows tens of thousands of Jewish citizens 
to do so. At both events the ferocity of police actions are directed towards Palestinians and 
was some of the most intense and frightening I experienced in the field.  
To a great degree violent confrontation between Israeli security forces and Palestinian 
protesters accorded with my expectations. In the beginning I was on edge when travelling to 
and through East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Only gradually did I learn to be most afraid 
when soldiers or riot police came into view. However, (here it is again) 90 percent of the 
protests I attended in Jerusalem did not involve Israeli security. Is this the reason there was 
no violence? There were a number of small demonstrations outside the Damascus Gate where 
only a few dozen people turned up, nobody passing by paid attention and I felt like an idiot 
standing in the intense and glaring heat of the midday sun. There is not a sliver of shade in 
that white limestone bowl. The weekly events I participated in were the silent vigil of Women 
in Black and the demonstration at Sheikh Jarrah. Oddly enough it is the former where 
tensions were more likely to rise, for it is an Israeli protest in front of an Israeli population. 
On a number of occasions the regular verbal vitriol directed at these women, most of whom 
are grandmothers, became intimidating when some muscular young man of military age 
decided to get in close and personal, maybe grab a placard or spit on the women before being 
held back by his mates. At Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem the protest has to some extent no 
apparent audience. Passing drivers honk their horns in support, orthodox Jews walk past on 
their way to the tomb of Simon HaTzadik unhindered and only twice in the year did I see an 
altercation with a settler. 
It must be remembered that the popular committee protests are epiphenomena, usually 
consequences of particular acts of dispossession; a well in Nabi Salah, a strip of farm land 
taken for a security fence in Beit Ummar, the demolition of a portaloo on the barren hills of 
Susiya, or the eviction of a few scattered families in Sheikh Jarrah. Indeed in Sheikh Jarrah 
settlers have managed to take over the front half of one house, while the Palestinian family 
remains in the back half. Each of these instances of dispossession were, on separate 
occasions, described to me as ‘microcosms of the occupation’. Whilst security forces are 
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brought in to execute or protect expropriations it is the daily mundane control of the minutiae 
of life that best describes the logic of occupation. This logic is, by the necessity of 
maintaining some semblance and self-image of liberal democracy and rule of law, very 
strange. So too is life under its rule and the subsequent attempts to resist its impositions by 
the popular committees and solidarity activists. Take for instance the case of Hebron, also 
described as a microcosm, and its annual Open Shuhada Street demonstration described in 
the following section. In 1994 Baruch Goldstein, a doctor from the settlement of Kiryat Arba 
which adjoins Hebron, walked into the mosque in the Tomb of the Patriarchs dressed in his 
army uniform carrying his military Galil assault rifle and four magazines of ammunition. He 
killed 29 worshippers and injured more than one hundred more before being overcome and 
killed. A participant of mine who was a serving soldier in Hebron that day told me: “The 
Palestinians were piling bodies on car bonnets and driving off, I realised that day we were 
protecting the wrong people. We should have been protecting the Palestinians from the 
settlers”. Still in the logic of occupation Israel chose to impose restrictions on the 
Palestinians, rather than on the Israeli settlers in the city, contending that these restrictions 
were necessary in order to protect the settlers’ safety. At first, Israel forbade Palestinian 
commerce and vehicle traffic on part of the Shuhada Street, and only residents of the street 
were allowed to enter by vehicle. The situation has progressed since then and Palestinians are 
forbidden to even to walk along the section between the city centre Israeli settlement 
compounds of Avraham Avinu and the Beit Hadassah where about five hundred Israelis live. 
The army also prohibits Palestinian traffic on adjacent streets, thereby creating a contiguous 
strip of land in the centre of Hebron from the Kiryat Arba settlement in the east to the Jewish 
cemetery in the West in which Palestinian vehicles are completely forbidden. This has led to 
an economic collapse of the city centre and its historical market which has become a ghost 
town. The few Palestinian residents left on the street are prohibited from even walking on it 
or using their front doors, many of which have been welded shut by the military. Each 
Shabbat, Israeli settlers accompanied by Israeli security conduct tours for Israeli supporters 
through this deserted city centre. It is baffling. 
I did not know it beforehand, but the Open Shuhada Street demonstration is probably 
the largest annual solidarity protest of the calendar year. There is something of a festival 
atmosphere to it with buses coming from all over the West Bank and Israel. Faces are 
recognised, greetings and welcomes made as the crowds converge at the starting point on the 
outskirts of the city, unimpeded in their movements by the total absence of the IDF. I would 
estimate the number of marchers to have been easily three thousand (I became quite good at 
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gauging crowd size by counting attendance at every demo and comparing crowds to 
nightclub dance-floors). The size of the protest was also matched by the military capacity 
which was organised to terminate the march just before the checkpoint to Shuhada Street in 
the city centre. Again to a large degree the ensuing clashes reflected the imagery famous in 
global media; green armoured cars and green armoured men against masked stone throwing 
youths in jeans abound. Yet there was much that surprised me that day in the centre of city 
which was obviously familiar with the logic and mayhem of occupation and repression. Cars 
continued to drive through the streets even as ambulances and armoured cars flashed by. 
Onions fell from the sky and we were invited for tea on the veranda. The Hebronites certainly 
do not think this is a normal life but that they're so well versed in managing such situations, is 
in itself difficult to comprehend. The following extract from my fieldnotes, though refined for 
readability, was typed up on the evening after the demonstration. It is included here not 
merely as an introduction to the discussion on Weirdness as an affect but also in an attempt to 
invoke that feeling in the reader. I recount the events of the day as I recalled experiencing 
them that evening. I do not attempt to make any given event in the day purposely bizarre or 
confusingly constructed but I ask the reader to remain open to moments in which they feel 
that events in the text simply don’t make sense. 
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Open Shuhada Street demonstration, Hebron city centre, 2012. 
 
I arrived at the Jerusalem meeting point for 
transport to Hebron in Gan HaPamon at around 
9am
32
. The Jerusalem marathon was on that day 
and there were people everywhere in tracksuits 
and trainers. I saw Vered across the way and went 
over to see her. I got a hug. We boarded the 
privately hired coach and as we set off were given 
a briefing by someone at the front of the bus. We were told to ‘buddy-up as it’s easy to get 
lost in Hebron’. Vered suggested we should be buddies for the day. She said she’d been 
tasked with videoing the demo for live streaming on the Internet and as we drove south she 
set up the streaming service application on her smart phone. I struck up a really nice 
conversation with Aaron. He seemed to be a bit worried and told me, ‘this is the first time 
I've been at this kind of demo’. He'd started protesting at Sheik Jarrah in East Jerusalem and 
had met people there who told him that he should come to South Hebron with Ta'ayush 
where he ‘could make a real difference’. He didn't make much of his activism. He told me 
that he was no new to solidarity activism but his sense of the unknown and the tension 
surrounding Hebron would be a recurrent theme of many people I met that day. It was visible 
in the faces and bodies and testimonies of many people that day. As Hebron was also 
unknown to me I was rather unaware of the potential for danger and fear at this demo, I was 
blithely ignorant. Myself and Aaron had a good chat about Internet design and development. 
We enjoyed ourselves for the hour before we arrived. 
There were other buses arriving at the rendezvous point somewhere in the suburbs of 
Hebron, no one seemed to know where we were exactly. People milled about and greeted and 
smiled. A young handsome man called me with his eyes as I passed and warmly introduced 
himself. He was a musician from Jericho and had come on a bus with 15 other Palestinians. 
‘Buses have come from all over the West Bank’, he told me. Though smiling and friendly he 
was clearly nervous too and asked me, ‘Do you know what’s going to happen today, I’ve 
never been to Hebron or anything like this?’ I began to feel there was something I should be 
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worried about. Vered came over and asked me to help fit her gas-mask on while someone 
gave her instructions for filming. ‘No cursing, no faces of stone throwers, no activist 
commentary, keep it to a minimum’. ‘When do I start filming?’ she asked. ‘You'll know 
when you get there’, was the reply. We set off with no one nearby certain where we were or 
where we were going. We just followed the crowd. ‘You look tense’, I said to Vered as we 
walked and she filmed. ‘I am tense!’ 
The march didn't look too big, a few hundred people, yet considerably bigger than 
anything else I’d been to which had never exceeded forty or fifty people. I still see no soldiers 
or police anywhere and I’m expecting to be stopped at any minute. I meet a guy from 
Tulkaram quite by mistake as I offered to let him pass at a tight spot, holding out my hand to 
offer him priority passage, he shook it instead and (thinking I spoke Arabic from my little 
intro) we struck up a conversation. He asked that we pose for a photo. I told him I had to 
catch up with my buddy and left. We would see each other again. We soon came to a halt 
outside a large mosque where another group was waiting. Our little march with banners and 
chants had just been a stroll to get to the start of the main demo. As we set off we were 
maybe one or two thousand people. Large banners, lots of flags –Youths Against Settlements 
movement was the main organiser but the lead banner at the front read (in English) ‘Open 
Shuhada Street’ and was carried by women who formed the vanguard of the main group. 
There was a car with flying Fatah flags and calling chants in Arabic through a megaphone. 
Hi-vis marshals ran back and forward to keep the Shebab
33
 and others from running too far 
ahead. I kept my eye on Vered guiding her as she walked backwards filming. Lots of 
chanting, lots of energy all round us. We walked for quite a while – about half-an-hour - 
which for reasons I don’t understand felt odd to me. We still didn't know where we were or 
where we were going. 
 
Vered:  ‘There's the army, see the blue light?’ 
Me:  ‘I see some shoulders on a balcony’ 
Vered:  ‘Help me with my mask’ 
 
We were fairly close to the front of the march, about 20 metres and there are hundreds of 
people in front and thousands behind us. The tension was now higher in me and Vered and 
myself kept close together. Then there’s a volley of loud percussions from gas-grenade 
launchers which hiss as they fly though air and the whole crowd in front of us – hundreds of 
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people – suddenly turn and run towards us. We rush to the side of the street clinging against a 
metal fence wall. Danger. This is dangerous. I am afraid the army is about to charge, I’m 
worrying about the crowd knocking us down. There's gas in front and behind us and we’re 
crouched in a corner beside a steel container. ‘We gotta go back!’ I shout at Vered and I lead 
us past the container, keeping close to the side, head down, glancing over my shoulder, 
beginning to feel the gas stinging my eyes and throat. We run back to a large junction in the 
road and turn off the main street to the right. Vered still has her gas mask on. I'm spitting and 
coughing and my eyes sting. It’s not so bad though once you get away. 
People all round us are coughing up, all eyes are streaming. Then I get hit on the head 
by something falling from above. But it’s not hard like a stone. I see onions lying on the 
ground all around me and more are still falling. I look up to the roofs above where the onions 
are being thrown down by dozens of women. Sniffing onions is used to alleviate the irritant 
in tear-gas. Some kid offers me ‘alcol’ – the small surgical wipes which are also sniffed 
against tear-gas and work better than onions - no thanks I say, I have some. Another young 
girl comes along and asks me for ‘alcol’ wipes so I give her all I have – I'm thinking well the 
demo is now over so I won’t need them but down on the main road we see people (all men?) 
moving forward and then running back. It’s an urban area and the inclines of the side streets 
are steep enough to hide the main road below so we go back down to film from the junction 
we’d fled from. It’s about forty metres from the main IDF road-block. Amazingly cars are 
still driving on the main road even as ambulances go up and down to the clash point. The 
crowd mass has gone and there’s lots of people milling about. It’s quite easy for us to make 
our way back up cautiously towards the point we’d run from. Vered is filming and 
commentating. 
 
Me:  ‘If something happens we're running right, OK?’  
Vered:  ‘OK’ 
 
Suddenly a large armoured vehicle comes racing up the side road behind us, about to cut off 
our planned escape route and we dash back across the junction just before the looming lump 
of hard green roars past our heels. It feels as if the soldiers are coming, moving in, they're 
mobile now. We’ve no idea where to run to. 
 
Vered: ‘I don't know where to go!’  
Me:  ‘Down this way!’ 
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We run down an alley and find ourselves in some open ground at the back of the buildings. It 
feels safer but the tension follows us. Others are also scattering through this space and we 
hop over a wall after them as the sting of gas starts to bite again. We hear the engines of jeeps 
in high revs somewhere very near then a voice calling ‘Hello, hello! This way, this way’. I 
look up and there’s a man calling us from the roof-top four stories above us, signalling us to 
the entrance of his building. We find the door and climb the stairwell, panting and relieved. 
As we pass the apartments on the way up we see many children, 4-8 year-olds, in the 
stairwell holding their noses, their eyes watering as the traces of gas come into the homes. 
We reach the top floor and come out onto the terrace roof from where we were hailed. There's 
others here too; a older man, a journalist from Cairo, a young Palestinian journalist from the 
Ma'an news agency, half-a-dozen others. The man who had called us up was the father of a 
family, a rotund and smiling gent well dressed and relaxed. ‘Welcome, welcome’, he said to 
all. He spoke no English nor Hebrew and we knew no Arabic. We were brought coffee and 
tea and chatted with the other Internationals and Israelis about what might be happening as 
we heard the puffs of gas, percussion bangs, glimpses of youths running and revving engines 
served as descriptors for continued points of contact. Then somewhere down below an 
American voice over a loudspeaker calls out ‘This is not a test’ and the LRAD34 non-lethal 
crowd control ‘sonic cannon’ starts to scream. I find it remarkably ineffective, but perhaps I 
have bad hearing. Suddenly we are being hit. Something is pelting us from above. Everyone 
is alert and altered, confused and quick, trying to find the source of attack way up here. Small 
white beads are landing on the roof we stand on, dozens then hundreds of them! It takes 
moments or intense milliseconds where all is appraisal and words are unused before - its hail-
stones, it’s hailing in Hebron in February. I look up from the ground and see everyone else 
look up at the same time. The host family seemed to have been going through the same 
process – we didn't have to tell each other that we were, for we all burst into laughter in that 
moment as the riotous context of hail in Hebron hits us all with its punch line. The mother 
smiled at me with a kindness and seemed to say some approving words to her husband as I 
played with her young children up here on the roof above the violence. 
The Israelis showed a lot less engagement with me, talking seriously between 
themselves. Even though we shared two languages, cultural and ideological proximity and a 
shared friendship through Vered nobody asks me anything, not even my name. I'm not a 
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source of concern or knowledge nor do I have their intimacy of shared experience. Up here 
on some stranger’s veranda in the middle of a riot, I find their cliqueiness weird. Eventually 
Vered and I decide to go back down and we go back to the junction to film some more. 
Amazingly still see a couple of young men moving right towards the well-armed roadblock 
holding the Open Shuhada Street banner (see photo above). Here at the junction many young 
Palestinians are hanging around with a stone in one hand. We move tentatively forward a bit 
more, passing the junction. I can't believe it and I hadn’t noticed before but there’s a man 
cooking and selling kebabs from a stand at the middle of the intersection and people are 
buying. The road is still blocked by the army though there’s not as much gas now and the 
cars are still driving along street, beeping the youths out of their way. Ambulances are still 
going back and forth and people still dash in some direction every so often. A phone call tells 
us to rendezvous with everyone from Jerusalem at a clinic just one hundred metres back up 
the road from the junction. Just as we arrive at this relatively safe distance, a dash of people 
runs towards us and a fresh sting of gas blows our way and we hurriedly walk on towards the 
buses that will take us home. On our way, we pass a group of young men sitting on a wall 
quietly among the crowd. One smiles at me and says ‘It’s great to see you people here, 
sharing what we experience in Hebron’, I smile and wave back. I joke with Vered ‘Well, 
maybe us being here will help’. 
 
Later back in West Jerusalem, Vered and I go for drinks in the Uganda bar. 
  
Vered: ‘I always feel weird after protests, coming back, like it never existed. It’s like when 
you go away on holidays for a long time and you come back and it’s as if the holiday and the 
experiences you had never happened’ 
 
Me: ‘When I come back from places I've often found it hard to relate to my home and 
friends’ 
 
Vered: ‘Yeah, they haven't experienced the things, they don't understand, they can't 
understand because they haven't experienced them and they won't...and I think of the 
Palestinians who stay behind. Often I go home and there's no one there in my flat and I'm 
alone for the weekend. So I paint or listen to music’.  
 
Vered’s been taking a few breaks from weekly activism after Shuhada Street. Doing 
gardening work for her dad. Mowing the lawn. 
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5. Emotional Encounters with Ignorance 
Weirdness is hard to figure out, that is its 
function
35
. That is its affect. As an embodied 
knowledge of the organism’s relationship to the 
object or action of apprehension, weirdness has the 
function of representing the failure of received 
expectations. This object or action is not a threat 
and so the feeling that something is out-of-place or 
not-quite-right is experienced in a subtle and elusive way. We may be at a loss to describe 
this not-quite-rightness in words but we call the wordless knowledge we feel Weird. In a 
perceptual sense it may be a momentary instance, some oddity which we glance in passing. 
We may furrow our brows at this and then simply shrug it off, for weirdness is not moral. 
Weird shit happens all the time and we’re pretty good at dealing with the unthreatening 
unexpected. If we admit that experience is inherently ambiguous we must also acknowledge 
that most of the time we are managing mismatches with the certainties or truths we have been 
lead to believe in. Our lifeworlds are full of what C Wright Mills called the interpretations of 
others, the received wisdom of the cultural apparatus, that allow us to judge the world we 
perceive as ‘normal’ (Mills, 1967). However, as Vered pointed out after the day of craziness 
in Hebron a perceptual affect can have lasting effect. If weirdness is recurrently encountered 
or so overwhelming as to be categorised as crazy, bizarre, Kafkaesque or some other term of 
aberration, a shrug alone won’t suffice to dispel the feeling of perplexity and we may be 
motivated to act on or against the weirdness in order to cognitively emplace the oddity. We 
cannot but impose order on abnormality. If weirdness can no longer be shrugged off it leads 
us to doubt the truth of the received wisdom. It may thus become an impetus for us to engage 
our powers of agency and so become a mechanism for social change. In Arendt’s 
(1971)terms the feeling of weirdness forces us to think. Despite this potential to shape our 
social practices the phenomenon of weirdness has received much less attention than the 
passionate affects such as fear, anger, or hate. I submit that the feeling of weirdness is an 
affective representation of acculturated ignorance which plays a subtle role in altering 
subjectivity and the emergence of dissent. The key relationships in the affective processes 
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discussed in the following are those we have to our normative imaginings of how the world 
is. 
I had begun to realise after a few months in the field that I ‘thought’ it was weird here, 
that it didn’t make sense, that this wasn’t what I expected. This is of course common in the 
ethnographic encounter, indeed self-estrangement is a requirement of the ethnographic 
methodology. In a moment of exasperation, fatigue and confusion I said to my supervisor, ‘I 
dunno it’s just weird, maybe I’ll write a paper on weirdness’. I was half-joking, but as I began 
to scribble notes and consider the affective meaning of weirdness the possibility occurred to 
me that I was not the only confused person in the field. So I began to tell participants that I 
was looking at weirdness. This was as a solid, simple and concise answer to the recurrent 
question, ‘so what are you studying?’, but more significantly most participants reacted with a 
smile of slightly raised eyebrows that half-nods the head back in an embodied movement of 
agreement, as they let loose the wordless vocalisation of intersubjective affirmation and 
interest in the understanding of the other - ‘ahhhh!’. More explicitly one participant replied, 
‘If you want to look at weirdness you’ve come to the right place’.  
The affective phenomenon of weirdness in Israel and Palestine occurs through the 
opposition between, on one hand the formal discourse of a democratic state, seeking peace 
and defending itself against an intractable enemy and, on the other the everyday practices of 
an occupying and colonizing ‘ethnocracy’ (Yiftachel, 2006). This discussion first outlines a 
theory of weirdness as an embodied perceptual phenomena based on the models of 
phenomenology and affect that frame this research. Feeling that something is weird 
represents a failure of our received understandings to describe the world we experience and 
is thus an encounter with a certain kind of ignorance. Though not approached as an affective 
perceptual phenomenon, I also offer a brief account of other approaches or 
acknowledgements of this phenomenon, from Husserl’s phenomenological epoché, critical 
realism, cognitive dissonance, and the place of optical illusions in the development of 
cognitive science. The inference is that weirdness is common and potentially more influential 
than might be expected. I then turn to a short ethnographic piece of a small demonstration in 
the West Bank which more directly brought forth the feeling and expression of weirdness in 
one participant and follow this with a discussion of the experiences of Israeli soldiers who 
have become dissenters. Though military occupation is basically a strange way for a 
democracy to organise society in the twenty-first century, more than any others this latter 
group raised on the principles of Zionism highlight how important hegemony is in creating 
weirdness and how repeated encounters with its ignorance fosters doubt. I conclude that, in 
109 
 
relation to social movement theory in particular, repeated encounters with ignorance can play 
a significant role in the emergence of doubt in relation to the truth of hegemonic elements and 
interpretations in lifeworlds. Doubt may be suppressed or sublimated by any number of 
mechanisms but it may also be resolved by the critical assessment of the received 
interpretations that have failed to properly describe the world. This is to say that a feeling can 
instantiate the application of Arendt’s faculty of thinking (Arendt, 1971). Furthermore, 
weirdness moves beyond an intentional experience and as evidenced by tactics of some 
activists, it becomes a way of both understanding and resisting the occupation. I suggest here 
that firstly social movement theorists and practitioners could productively investigate the 
subtleties of weirdness in mobilising ‘by-standers’ to their cause. Secondly that in a 
transnational world, where sovereign states struggle to control collective understandings, 
anthropologists may also find it fruitful to understand that anybody may very well find the 
myths, narratives and interpretations of her own society a little weird when compared to its 
actual practice.   
A theory of weirdness 
Weird is not a property of an object or action apprehended, but of the relationship between 
the observer and that observed. It is a product of a moment of intentionality cascading 
through lifeworld which begins as affective perception, a patterned embodied experience that 
describes in Damasio’s (2000) terms the organism-environment relationship and how the 
organism has been changed by that relationship. Following from Prinz’s (2004) perceptual 
theory and in particular the representational quality of emotions, weirdness represents the 
failure of acculturated lifeworld to properly describe or accord with the actual experience of 
reality as just encountered. Though the hegemonic elements in a lifeworld are carefully 
crafted to provide us with definitive understandings they also contain a degree of ambiguity. 
They are susceptible to manipulation in the ‘social poetics’ of their usage (Herzfeld, 1997). 
They also exist in the complex and unfolding world of the inherently ambiguous intentional 
observer. So hegemonic norms can only attempt to delimit ambiguity based on particular 
abstractions and ideals that we understand as knowledge. However, in doing so they also 
describe a particular form of ignorance in refusing or failing to acknowledge or encompass 
that which does not accord with it greater narrative. We seem to come equipped to recognise 
when we have reached the limits of hegemonic knowledge for I would argue that weirdness is 
an affect that everyone experiences. As a reflex affect it represents an emotional encounter 
with our own particular form of ignorance. 
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Weirdness, as a family of feelings with convergences of certain characteristics, varies 
in intensity, is contextual and of course highly relativistic. Something may seem so 
unexpected in a given situation, such as the hail on the roof in Hebron during a heavy military 
clampdown, that it forces itself almost immediately to subjective consciousness. In the case 
of hail the sensation was propelled to salience by the potential for danger that lay four stories 
below. Later the sight of the food vendor plying his wares practically at the nexus of conflict 
was just bizarre to behold. In other contexts the flow of circumstances and admixture of 
affects may overwhelm the immediacy of weirdness, so that it may only register as an 
embodied understanding upon later recall and reflection. Certainly my own experience of the 
Hebron demonstration wasn’t one of puzzlement, mostly I was far too scared and stoic and 
uncertain, awash with teargas or adrenaline and relief, or hoping my ‘buddy’ Vered would 
have had enough of filming and nervously watching our backs as she did.  Quirkiness was 
mostly drowned out by these other feelings but during moments of respite from intense 
affects its message could be heard. Even though they have been through such experiences 
time-and-time-and-time again many Israeli participants, Vered included, admit to being left 
with a feeling of weirdness once the dust has settled. After having discussed my ideas with 
one activist friend he wrote on his blog, ‘In hindsight, I often expect things to happen 
precisely as they do, and they’re still weird. Occasionally, when looking at past experiences 
in the Wild South [Hebron Hills] I recall or portray brutality as brutality, or generosity as 
simple generosity. These are mostly overly simplified. Weirdness is that infinitely complex 
spectrum between black and white on which experience actually occurs’ (see 
Radicalmonkeyclown, 2013 orig. emph.).  
Hebronites such as the food vendor and other Palestinians in the territories don’t go 
home to a radically different everyday experience like Vered’s in West Jerusalem. Though 
they live under military occupation on a daily basis they are of course perfectly aware that 
such a life is far from normal. They know it is wrong, or unjust or illegal, yet they have also 
described the situation to me as ‘crazy’ or as Fayrouz an activist from Walaja described the 
logic of the Israeli security discourse ‘excuse my French but this is bullshit’. From his 
smiling face and relaxed demeanour I also got the feeling that the young man who greeted us 
at the end of the demo wasn’t referring to the brutality or injustice of ‘what we experience’ 
but to the craziness of it all. So we must acknowledge that something can be weird even 
though it occurred exactly as expected, as in the examples from Palestinians and Radical 
Monkey Clown and that weirdness can feedback from the intentional moment of ignorance to 
become part of the knowledge base of the affective lifeworld. I am pretty certain that the 
111 
 
occupation, not in its explosions of violence, but in its daily maintenance and administration 
is Kafkaesque and the  practices of expanding colonization in Area C and East Jerusalem by 
whatever means fits the moment has the capacity to continually confound expectations. In 
this sense the unfolding being and becoming of occupation and colonization by Israel in the 
early twentieth century will always be weird. It may be that dissenters experience events as 
weird, even though they unfold in a familiar and expected format, because they cannot 
fathom the worldview of those who consent to, enable or fervently execute the occupation 
and suppression of others. The capacity for experienced activists to find expected experiences 
weird notwithstanding, I shall focus in this discussion on how this affect may subtly motivate 
the inexperienced and unknowing subject to become a dissenter, on how a believer safe in her 
lifeworld may come to doubt the truth by stepping beyond its bounds and experiencing the 
particular forms of ignorance it has created. 
 
Some weird history 
To call something weird, absurd, bizarre, baffling, crazy or Kafkaesque is an attempt to 
categorize and thus make sense of something that fundamentally doesn’t make sense. The 
assignation of these semantic labels, which though they vary in intensity and attribution all 
share Wittgenstein’s ‘family-resemblance’, is a post hoc semantic trick to express the feeling 
that we have experienced a mis-match between our expectation and our observation. This 
phenomenon, the oddities produced by a discrepancy between our expectations of the world 
is commonplace and has a long history in Western thought. Not only has this question of 
appearances and reality been of central concern to Western philosophy, it also played a 
crucial role in the emergence of cognitive science in the nineteenth century. Trompe l'oeil or 
tricks of the eye have a long history in art, the representation of three dimensions on a flat 
canvas being the obvious example, but in the late nineteenth century they were central to the 
development of cognitive science. Hermann von Helmholtz published his Handbook of 
Physiological Optics (Helmholtz, 1896) which theorised and described the importance of 
unconscious inferences for perception. Optical illusions were used to demonstrate how visual 
perception was not merely a mental facsimile of the object apprehended but was produced 
through subjective reference to expectations. Optical illusions are basically characterised by 
visually perceived images that differ from ‘objective’ reality and have three main types; 
physiological, such as afterimages of bright lights burned on the retina; pathological illusions 
such as Akinetopsia or motion blindness; and cognitive illusions theoretically caused by 
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unconscious inferences. Famous examples of cognitive illusions are the Necker cube, the 
Rubin vase and the Café Wall illusion. The Café Wall, which is drawn with parallel lines that 
appear to curve is known as a distortion illusion. Both the Necker cube and the Rubin vase 
are categorised as ambiguous illusions in that lines and/or shadings of each part of the picture 
are ambiguous by themselves, yet the human visual system picks an interpretation of each 
part that makes the whole consistent. Through the work of Helmholtz and others on tricks of 
the eye, the doors of perception were opened to critique. 
 
 
 
Café Wall illusion The Necker cube The Rubin vase 
 
Perception, unconscious inferences and ambiguity are also central themes of 
phenomenology which in various ways relate to the potential for weirdness to be a 
characteristic of the lived experience. Husserl realised that unconscious inferences drawn 
from lifeworlds fundamentally shaped how we perceived the world and that methodologically 
‘only by suspending or bracketing away the “natural attitude” could philosophy become its 
own distinctive and rigorous science’ (Sawicki, 2011). It is questionable whether or not a 
phenomenological approach could or should be ‘rigorous science’ but this suspension or 
epoché recognises that our lifeworld’s assumptions and expectations present an impediment 
to understanding ‘reality’, if indeed such a thing exists. This approach is fundamentally akin 
both to cultural relativism in anthropological theory and ethnographic methodology, and to 
Arendt’s faculty of judging (Arendt, 1968). Recall too that according to Merleau-Ponty, 
ambiguity of experience prevails both in the perception of things, and in the knowledge the 
subjective self (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). Weirdness would not exist without ambiguity and if 
we also consider Damasio’s assertion that we are not consciously aware of all the affective 
processes at play in the body and the various studies on the prodigious levels of visual 
perception that are unconsciously filtered out of awareness (Gerson, Parra, & Sajda, 2006), 
then we must admit that the human organism works hard at finding the world unambiguous.  
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Perhaps, the most developed theory of a common kind of weirdness is that of 
cognitive dissonance, which relates to the oft observable inconsistencies between peoples’ 
beliefs and their actions and our ability to simultaneously hold contradictory opinions. First 
described by social psychologist Leon Festinger, he proposed that the feeling of discomfort 
aroused by ‘the existence of nonfitting [sic] relations among cognitions, is a motivating factor 
in its own right’ (Festinger, 1957, p. 3). This influential theory has been applied to a wide 
variety of studies and paradigms, such as forced compliance (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), 
decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977), economic maximization (Gilad, Kaish, & Loeb, 
1987), and risky sexual behaviour (Mannberg, 2012). The direction of gaze which shapes 
cognitive dissonance and the discipline of psychology in general tends towards 
inconsistencies which are thought to dwell within the subjective individual. In the first 
instance Festinger’s basic premise is that the individual strives towards consistency within 
himself. Secondly the mechanisms theorized to mediate dissonance and discomfort, such as 
self-affirmation, self-justification or the more sociologically inclined ‘New Look’ 
perspective
36
 are on the whole focused on the existence of internal contradictions (see Stone 
& Cooper, 2001).  
However, for the purposes of the discussion here the contradictions signified by a 
feeling of weirdness are not simply internal but a product of the intentional relationship with 
what we assume to be an external ‘reality’. From the preceding we must concede that our 
hopes of an external realism may not be met – reality is more than meets the eye and 
sometimes it’s less. For Bhaskar (1989) the real is stratified and divided between reality 
itself, the actual world of our perceptions, and the empirical world of the characteristic 
observed in a determined event. According to this critical realism perspective, the empirical 
world mediates between supposed objective reality and the actual in that the empirical 
characteristic observed is assumed to contain both possibilities. There is clearly room for 
ambiguity here and the notion of mediation may allow for a lifeworld’s unconscious 
inferences to portray an actual world in which the ambiguities are reconstituted as a whole 
that is consistent with our expectations. When this mediation fails, when the characteristic 
observed cannot resolve actual perception and reality, we have moved beyond the limits of 
our acculturated lifeworld and the knowledge it references and produces. We are confronted 
by our own particular form of ignorance, a perceptive actuality signalled to the self through 
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 A school of psychology which attends to the role of acculturated and shared value systems in 
subjective interpretation.  
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the theatre of the body by the feeling of weirdness. Weirdness is the affective representation 
of an encounter with our own ignorance, it is the answer to the question we have not yet 
asked, but are probably always asking: Is this as I have come to expect? My ethnographic 
research suggests that the frequency with which we experience weirdness plays an 
underestimated role in social change. Whilst anger and moral outrage have long been 
recognised as strong motivating factors in the mobilisation of social movements, the subtlety 
of weirdness highlights the ambiguity of our received assumptions about the world, leading 
us to doubt their truth. Doubt in turn, if it is strong enough or frequently experienced, must be 
cognitively interrogated, requiring the application of critical thought. And so Arendt’s (1971) 
faculty of thinking is applied. Subsequently we come to perceive the cracks in the patina of 
received lifeworlds and its hegemonic interpretations. 
The sense of not making sense 
In January 2012 I joined the weekly protest in the West Bank village of Al-Maasara for the 
first time. I was becoming familiar both with the practice of ethnography and the practice of  
protest. A strong and fruitful researcher-participant relationship was developing between 
myself and Vered who had invited me along that day. Vered was by this time a dedicated and 
experienced Israeli activist with Anarchists Against the Wall. That day she had also brought 
her normally non-protesting father, Frank. Even though I’m told the entire area is a ‘closed 
military zone’ for the duration of the protest, the soldiers casually gathered at the entrance to 
the village do not stop our vehicle and we drive about a kilometre past small general stores, 
family homes and a mosque to the meeting point where about ten other people are gathered. 
One car load of Israelis have locked their keys in the car and I strike up a conversation about 
their dilemma with Edo, the car’s owner. Someone is calling Vered’s name, it is Fesal an 
organiser from the popular committee, who greets her and is delighted to meet her father. She 
seems well loved here. 
Vered explains to Frank and myself what will happen. ‘We’ll march back down the 
road and the army will stop us and we’ll shout for a bit’. It is about half-an-hour of 
unhindered strolling with flags and banners, back past the mosque, houses and stores. It’s 
about twenty people, not moving in a block, but in small groups of two to five, strung-out 
over thirty metres or so. A few people glance at us as we walk by but I don’t see anyone join 
us. Frank is cold in the weak winter sun and loves complaining; ‘I came here to drill a few 
holes in the wall!’, he jokes referring to his daughter’s apartment and not the separation 
barrier. Frank and I exchange background stories, interests and anecdotes before we get to the 
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entrance to the village where about twenty-five soldiers and Magav border policemen are 
waiting for us. The security detail outnumbers the protest group. They are ready and blocking 
the width of the road in a line, riot shields held in formation. They stop the march from 
passing the junction. Across the road is a Palestinian quarry works and not much else from 
what I can see. It is the local men who stand face to face with the heavily armed soldiers. ‘We 
want to get to our land’ shouts Fasel in English, ‘Yallah Shebab!’37. There’s a push forward 
against the line of soldiers by a handful of the local men, insisting they be let through the line 
of riot shields. Scuffles ensue as the shields insist they do not pass. The scuffles stop and the 
men begin to chant in Arabic and English, joined by the Israelis and Internationals. I find 
myself wondering why are we stopped here? There is nothing behind the line of soldiers that 
could be identified as something that must be protected, only the main road which has no 
traffic on it and a few industrial sheds on the far side. By this stage several Israelis and 
Internationals are standing behind the security line without any trouble or opposition. They 
photograph, chant or just observe the proceedings. Somehow it’s perfectly reasonable to get 
to the far side of this ‘red line’ by simply walking around either side rather that pushing 
through it – so long perhaps as you’re not recognized as one of the local Palestinians. Time 
and again there are these small scuffles, with some breaks for chanting and occasionally 
Fesal, the head of the popular committee, speaks directly to (or at) the soldiers, leaning in 
close to their faces and asking in a voice loud enough so that all can hear ‘are you proud of 
yourselves, are you proud to say you stop people from getting to their lands?’ The soldiers 
ignore him as best they can, some joking with each other in Hebrew. 
There is no moving the line. There is no charge or tear gas, no stone throwing. 
Suddenly a call comes from Fesal in Arabic and the protest group quickly turns to the right 
walking briskly towards an alternative exit from the village. I am perplexed at the sight of the 
soldiers stumbling along through a ploughed field beside the road in parallel to the protest 
group.  They are trying to reach the alternate exit before the protesters, but the protesters 
don’t run, they’re not trying to escape. Indeed they’re not trying to get anywhere that is 
generally forbidden to them. This is the way in and out of the village and all these men use 
this road on a daily basis, mostly unencumbered. They could have come this way unnoticed 
two hours before and they will probably go this way later in the afternoon. None of this is 
what I expected, so as a diligent anthropologist I critically observe the dynamics and quietly 
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 Yallah Shebab! (Arabic) Come on guys! 
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ask Vered for insights when I can. Frank however, is afforded no such professional or 
epistemological protection from the proceedings. He had kept his distance from the 
performance, five metres is sufficiently far to observe safely. ‘This is bizarre, this is 
Kafkaesque!’, he keeps repeating throughout the whole performance. He too is asking his 
daughter what is going on: Why can’t they cross the road? What will happen if we get to the 
other side? Where’s the wall going to be? Vered, who is very knowledgeable about the 
occupation and well experienced in protest dynamics explains that all protests are considered 
illegal and must be stopped, but unsatisfied by her own rationalizations she eventually sighs 
and says, ‘I don’t know, let’s ask them’. Turning to the soldiers she asks in Hebrew why we 
can’t cross the road. She gets no reply. After about an hour Fasel calls the protest to a halt 
and we turn and stroll back into the village. Soldiers fire a few gas canisters our way, a few 
stones are thrown towards them. We all casually walk back through the village past the 
stores, homes and mosque. 
… 
Back at the meeting point I see Edo back at his locked car. They’d called a lock-smith who, 
much to their amusement, came from one of the near-by Israeli settlements. ‘I’m surprised 
they let him in to the village’, laughed Edo. We drive back out of the village, past the soldiers 
who are still hanging around. They pay us no heed. 
 
It’s difficult to say why this protest is weird because this is precisely the nature and purpose 
of the feeling of weirdness. Its causes are subliminal and elusive but the wordless knowledge 
this affective perception is telling us is clear: ‘I’m not quite sure what is out of place here, but 
something doesn’t fit with what I expected’. This stands in contrast with the more assertive 
affective signal that something is wrong. The feeling of weirdness is not as impelling as the 
feeling of wrongness for it does not represent a clear moral transgression but rather 
something of a puzzle to the mechanisms of mind and senses. Of course the solution to such a 
puzzle pivots on an acculturated understanding of the world and subtle dispositions which 
shape how we see and judge a scene, our lifeworlds. Perhaps one may be disposed to agree 
that any state has the right and duty to protect itself, its citizens and infrastructure but at Al-
Maasara one scans the horizon in vain to find either a viable threat or an endangered asset. 
The protest does not approach lands near a settlement fence nor a section of the separation 
barrier all of which are normally out-of-bounds. Without including the armoured vehicles, the 
Israeli security personnel outnumber the flag-holding protesters twenty-five to twenty, and 
the non-Palestinian contingent seem to be free to go where they want so long as they don’t 
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obstruct the obstruction of the protest. The soldiers themselves could not be said to be in 
danger and the protest is stopped simply because it is a protest. The line of Frank’s 
questioning illustrates that he cannot cognitively access an interpretation of the situation that 
makes sense to him, such that he can only describe it as bizarre and Kafkaesque. 
This is not so weird if you are a Palestinian and have grown up in a world where the 
minutiae of life are restricted on almost a daily basis by military personnel. Living with 
militarily occupation has consequences in that no matter how unusual the routines of petty 
constraints, roadblocks and night-time arrests of children are from a global perspective. 
Palestinians have come to expect – though not condone - such an existence, yet they are well 
aware that in the wider sense that life under occupation is crazy. If you are an Israeli or 
international activist familiar with popular committee protests and disposed to see Israeli as a 
‘fascist and apartheid state’ you may not experience much dissonance either. It all depends on 
the process of expectations and interpretations. Conversely, some radical settlers who’ve 
been nurtured to feel their right to these lands is exclusive and divinely commanded need not 
concern themselves with the earthly concerns. As Kierkegaard noted:  
 
When the believer has faith, the absurd is not the absurd — faith transforms it, but in 
every weak moment it is again more or less absurd to him. The passion of faith is the 
only thing which masters the absurd (Kierkegaard, 1851).  
Repeated encounters with ignorance 
Kierkegaard’s faith protects the believer from the absurd, such that this is its purpose. The 
purpose of all knowledge systems is in part to protect us from the chaos of free interpretation 
and it is only the infant or the insane that ‘stands alone directly confronting a world of solid 
fact’ (Mills, 1967, p. 405). However, the production of hegemonic knowledge also produces a 
particular form of ignorance when the world fails to conform to its interpretations. Perhaps 
the greatest opportunity for Jewish Israelis to sense that the world is not as one was lead to 
believe occurs during military service, when they leave childhood and become willing and 
armed conscripts for the state. The IDF promotes and prides itself on being the ‘most moral 
army’ in the world, with a code of ethics specifically developed to prioritize lethal 
engagement in situations where ‘responsibility for one’s own citizens takes precedence over 
the other responsibility to the non-dangerous neighbors [of terrorists]’ (Prof. Asa Kasher in 
Horovitz, 2011). All conscripts receive mandatory training in the ethics doctrine known as 
The IDF Spirit, which has been developed by Israeli Professor of Philosophy Asa Kasher. 
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Indeed military mantras such as ‘Purity of Arms’ and ‘Black Flag orders’ are familiar to all 
Israelis regardless of combat experience. ‘We receive weeks of combat training which is 
designed to prepare us for conventional warfare, basically with Syria’, Avner told me, ‘after 
that we get one week on dealing with a civilian population and then we’re sent to the West 
Bank to protect settlers from terrorists’. Avner is on the staff of Breaking the Silence (BTS) 
an Israeli organization of IDF veterans who ‘have taken it upon themselves to expose the Israeli 
public to the reality of everyday life in the Occupied Territories’ (BTS, n.d.). 
While many of the 700 or more testimonies collected by BTS record cases of outright 
abuse, beatings, or ‘unnecessary’ killings where there is a sense that a moral boundary has 
been crossed in the course of an operation, the daily banality of occupation also affords 
soldiers the opportunity to regularly encounter situations that are difficult to make sense of 
through the security paradigm. Avner told me, ‘We’d go into these villages, basically poor 
encampments in the hills, even though we knew there were no weapons or anything there. 
Sometimes we go in out of boredom, sometimes on orders to “put in an appearance – let them 
know who the sheriff is” […] We’d walk in, throw a few stun grenades about, turn over the 
tents, confiscate stuff’. For some soldier such practices seem dissonant with self-perception 
of purity of arms versus immoral terrorists which was instilled in them in basic training. Oz, 
another ex-combat soldier turned activist, agrees. ‘I hate all the stories about masochistic 
[sadistic] soldiers, it’s not about that at all. Do you know what’s weird in Israel? Our whole 
concept of violence. We’re so used to shooting guns that it’s not considered violent, so when 
we boarded the Mavi Marmara
38
 and killed nine people all that your heard on the radio was 
“our boys were being attacked”’. While it can be argued that military service generally 
involves activities foreign to most people’s experience, the combination of universal 
conscription in Israel and the heavily promoted purity of its intentions and actions 
paradoxically opens a space through which Israelis can encounter the dissonance between the 
narrative and the reality.  
Israelis are often accused by their left-wing compatriots of wilfully ignoring the 
situation in the territories and of the people under its military occupation, of not wanting to 
know. Indeed it is normally fairly easy to avoid encounters with a reality that conflicts with 
the idea that Israel is a free and democratic country defending itself from an intractable 
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 The Turkish registered ship, part of the Gaza Flotilla, which was boarded in international waters by 
Israeli naval commandos in May 2010. 
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enemy that wishes to destroy them. With the exception of a couple of journalists, notably 
Amira Hass and Gideon Levy of the newspaper Haaretz, there is almost no media coverage 
of the weekly popular committee protests, all of which are in the mainstream imagination 
dangerous confrontations with Palestinian stone throwing mobs. The release of Five Broken 
Cameras (Burnat & Davidi, 2011), a documentary on five years of the popular protest in 
Bil’in, helped reach a wider audience and dent this image in Israel when it was nominated for 
an Oscar in 2012. Attacks by radical settlers on an IDF base in the West Bank in 2011 also 
caused some to consider that perhaps the Palestinians were not the (only) threat in the 
territories (Katz, 2011). Though attacks by settlers against Palestinian farmers, crops and 
properties have been going on for years – often witnessed and recorded by Ta’ayush and IDF 
personnel as BTS testimonies confirm – this issue never even makes the back pages of major 
Israeli media. Having been convinced they are there to protect Israeli citizens from 
Palestinian terrorists, it is the Israeli soldiers confronted with an alternative to their expected 
reality, of settlers attacking Palestinians, who express this dissonance as weird, crazy or 
surreal. However, one need not be in the ‘front line’ to carry doubts as to the consistency of 
the Israeli hegemonic narrative. The occasional high-profile aberration reported in the media 
or heard in casual conversation between friends, and the exposure to alternative narratives 
that is inevitable in modern life, also affords occasions for civilians to encounter tales of 
weirdness. As Ronit, one of the Anarchists Against the Wall, pointed out to me when I asked 
her how she became an activist.  
 
All my life there’d been holes in the story. I came from a [right-wing] Likud family 
and then I met a guy who was left-wing. He showed me what the holes were and 
when we broke up I was afraid I wouldn’t be able to see them anymore. But I could. 
Cracks in the patina: The social impact of weirdness 
Like all reflex emotions feeling weird is a complex intersubjective embodied experience 
occasioned by intentionality. While the embodied phenomenon of weirdness results from the 
immediacy of the organism’s interaction or apprehension with the environment, the 
subjective individual is not a free-floating agent continuously constructing an understanding 
of the world independently. Meaning-making is produced through our lifeworld which is 
laden with the ‘ready-made interpretations’ of others (Mills 1967). The embodied perception 
that weirdness represents is a failure of those expectations, but one that is neither so 
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threatening as to cause fear or so great a transgression as to evoke moral judgments such as 
anger, contempt or disgust.  
As any anthropologist knows weirdness can be easily evoked as we journey through 
strange lands - by something as simple as milk being sold in a plastic bag rather than a waxed 
paper carton. Like all emotions its cause is culturally relative. However the stories we are told 
by others about ‘ourselves’ through national curriculae, the media, the military and other state 
institutions are not designed primarily so that our meaning-making will reveal the truth. They 
are often abstractions imposed upon reality in order to produce collectivity, ethnicity, 
nationhood, religiosity and so forth. Though they purport to represent authoritative truth clean 
and simple, hegemonic knowledge will regularly impinge upon the messy contradictions and 
ambiguities of social life. This ambiguity is not so much, as Mary Douglas’s (1966) socially 
proscribed impurity of ‘matter out of place’, but of matter all over the place in the complex 
reality of unfolding social life. This ambiguity and complexity is amplified by our awareness 
of and exposure to a variety of interpretations produced in the transnational dimension, which 
also limits the capacity of local propriety knowledge to define the normal (Hardt & Negri, 
2000).  In sum, national hegemonic processes not only specify ways of understanding and 
meaning-making, they must also produce specific forms of ignorance and in doing so define 
weirdness. 
Weirdness is clearly a subtle experience and its sociological impact can be hard to 
observe and assess. While there has been much analysis on the social impact of acutely felt 
and hard to dismiss emotions  – such as maintaining and reproducing social order through 
fear (Ulrich Beck, 1992; Glassner, 1999) or the ‘moral outrage’ thesis of social movement 
mobilization (Gould, 2009; Nepstad & Smith, 2001) – weirdness is by purpose and definition 
less certain and often fleeting and so its social impact is easy to overlook. Indeed, though we 
may often admit to feeling weird, I suspect that it isn’t generally considered an emotion; 
rather, it is a quality ascribed to an object or act apprehended external to us. Not until we 
postulate emotion as perception and a representation of our relation to the environment can 
we understand that when we look at a situation and say ‘that’s weird’ what we mean is ‘that 
is making me feel weirdness’. Research into this phenomenon has often focused on how we 
suppress its affect, the processes of denial, repression or sublimation and the pathologies that 
such efforts cause. Israeli anthropologist and army reservist during the First Intifada, Eyal 
Ben-Ari, writes on the social processes by which combatants suppressed dissonance upon 
return to civilian life. He argues that the significance of military service to social evaluation 
in Israel and the organizational culture of the military as the enactment of certain meanings, 
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naturalizes the Israeli army’s policing of a civilian population. This naturalisation diffuses ‘a 
more penetrating self-analysis...of “double standards” to behaviours within and across the 
Green Line [i.e. occupied territories]’ (Ben-Ari, 1989, pp. 383–5). 
The various personal and social mechanisms used to diffuse or dismiss the subtlety of 
weirdness found in the military occupation of the Palestinian territories are significant and 
their effectiveness can be judged by the relatively small percentage of soldiers who turn to 
Breaking the Silence. However, the impetus for change contained in weirdness is also 
observable in the interpretations of Israeli activists, who much like Ben-Ari’s soldiers, are 
also engaged in the enactment of certain meanings – albeit meanings that run counter to those 
of the hegemonic narrative. They have come to see the weirdness – ‘the holes’ – everywhere. 
As I began to tell participants I was looking at weirdness, practically everyone would simply 
smile and nod in recognition of its pervasiveness from their vantage point. While many 
activists could cite a specific event which crossed a moral boundary, an event not just weird 
but definitively wrong, the exceptionally long duration of the military occupation and rapidly 
increasing colonization of the territories, allows for repeated occasions upon which the self-
image of a nation under attack is dissonant with certain facts on the ground. Furthermore, 
some activists harness the weirdness of the situation as a tactic, employing ‘pink block’ 
frivolity and culture-jamming to stimulate the sensation in others. Thus there have been 
football matches played at the major ‘Israeli only’ checkpoint between Al-Maasara and 
Jerusalem, while Israel’s own ‘Clown Army’ regularly plays the motley fools as the IDF tries 
to disperse or arrest them (Ben-Abba, 2012; PSP, 2012). A group of Israeli women went to 
visit a Palestinian family on Shuhada Street and while inside they donned traditional 
Palestinian dresses and hijab
39
. They then left the house and proceeded to walk down 
Shuhada Street, which as Israeli citizens they are permitted to do. They were arrested as 
expected. Apparently, it’s illegal for Israelis to walk on Shuhada Street if they dress like 
Arabs.  
These people have closely examined the patina of hegemonic understandings and 
found them to be cracked and flaking, such that their inconsistencies can no longer be glossed 
over. They have come to experience reality in a way radically different to the hegemonic 
interpretations, in part because of doubt produced by almost insignificant but repeated 
failures of that system to describe the truth. The accumulation of doubt over time makes it 
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 Hijab (Arabic), headscarf. 
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more likely that a given act, law, argument or social policy will be seen as part of a systemic 
wrong rather than being excused as a singular aberration or a case of unfortunate but 
necessary exceptionalism. Repeated encounters of such imperfections atrophy the hegemonic 
corpus to a point where they understand that the world they live in is weird and weirdness 
becomes both a form of knowing and understanding which is leveraged in the practice of 
dissent. 
Conclusion 
At the macro-level, Israeli hegemonic self-understanding as a Jewish democracy with ruthless 
enemies is not a fabrication. There are regular multi-party elections for executive and 
legislative branches, an independent judiciary and rule of law, a capitalist economic system, 
freedom of religious practice and competitive press institutions. These various bodies are 
relatively free and capable of contesting with each other over the production of authoritative 
interpretations of the ‘national character’ of Israel. This narrative emphasizes the nation’s 
internationally acceptable and laudable reality, allowing Israelis to feel their society is normal 
in the Western sense. Like most hegemonic understandings it also attempts to obscure 
unacceptable and aberrant realities. Israel is not however a liberal democracy in terms of a 
state’s formal blindness to ethnicity, the model by which many nations are constrained. This 
is a significant distinction which many Israelis seem unaware of and so it is not weird for 
them that the legislative corpus contains laws based on ethnicity and the executive branches 
distribute national resources on the same basis. It is the Jewish state after all, so why 
shouldn’t Jewish nationals benefit more than others. If we also admit that for over forty years 
the state has exercised de facto authority and military control over an entire population denied 
voting rights, the notion of democracy itself becomes questionable. Indeed, with four million 
‘native’ born non-citizens in the territories and two million non-Jewish citizens in Israel, the 
notion that the state is predominantly Jewish does not accord with its demographic reality. 
However, the narrative that ‘Arabs’ are enemies of the state allows them to be excluded from 
such calculations and so weirdness is not perceived at this macro level. At the micro-level, 
the daily harassment of farmers and labourers, the arbitrary dispossession of lands and the 
ongoing production of state and wildcat of settlements in Area C points more towards a 
policy of systematic colonization than an honestly defensive stance. Weirdness is most often 
perceived in the details. 
There are of course historical contingencies through which this situation has 
developed, which themselves are contested through a multiplicity of discourses. The history 
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of the Jewish people in Europe, the purpose of the Zionist project and both the real and 
perceived animosity towards it are said to compel Israel to be different from all other nations. 
Israel is not alone in making the claim of ‘exceptionalism’, and in the United States 
conservative and neo-conservative writers have argued that American exceptionalism allows 
the nation to march ‘to a different drummer’ (Rose, 1989, p. 92). So Israel also leverages 
exceptionalism in its defence, both in the context of its foundation and its contemporary 
setting. Thus the state as described in the words of former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, 
is a ‘villa in the jungle’. Despite the (possibly unintended) colonial undertones of this 
metaphor, Israeli exceptionalism is often presented as the rationale for why it is ‘forced’ into 
actions most other nations would consider aberrant. However, as Hardt and Negri point out, 
the function of exceptionality in the application of domestic and supranational norms or laws 
is to control and dominate a fluid situation, by granting the authority and capacity to define 
the demands of intervention and set in motion forces and instruments of repression and 
rhetorical force; ‘therefore is born, in the name of the exceptionality […] a form of right that 
is really a right of police’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 17 orig. emph.). The exceptionality in 
Israel’s hegemonic narrative thus grants them, and them alone, the authority and capacity to 
‘police’ the occupied territories and its populations through laws and practices whom others 
might consider an absurd application of democracy. Excluding overtly maximalist Zionist 
tendencies in Israeli society, whose political representatives unabashedly call for population 
transfers and annexation, there are still and perhaps growing discrepancies between the 
national theory of a progressive democracy under threat and the national practice of 
occupation and colonization. It must be noted here that Foreign Minister Lieberman has 
publicly called for the disenfranchisement of Israel’s Palestinian citizens in any peace 
agreement (Lieberman, 2010) and Housing Minister Bennett has presented a plan to 
‘manage’ the conflict by annexing Area C of the territories (Bennett, 2010). Such tendencies 
are not on the fringes of society but in the executive branch of government and so the space 
between hegemonic ideals and the unspoken reality where opportunities to perceive 
weirdness arise is widening.  
In any case, the phenomenon clearly plays a significant role in the emergence and 
development of counter-hegemonic processes for Israelis, by causing them to doubt their 
received interpretations. As such it should be of particular interest to the study and practice of 
social movements and dissent in other regions. It also comes to form part of the pattern of 
dissent in the meshworld of the affective lifeworld, a way of interpreting the occupation. 
Many activists are clearly aware of the absurdity in the security narratives and leverage this 
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through clowning, changing costume and even, as with Al-Maasara, the choreographed 
weekly attempts to cross a road as a group. Weirdness stems from an intentional affective 
moment, the sense of not making sense, but we can come to accept that this appraisal is more 
valid than those we had been taught to use in our relationship to hegemonic acculturation. It 
becomes a way of understanding the world. That others acknowledge and agree with this 
understanding indicates shareable commonalities in our affective lifeworlds. In the next 
section I address directly how such shared affective processes produce sociality and enable 
for concerted action in the political sense with a discussion on wrongness. More generally, in 
summation of Part I, the everyday nuances of life’s ambiguous nature could be fruitfully 
explored by social movement theorists and practitioners. Highlighting the inconsistencies and 
even absurdities of the logic of occupation or other systems of dispossession may well be 
more accessible to potential recruits than its bare brutalities. Humour may be of help in this 
for as Oscar Wilde said to have noted: If you want to tell people the truth, make them laugh, 
otherwise they'll kill you. Secondly, in the complexity of contemporary transnationalism 
which touches most lives everywhere, access to alternative interpretations to the ones we 
received in youth may accelerate. It seems plausible then that people everywhere may find 
their own world a little weird now and then, and so as anthropologists asking when and why 
this happens (or doesn’t happen!) may be a valuable way to explore how our participants 
understand their world. 
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Part II 
Wrong 
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6. The Eternal and Undivided City 
There may come a point after weirdness, after 
some reflective thought and maybe a bit more 
weirdness and thinking, that the situation is no 
longer just crazy or confusing but comes to be 
understood as unjust or oppressive or fascist
40
. 
These are just three of the categories commonly 
used to describe the Israeli-Palestinian 
condition by dissenters and reflect the wide range of discourses, or framings, of the situation. 
Part II of the thesis turns away from the subjectivity of the feeling-thinking mind to analyse 
and understand the inherent diversity in transnational dissent and how action in this plurality 
is underwritten and supported by affect. This first chapter in this second section presents an 
extended ethnography which describes the complexity within both solidarity activism and the 
forces which it resists. The focus here is not on the affective perceptions of dissenters but on 
the diversity of backgrounds, genders, motivations and understandings encompassed in sites 
of protest. I also highlight the diversity of modes of dispossession and colonisation with 
particular attention paid to the evictions at Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem. The interaction of 
these two complexities produces a high degree of uncertainty and differences in discursive 
diagnoses of the issue. As Abdul from Sheikh Jarrah notes, every place in Jerusalem has its 
own story. 
In the following chapter I will argue that despite the lack of a clear unifying framing 
in solidarity activism, collective action continues nonetheless because of a shared sense that 
something is wrong. This feeling exemplifies Prinz’s (2007) understanding of affect as the 
pre-cognitive foundation of morality. The definite feeling of wrongness has the capacity to 
overcome uncertainty in the face of complexity and is an affective critique shared by all 
dissenters. I then turn to consider the unintended social consequences of collective action in 
the field and argue that the practice of Palestinians, Israelis and Internationals coming 
together in solidarity is producing a community of sorts. I base this on a number of factors 
and processes. In the first instance the sites of protest act as fixed points which dissenters 
have repeatedly moved to and through over the years. Building upon Ingold’s (2011) notion 
of wayfaring through a sensual world and Pink’s (2008) idea of emplaced sociality I argue 
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 One of the Women in Black at the weekly vigil in Kikar Paris, West Jerusalem 
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that a particular pattern of dissent experience is inscribed upon the affective lifeworld. This 
pattern is recognised, shared and sharable with others. In addition to the protests themselves 
the practice of dissent also incurs and affords a great deal of non-instrumental sociality and 
also provides avenues for occupational specialisation, channels economic activities and 
affords spaces and occasions for casual socialisation and leisure. Following on from 
contemporary reassessments of the concept and formation of community, I highlight how the 
sociality of participants reflects the ‘traffic relations’ and consociation which have been seen 
to produce a sense of belonging in other novel community formations (Amit, 2012; Amit & 
Rapport, 2002; Djelic & Quack, 2010; Wallman, 1998). Finally, I shall situate this 
community in relation to the use of networks and networking to describe the sociality and 
practice of transnational social movements elsewhere (Castells, 2004, 2012; Juris, 2008a). 
The tentative critique I offer here is that, by ascribing the notion of networks to transnational 
social movements, we may be denying its practitioners the social legitimacy which comes 
with community and which affords sense of belonging and potential which many long-term 
struggles will require if they are to endure.  
Action in the public sphere  
The second half of my Friday is beginning. The demo in the village of Palestinian Walaja in 
southern Jerusalem was small. Fayrouz, one of the resident activists had just given us an 
informative tour of the village and the huge concrete wall that is being built to entirely 
encircle it. During this tour Fayrouz described the Israeli discourse of ‘security’, used to 
legitimise the  barrier here, as ‘bullshit’. ‘Where are we going to go?’, she pointed out, ‘Once 
we get outside of the loop that encloses the village, we’re still behind the rest of the wall’. 
The tour ends with some pensive looks and groups of people wondering what to do next. It 
becomes clear that people are in need of transportation to get to where they want to go and as 
I have a car I offer a lift to anyone going to the Sheikh Jarrah protest north of the city centre. 
As I mentioned the dispersed locations of the regular protests and lack of public transport 
between them made my car a particularly useful resource. Walaja is in southern Jerusalem 
and Sheikh Jarrah is north of the centre. It’s not a big city but to get between the two without 
a car, involves walking, hitching, changing buses and a major checkpoint in Bethlehem. I can 
take four people there in less than half-an-hour and have a nice intimate chat inside the 
vehicle with these foreign visitors. So I set off and ask the passengers where they come from, 
why they are here, the standard research questions. There’s Byron a young researcher from 
Holland whose father is Arab and mother from the Far East, Luke a photographer from 
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Australia, Mia from Sweden who is here with the International Solidarity Movement, and 
another young woman who doesn’t say much. I know this area, so I get to give running 
commentaries of the landscape, the checkpoint locations and the Jewish and Palestinian 
neighbourhoods as we drive. The route we take drives northward and is rarely more than a 
few hundred metres from either side along the unseen route of the Green Line
41
 which 
divides Jerusalem into East and West.  
We are a little early for the Sheikh Jarrah protest so I sit and chat with Bill. The 
protest here began in 2009 when four families were forcibly evicted from their homes. The 
evictions were carried out by the police for Nahalat Shimon Ltd. whom the Israeli courts 
ruled to be the legal owners and authorized the eviction orders on the grounds that the tenants 
were in breach of a rental agreement. The Palestinians in this small plot of residential units 
are all 1948 refugees from places like Jaffa and Ramle who like the residents of Walaja ended 
up on the Jordanian side after the war. They contest that they were given ownership of the 
land in the 1950s by the Jordanian authorities and UNRWA, as part of an effort to solve the 
housing crisis for refugees. In return for taking the houses built by UNRWA, the twenty-eight 
Palestinian families renounced their refugee status. However, the law of the land changed 
under their feet again in 1967 with the annexation of East Jerusalem and in the early seventies 
two organizations, the Sephardi Community Committee and the Ashkenazi Knesset Yisrael 
Committee, began to sue for legal ownership of the land. They initiated a series of legal suits 
against the Palestinian inhabitants including demands for rent and later requests for the 
houses to be evacuated. This land had indeed been bought by these two Jewish community 
trusts for 16,000 Francs in 1876, and it is on the basis of these Ottoman deeds that the Israeli 
courts granted ownership
42
. An adjacent plot of land was purchased by a private company in 
1891 and plots sold to individuals of mostly Yemenite, Halabi and Georgian Jewish origin. In 
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 The 1948 Armistice boundary between Israel and Jordan. While the Green Line marked the 
boundary of Jordanian jurisdiction the lesser know Red Line drew the extent of Israeli control. 
In several places the space between the two lines was ‘no man’s land’. Nineteen years of non-
development helped shape the current infrastructure and the major road north from the city 
centre, along which the tram line also runs, follows the route of no man’s land. 
42
 The entire region of Israel-Palestine and beyond was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 to 
1917. The walls that still surround the Old City were commissioned by Suleiman the 
Magnificent. Control passed to the British Empire in 1923 until the establishment of the State of 
Israel in 1948.  
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1916, 93 Jewish families, comprising 259 individuals, lived in this neighbourhood, which had 
four synagogues as well as the tombs of Shimon HaZadek and the Small Sanhedrin
43
. During 
the conflict of 1948 these Jewish families left the area for the sanctuary of Israeli jurisdiction 
and the neighbourhood found itself adjacent to the Green Line. It was during this period in 
the 1950s that the Palestinian families moved into the houses built by UNRWA and the 
Jordanians on empty land in the Ashkenazi trust's parcel of land. Israel's Custodian General 
of the Ministry for Justice took control of the land after the 1967 war and in 1972 the two 
Jewish trusts completed legal proceedings for the release of properties to them and 
registration in their names (see Reiter & Lehrs, 2010). After that it gets complicated, or rather 
the historical complexities become subject to the intricate discourse of civil law regarding 
property, holy places, Palestinian absentees, municipal zoning, national parks, archaeological 
and religious sites and political imperatives in Israel. One law in particular stands out in the 
argument over ownership, the Absentee's Property Law (Knesset, 1950). The net effect of 
this law is such that property belonging to Palestinian refugees of 1948 was turned over to the 
Israeli state and they are barred from reclaiming it or seeking compensation. This does not 
apply to Jews, so while the Sephardi Community Committee and the Ashkenazi Knesset 
Yisrael Committee are free to claim ownership of property they abandoned during the war, 
Palestinians are prohibited from litigating for property in Jaffa, Haifa, Ramle or any place 
within Israel proper.  
In August 2009 one family refused to leave the area after their eviction. They set up a 
tent to live in and found themselves joined by a growing number of people protesting against 
this situation. The district police began to take notice, indeed Member of Knesset (MK) and 
former Tourism Minister Benjamin Elon had called for a greater police presence in the 
neighbourhood to protect Jews from Arabs: 
 
‘This is a holy site – the 2,000-year-old gravesite of Simon the Just – and an area 
where people come to pray at all hours of the night; Arabs often throw rocks there, yet 
the police are not there’ (Fendel, 2009a). 
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  Simon the Righteous (or the Just) was a High Priest of the Second Temple and the Small 
Sanhedrin was a lower law court of the same period. The traditions that the priest and the jurists 
are buried here certainly date back hundreds of years. 
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Arutz 7, an overtly pro-settlement news outlet which published MK Elon's request for police 
called him ‘the driving force behind the reclamation of the Shimon HaTzaddik/Sheikh Jarrah 
neighbourhood’ and also described the beginnings of what would be a high profile protest in 
the neighbourhood. 
 
‘What is happening in Shimon HaTzaddik is a microcosm of the entire story of 
Jerusalem,’ Elon told Arutz-7 … Earlier this week, another home in the 
neighbourhood was “inherited” by a Jewish presence; the Arab squatters living there 
left, in accordance with the eviction orders, except for one family that defiantly 
remains (ibid). 
 
MK Elon has long been interested in developing this area and was instrumental in bringing 
together Israeli and international investors to form Nahalat Shimon Ltd. who purchased the 
property rights from the two religious trusts, and raised further funds ‘to invest some $4 
million in ‘compensation for the evacuation of the Arab residents, as well as in the planning 
and rebuilding of the area to establish a Jewish neighbourhood’ (Shragai, 2001). This part of 
a policy, overtly stated by a number of individuals and organizations, which has grown in 
significance over the last ten years to ‘Judaize’ East Jerusalem:  
 
‘Our strategic plan for the city is one: a belt of Jewish continuity from east to west’ 
Elon said during a press tour of the Sheikh Jarrah...Six Jewish families currently live 
in the neighbourhood, under 24-hour guard amid hundreds of Palestinians’ (UJF, 
2002). 
 
The police came in large numbers. They declared the protest to be unlicensed and 
therefore illegal and told the crowds to disperse. When the protesters refused to do so they 
were arrested. By December 2009 sometimes as many as 25 people were being arrested each 
week at - or while going to - the protest. Armed and masked riot police were in attendance, as 
were police horses. The months of aggressive police tactics and arrests greatly increased 
media coverage of the protest, which then grew larger and larger. At one point, I am told, an 
activist brought flowers and laid them at the feet of the coordinating officer, in thanks. Sheikh 
Jarrah is not a backwater or impoverished neighbourhood. The British Consulate and the 
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Quartet
44
 are based here, as are other consulates and several large offices of the Red Cross 
and the UN. The neighbourhood had also seen the construction of several large villas by 
notable Palestinian families in the nineteenth century, as well as being the site of a medieval 
mosque which houses the tomb of Sultan Salah al-Din's physician. As such the ‘just’ 
evictions of ‘Arab squatters’ and plans to develop the area for Jewish residents had been 
noted and publicly criticized by the United States and the European Union (Arutz 7, 2009a, 
2009b; Fendel, 2009b). The violent arrests and dispersal of protests brought established 
activists, others who had never publicly protested, foreign diplomats, Israeli politicians, and 
people from across the world to the neighbourhood. It was several months before the police 
relented to petitions of prominent Israelis and court rulings that they had no legal basis for 
banning the protest and arresting people.  
Byron had been here in 2010 when the protest (or the police reaction to the protest) 
was at its most violent. It must be stressed that, having come to know many of the activists 
since and having seen arrests made, these are not violent protesters but protests violently 
dispersed. As is the case elsewhere, security forces are authorized by the state to employ 
violence and removing protesters entails such action. There is no longer a police presence at 
the protest nor are there the crowds of over five hundred. In September 2011 due to the 
success of the protests the Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity Movement, which had burst onto the 
Israeli activist scene, helping to mobilize and publicize the protest efforts and invigorating the 
Israeli Left, decided to change direction and expand its activities: 
 
‘The settler takeover of properties in Sheikh Jarrah has been hindered in parts of the 
neighbourhood, and halted in other parts. The courts have begun, for the first time in 
years, to rule against the settler organizations in hearings about the future of the 
neighbourhood. The police, the executive arm of the settlement, has retreated from the 
neighbourhood. Arrests of neighbourhood residents have dwindled to next to nothing, 
and as a result, our freedom of action and that of the neighbourhood popular 
committee have increased. Most importantly, the political reality in East Jerusalem 
has begun to change. The joint Palestinian-Israeli political struggle has become a 
byword in East and West Jerusalem’ (SJSM, 2011).  
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 The Quartet on the Middle East, (aka the Diplomatic Quartet, the Madrid Quartet, or the Quartet. A 
mediating organization in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it represents the United Nations, the 
United States, the European Union, and Russia. 
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Some of the locals who had been or still faced eviction wanted to continue the protest, and 
throughout 2011-12 they maintained the weekly event which is regularly attended by around 
forty individuals. Dr. Mahmood, the veterinarian, and Abdul who’s retired, arrived first, 
walking down together from the shops, followed by Rafik who hops off a mini-bus. Rafik 
and his family were amongst those evicted before the protests froze the process in the courts. 
He and his family are living across town with relatives. I still didn't know these men who 
constitute the small core of locals maintaining the protest, so I introduce myself and ask 
Abdul for an interview during the week. The regulars gradually arrive,  people from 
Ta'ayush, B'Tselem, Breaking the Silence, Yasamba, Anarchists Against the Wall, Women in 
Black, Rabbis for Human Rights, Boycott from Within, New Profile, Courage to Refuse, 
Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, Solidariot, International Solidarity Movement. 
I notice a man with a group I had not seen before and ask him why he came here. He tells me 
he is leading a ‘fact finding mission’ with a group of Dutch people. They’re visiting and 
having tours with both Palestinian and Israeli groups, looking to hear both sides of the story 
so as to make a more informed, nuanced decision.  
 
‘We are a group from a Protestant Church in the Netherlands. Most of the people with 
us are clergymen in that Church...I lived in Jordan for some time and got connected 
with the Palestinians about ten years ago. Since then I am active in this field, writing 
articles...if you don't write about it people won't know. So what I have seen here 
things like the expansion of settlements etc. are all facts that I know, but still when 
you see it is different experience from reading it. 
[he continued] 
‘I'm also a member of [a mainstream political party] in the Netherlands and I try to 
give them a view on the situation. The political view in the Netherlands is still very 
traditional pro-Israeli so the opinion of the CXP is quite important as the attitude of 
Europe to Israel is vital because the USA is very much siding with Israel due to 
internal pressure, restrictions etc. So Europe is quite important.’  
 
Byron who is with me, agrees with the assessment that Holland is very pro-Israel. I ask the 
Dutch gentleman how effective his work is in Holland. 
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‘Still disappointing, although maybe the feeling of ‘justice’ and the sake of 
Palestinians may slowly be progressing, but the people are still very much sticking to 
their old positions. Within my own CXP I can say I'm one of the leading people 
promoting a more balanced view. I’m a member of a committee of eight people who 
are studying this project and we are two out of eight, a minority. Recently I would 
have been the only one. The government are very hesitant to allow what they see as a 
minority opinion in the report. So the pressures of the past still dominate. But on the 
ground level I think there are more people looking for a more balanced view. I'll give 
you an example. About half of the people are clergymen in these Protestant Churches 
and one reason they wanted to join this very journey is that they have a balanced 
position. This afternoon we spoke to Rabbis for Human Rights we also had a 
presentation by a colonist [settler]. There are people on this journey who have spoken 
to others who took part in previous journeys, typical traditional pro-Israeli tours. They 
have a feeling that it’s not the journey they want; they want a point of view from both 
positions.’ 
 
I moved to talk again with my hitchhikers, one of whom is Mia who has come from 
Sweden with the ISM who were holding a nightly vigil in a tent in the garden of the al-
Quraish house. The situation in this front garden is hard to believe. During the decades long 
court proceedings over contended or intended ownership, a small extension built onto the al-
Quraish household was deemed to be in contravention of a contested rental agreement
45
. In 
1999 the Palestinian family was evicted from this one room and the unit sealed. Following 
this, Jewish settlers managed to covertly break into to the sealed unit and have maintained a 
constant presence of up to four young religious men in the sparsely furnished room. Lately 
they got a rather fierce guard dog.  In this situation the settlers live in the front part of the 
house while the al-Quraish family occupy the back. Though for the most part it was quiet in 
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 In 1982 the two Jewish trusts filed suits to have 17 apartments removed from the site. Their 
lawyer negotiated an agreement which gave the residents long-term rental rights, thus requiring 
them to pay rent and maintain property appropriately. Most of the residents refuse to recognize 
this agreement on the basis that their lawyer made it without their consent, and refuse to pay rent 
on property which they feel they rightfully own. This ruling is the legal basis for the evictions: 
failure to meet their obligations as tenants of rental property (see Reiter & Lehrs 2010 for an 
extensively referenced account of the court cases). 
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2012 the garden is a fulcrum of confrontation, one of those microcosms of the occupation. 
The garden walls are awash with an ongoing graffiti dialog in at least three languages: ‘Free 
Palestine’ is followed by ‘of Leftist Scum!’ which is rejoined by ‘Free Yourselves’. The vigil 
‘tent’ is a makeshift gazebo which separates the front half of the house from the back. It 
contains a couple of sofas and an old oil drum for making a fire at night. Although it is 
mostly quiet there is no love lost in this garden. Mia tells me how the settlers had spat and 
thrown water at her during the night, using sexually explicit language. On occasions when the 
protest group goes down and fills the garden tensions rise if a settler comes out. Some 
protesters may shout ‘thieves, thieves’, or the drummers might lead a chant ‘fascism won't 
come here’. Once when I joined a relatively large and vocal group of about fifty who had 
marched from town, two men came out of the room with large Israeli flags and the guard dog, 
which snarled and snapped out as the crowd filled the garden. Someone threw a stone hitting 
the man with the dog and cutting him under the eye. It was tense, frightening and unpleasant. 
Today though the demonstration stays up at the main road, far from the contested 
houses. As I chat with people an old friend jumps up from behind to surprise me. ‘Hello my 
friend, how are you doing?’, says Oz smiling. I've known Oz for ten years. We had lived 
together in 2003 when he was a signatory to the Ometz LeSarev (Courage to Refuse - CTR) 
letter. Letters written by serving soldiers is a generational dissenting practice in Israel. Like 
the letters which spawned Shalom Achshav in the seventies, and Yesh Gvul
46
 in the eighties. 
The CTR signatories were members of reservist combat units, who comprise a significant 
part of Israel's offensive capabilities. This last ‘refusenik’ movement, as they are known in 
Hebrew, emerged out of the violence, death and destruction in the Second Intifada. At the 
time the signatories refused to serve in the Occupied Territories on the grounds that they were 
oppressing a people rather than providing security for the state, not a general pacifist 
conscientious movement but a refusal to operate in a given area (see CTR, 2002). Time, 
travel abroad and the ongoing situation in his country had radicalized Oz further. ‘I would not 
sign that letter now’, he once told me, ‘macho bullshit’. He could no longer agree with the 
overt militarism and ‘values of Zionism’ referred to in the Combatants Letter, he was a 
Zionist no more. By his own admission he wasn't really an activist anymore, certainly not in 
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 Ometz LeSarev (Heb) Courage to Refuse; Shalom Achshav (Heb) Peace Now; Yesh Gvul (Heb) 
There is a Limit (Border);  
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terms of running over the South Hebron Hills with Ta'ayush
47,
 or getting arrested for 
demonstrating against the wall. He now had a young child and a successful academic career. 
Such personal and family commitments make it difficult to overcome the eventual burnout 
that most activists I talked to eventually feel. So Oz comes here once in a while and meets up 
with people he knows from his past actions. He introduces me to some people. Shai who 
worked at Radio Kol HaShalom
48
, Benny who is a researcher with B'Tselem
49
, and the 
legendary veteran Israeli activist Zvi. Oz goes off to talk to some other friends and 
acquaintances and I chat with his mother Tali who is one of the Women in Black and his 
father Pauli who tells me, ‘There is no hope for this country...they are talking about bombing 
Iran, that will be the end’.  I also see Mags from Finland and Jost from Switzerland, two 
volunteers with the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program for Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) 
program. I had first met them at the Women in Black vigil over in Western city centre and we 
were becoming nicely acquainted with each other. The protest only lasts about ninety 
minutes, so conversations are often quick-catch-ups. Today I end up spending most time with 
Gur, ‘You must meet him, he is a lapsed activist but we're getting him back’, said Tali as she 
introduced me. Gur is a maths teacher and loves to talk about the history of Palestine before 
1948, of physics, the discovery of zero and almost any subject other than who he is and why 
he comes to Sheikh Jarrah.  
Sheikh Jarrah is a very social affair. It is easy for Jerusalemites to reach and begins 
around 4 pm so that people returning from the noon-time demonstrations in the territories can 
drop by on their way back to the city. Now that the police no longer break up the 
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 Ta'ayush (Arabic) 'Living Together' or 'Coexistence'. Founded in 2000 as a Jewish Arabic 
partnership movement is particularly active working with poor and peripheral rural Palestinians 
in the South Hebron Hills.   
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 Radio Kol HaShalom (Heb) All for Peace Radio is a Palestinian-Israeli radio station with offices 
in Ramallah and Sultan Amir. It broadcast its signal from Ramallah but was shut down by the 
Israeli Communications Ministry. It still broadcasts through the internet. 
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 B'Tselem (Heb) 'in the image of' (taken from the Book of Genesis 1:27 "And God created 
humans in his image”). Established in 1989  B'Tselem is 'The Israeli Information Center for 
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories...It endeavours to document and educate the Israeli 
public and policymakers about human rights violations in the Occupied Territories, combat the 
phenomenon of denial prevalent among the Israeli public, and help create a human rights culture 
in Israel'  
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demonstration and Solidariot have called an end to their activities, the protest group is made 
up of only some of the locals and people who are often involved with other organizations, 
other protests.  It could be said that the individuals who come here are representing one of the 
organisations or social movements they claim affiliation to. On some occasions this is true for 
some individuals and to a degree I was always representing Loughborough University. 
However, the sample of movements mentioned above, the political parties, and human rights 
organizations are not mobilising their membership to come here. For the most part people 
come here because some of the locals wish to continue the weekly protest and they wish to be 
supported in this effort. They are joined by visiting groups such as the Protestant Church 
group from Holland, New York Communists, members of a French Palestinian Solidarity 
Movement, the Speaker of the Irish Parliament, who come to show support and to find out 
exactly what's going on here. Although this is an orchestrated event, with a bag of placards 
provided in three languages, and Palestinian flags flown, with slogans and chants called out 
over a mega-phone, and central players discussing direction and tactics, any sense of 
collective action or call-to-arms is loose. Some people hold placards, some people chant, 
some people don't like the rhetoric of certain slogans, some people are positive about the 
future outcome, others say the protest is ‘in danger of becoming like Women in Black’. Their 
23 year weekly vigil against the occupation is seen by some as an ineffective symbolic act, or 
even a symbol of ineffectiveness. Why do you come here? I asked Benny many months later. 
With his wry smile he replied, ‘It's handy. It’s on my way home, I can do some shopping, 
meet some people, you know’. 
 
A week later I interviewed Abdul, a quiet man in his sixties and one of the three or four locals 
who are still actively maintaining the weekly protest. He is one of the residents who are 
fighting the eviction in the courts. Though the protest is a social affair it occurs because of a 
deep sense of injustice, personal suffering, and purposeful resistance. As a child Abdul and 
his family were exiled from Jaffa, one of the refugees from 1948. As someone who might be, 
for the ‘greater good’ of Zionism, expelled from his family home for the second time in his 
lifetime described his understanding of the situation to me:  
 
‘Actually they want to take the whole area, not one or two houses. There are about 
seven properties disputed in the courts right now. But after they got rid of the first two 
families, they froze the eviction cases because they didn't expect there would be this 
kind of action. They thought that we'll give up after one or two months. The protest 
137 
 
made the government and the courts think that if they evicted another family there 
would be further reactions. So now every court case has been postponed - mine was 
postponed for one year. One year. Why? They didn't wait one year for the evicted 
families – it was our reaction and the protests that made them think. And I hope that 
with our purpose and the media we generate, with everybody that comes from 
overseas, from England from Europe from several countries and more...they will see 
all this and go back to their country, their family and tell them what's going on here.’  
 
Brian Callan (BC): You said you have faith in the court process. Do you believe it will work 
in your favour? 
 
‘Yes. Our case is a human case, it’s not a political case. Not just my family, all the 
families here, they didn't steal the land, they didn't build the houses. The land and 
houses was offered by the Jordanian government and UNWRA to solve the problem 
of the refugees. So they offered us land and UNRWA build the houses and everyone 
was happy. The house was released in our name and everyone got a home. What they 
the settlers claim on the other side is that they owned the area before 1948, but we are 
not guilty of stealing it. Let me just say, everybody who came here in 1948 has 
property in Israel. Everybody has houses and land. My family has two houses in Jaffa. 
So how can they have the right to take back these houses and we don't have the right 
to take back our houses? We also have maybe 450 dunams in South Tel Aviv, that's 
our property, to hell with this property! So there is a right for them to get properties 
but we have no right to get our properties back. Two kinds of law - one for Israelis 
and one for Palestinians.’ 
 
BC: What are you using in the court as your defence? 
 
‘Our lawyers went to Turkey to look for the old Ottoman deeds of the land. And they 
found 12 documents stating that this land belonged to a Palestinian family who used 
to live in the cave - down there. This was a Palestinian who rented the land to another 
man. So at one stage the old Jewish residents moved from renting to owning - they 
falsified papers and documents to say they owned this land. Now they are trying to 
submit these false papers to courts, but they don't succeed. If they do succeed to take 
this land they will not stop here, they will continue to Wadi Joz, Mount Olives, Ras-
al-Amud, Silwan. They want to circle the Old City with settlements and their program 
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here if they succeed - although they will not - is to build 250 family units for Jewish 
settlers only.’ 
 
‘Every place in Jerusalem has its own story. Here in Sheikh Jarrah the story is not the 
same as Silwan, Ras al-Amud. Here as I told you they didn't steal the land they didn't 
steal the houses. In Silwan it’s different problem, they built houses by themselves 
without permits so their case is different. Our struggle here is social, we don't have 
relationship with political organizations like Fatah, Hamas. If we change to politics, 
there will be police arresting people, there will be violence. So we say our struggle is 
peaceful and non-violent and that's why we succeed.’ 
 
I thanked Abdul his time and asked him what I could do to help. ‘Your visit here helps us 
continue’, he replied, ‘send back the story and maybe you can also bring your family too, to 
come here and to see’. 
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7. Something’s Wrong Here 
Transnational dissent and the unimagined community  
For millennia Jerusalem has been a crossroads 
and a destination, a site of transnational social 
emplacement where armies triumphed and 
retreated, merchants paid their toll and kept 
their piece and migrants and pilgrims came and 
went and stayed
50
. The city is a repository of 
the unending cultural accretion of thoughts, 
tongues, texts, deaths, and lives that touch 
upon its hills. Today solidarity activism is a significant contributor to these ongoing 
processes. In this chapter I focus on the inherent diversity of this latter-day transnational 
process which moves to and through the established sites of weekly protest. This takes us 
away from the subjectivity of weirdness and its relationship to critical thinking and into 
Arendt’s notion of action within the plurality of the human condition (Arendt, 1958). In 
addition to the instrumental practices of demonstrations I shall highlight that being a dissenter 
also incurs a great deal of sociality and also provides avenues for occupational specialisation, 
channels economic activities and affords spaces and occasions for casual socialisation and 
leisure. I therefore assert that the practice of Palestinians, Israelis and Internationals coming 
together in solidarity is producing a community of sorts. I base this assertion on 
contemporary reassessments of what this ambiguous unit of sociality might be or becoming 
in contemporary times (Amit, 2012; Amit & Rapport, 2002; Djelic & Quack, 2010). I situate 
this community in relation to two important theorisations in social movement theory; the 
micro-level processes of collective action frame production and more importantly, the 
structural conceptualisation of networks at the macro-level of Global Civil Society (Beck, 
2005; Juris, 2008a). The argument I present is that, while solidarity activism can certainly be 
understood and analysed as a network, it is also characteristic of what could described as a 
community. The difference is important in that community can convey ideas of capacity to 
include, to care for, to reproduce itself over time and to endure. One may be part of an 
extensive network, but one belongs to a community.  
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A number of factors are producing this particular transnational community. In the first 
instance there is Arendt’s (1958) action, as a political activity within uncertain outcome in the 
plurality of solidarity activism. This action entails repeated movement along specific lines 
defined by the locations of protest and sites of dissent leisure. We have then the shared 
sensuality of both Pink’s (2008) emplaced sociality and recognisable patterns in Ingold’s 
(2011) meshwork. The affective lifeworld of any solidarity activist thus contains experiences 
and understandings that can be shared and exchanged with another, even if they never shared 
these spaces and the same times. To a great extent this is enabled by the long duration of 
weekly resistance to an unending occupation, which allows for a great many people to have 
moved between these sites over a decade or more. A second consequence of this is that the 
long duration has afforded the emergence of specialisation, occupational possibilities, 
generational legitimacy and knowledge based on the practice of dissent. Thus the community 
is not comprised simply by ‘activists’ at site of protest but of a wide range of people who are 
or have been resisting the processes of dispossession directed at Palestinians by the state of 
Israel. The ethnography shows that there is no underlying practice, interest or episteme which 
can be said to be a common factor in reproducing this community. What all dissenters do 
share is simply the feeling that something is wrong. The diverse and dispersed transnational 
community is thus driven to action by the certainty of an ambiguous yet hard to shake 
affective moral appraisal. However, I shall begin with a brief discussion of how the 
transnational sociality of dissent is often imagined, both by my participants and certain 
theories on transnational social movements. The point I wish to make here is that for the most 
part very few people seem to imagine it as a community. 
Imagining transnational sociality  
The notion of community is sometimes used by the highly heterogeneous collective of 
dissenters, however it is often imagined to be small, weak and fractured. Its boundaries are 
thought to terminate at municipal or state borders and it is fractured along ideological spectra, 
prognoses and tactics. The categories used by members to describe their community reflect 
traditional and idealised understandings of community, as a geographically bounded 
population which possesses a relatively harmonised outlook on the world. We have thus the 
‘Israeli Leftwing community’ which collapsed after the Second Intifada, or perhaps exists ‘in 
Tel Aviv but not Jerusalem’. For the Palestinians there are the local ‘popular committees’, 
however judging by the low local turnout at most protests these committees may not be that 
popular locally. Contemporary research of transnational social processes in fields such as 
141 
 
economics, international relations, migration studies, knowledge production and global elites 
are now decoupling the notion of community from place and finding communities of practice, 
purpose, interest, episteme. Building on this body of work the following discussion ultimately 
asks why the field of transnational activism studies has ‘on the whole not used or 
appropriated the term “community”, preferring terms such as “networks” or “social 
movements”’ (Djelic & Quack, 2010, p. 41). This absence highlights certain problematics 
that the practice of transnational activism poses for paradigms and concepts in traditional 
social movement theory, at both the micro-level specificities of framing process theory and 
the macro-level abstraction of Global Civil Society commonly used to describe and analyse 
this phenomenon. 
In the first instance framing process theory, or collective action frames, may be more 
divisive than cohesive and often unsuitable for addressing the elusive and fluid nature of 
contemporary transnational power and resistance. More importantly terms such as Global 
Civil Society and Transnational Networks are structural abstractions which though 
descriptively and analytically powerful, can obscure the affective and potentially productive 
dimension of ‘belonging’ that community affords. By the turn of the millennium Global Civil 
Society (GCS) was an idea of ‘unusual promiscuousness’ (Keane, 2003, p. xi) employed both 
by academics as a major sociological potential (Beck, 2005) and by proponents as ‘an 
expression of the love of life, freedom, community, and democracy that resides deep in the 
soul of every human being’ (Korten, Perlas, & Shiva, 2002). Like grand ideas such as Nation 
or Society, GCS has always been an imprecise concept, at once manifest yet difficult to 
empirically define. Network analysis has indeed proved a sophisticated and empirically 
grounded methodology from which to approach its various emergent instances. Its tool-kit 
provides comparisons on signature characteristics, goal-achievement, communication flows, 
mobilization processes, the extensity, intensity and velocity of its macro-structure and the 
constitution of global public spheres through hyper-network structures of inclusion and 
exclusion (Anheier & Katz, 2004). 
Though well suited to describing and analysing transactional exchanges, many 
affective dimensions of dissent have also been addressed through network concepts. Juris in 
particular highlights how the shared experiences of intense emotions at mass direct action 
events like Seattle, Prague or Athens generate affective solidarity, which is ‘particularly 
important with fluid, network based movements that rely on non-traditional modes of 
identification (Juris, 2008a, p. 63). However, in the tension between descriptive and 
normative capacities of social sciences there is always the problem of reifying our object of 
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analysis through our methodology. Our abstractions can become essences in the minds of 
academics and practitioners alike. Pro-Palestinian dissenters are keenly aware that they are 
part of a transnational network and they do imagine themselves as belonging to such a 
structure. However, in the following I suggest that another significant affective process 
occurs but is overlooked both by academics and practitioners; the production of community. I 
believe that this affective consequence of dissent may be significant, for just as the sense of 
community belonging is leveraged by major polities to promote cohesion and durability 
(Anderson, 1991; Berezin, 1999, 2001), it is possible that by imagining themselves as part of 
a wider transnational community dissenters may also overcome fragmentation and fatigue.  
Community is also a fuzzy subject having both concrete and constructed connotations 
(Fog Olwig, 2002). Certainly there are concrete relationships involved and as with any 
community these may come to de defined through both friendship or enmity, but I suggest 
that the practice of dissent by a diverse and distributed population is also akin to what is 
normally seen as an imagined community. This is partially a consequence to the ongoing 
nature of the conflict. In contrast to the intense affect of mass mobilization described by Juris 
(2008a), dissent sociality in Israeli and Palestine is shaped by long duration, scheduled 
protest and the interim and uneventful daily routine of being a dissenter. Though there are 
often intense confrontations these happen mostly on Fridays and Saturdays in locations far 
removed from each other. There are also professionalised dissenters, those in local or 
international NGOs, who may not even attend or are contractually prohibited from 
participation in such events. There are also the unspectacular and banal everyday practices of 
daily life of living in the city as a dissenter. The meeting of friends, family and colleagues, 
going shopping, writing emails, dropping the kids off to school or taking the bus. However, 
following Amit (2012) and others I shall argue that over time it is precisely through such 
familiar and concrete routines and faces that we come to feel we belong to a community.  
Who are we? Protest demographics & discourses in Jerusalem 
There are places across Israeli and Palestine where the sociality of dissent occurs. Some, like 
the regular weekend protests are scheduled in time and space. Others, like the cafes, bars, 
info-centres and offices are available during trading times and yet more like the city streets, 
the private homes and the social media sites afford random access. These sites are knots of 
sociality in the meshwork of dissent. Fridays and Saturdays are routine. I leave the kids off to 
nursery, then get a message that the protest at Walaja is called off so I go to West Jerusalem 
to join the silent vigil held by Women in Black. Dina who keeps the black hand-shaped 
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placards usually arrives first with Tali. They are joined by half-a-dozen other Israeli women 
dressed in black. About three to five internationals with the EAPPI also arrive. They are 
volunteers on three month rotations in the region and their movement between protest sites or 
security checkpoints is dictated by their coordinator. I met Mags and Jost here on my first day 
in the field, she from Finland and he from Switzerland. They had also just begun their three 
month placements with the Jerusalem team. The vigil is laid out along three sides of Kikar 
Paris, a small square that sits between four of Western Jerusalem’s major thoroughfares. 
Given the small size of the group, which is usually no more than twenty people, the protest 
body is dispersed in clusters rather than grouped in a block. I usually chat with a few different 
people catching up on the weekly news both personal and political and keeping an eye on 
fellow protesters being angrily berated or insulted by passers-by. The silent vigil has gathered 
here in West Jerusalem every Friday for the last twenty-six years, demanding to Di LaKibush 
or End the Occupation
51
. Having abjectly failed to achieve this aim I asked Tali why they 
continue? ‘We keep this space open, so that people know they can come here on any Friday’. 
At the stroke of two the women greet the end of the vigil with smiles and light-hearted relief. 
There is a small bustle of chit-chat as everyone comes back together to return the placards to 
Dina’s bag and with a criss-cross of Shabbat Shaloms everybody heads on their way.  
This leaves me an hour or so to cross the city centre to the weekly protest in Sheikh 
Jarrah. The distance is walk-able and takes you from predominantly Jewish West Jerusalem, 
up to the Old City walls and down past the commercial heart of predominantly Palestinian 
East Jerusalem at Bab al-Amud
52
. On the way there is enough time to drop into the 
Educational Bookstore on Salah Ad-Din Street. Mags and Jost had told me about this place, 
full of books in English relating to the conflict and cappuccino and cakes. The EAPPI teams 
are brought here as part of their induction training. This is also where I met Avner properly 
for the first time, a young Israeli man whom I’d seen several times before at Sheikh Jarrah 
chanting out slogans in Arabic over the mega-phone. In the quiet proximity of the bookshops 
our glances of recognition turned to handshakes and first names exchanged and we walked on 
down the road together to join the Sheikh Jarrah protest at four. 
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 Di LaKibush (Hebrew) meaning End the Occupation. This is written on each black-hand placard 
in one of three languages, Hebrew, Arabic or English. 
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 An Arabic name for a major gateway on the Old City walls. Also known as Sar Schem  in 
Hebrew or Damascus Gate in English.  
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Dina and Tali from the Women in Black (WIB) are usually parking the car by the time 
I get there. I see Mags and Jost with some others from the EAPPI
53
 and I’m drawn to them by 
their welcoming smiles. A handful of local men who have been evicted or face eviction from 
their homes constitute the core of the group. One brings a fine gold frilled Palestinian flag on 
a long pole. Occasionally other locals join, children play with crayons and Palestinian 
activists from the Hebrew University turn up. A regular group of Israelis bring a megaphone 
and a bag of placards. Sometimes the Yasamba drummers add volume to the protest. As I 
mentioned Sheikh Jarrah is a meeting point for a plethora of activists, NGO staff, journalists, 
photographers, political tourists and the odd politician from abroad. It is like the WIB’s vigil, 
a space kept open by local Palestinians who put out the call for solidarity. Its normally quiet, 
there are no police here now and though this fact is becoming a critique from some quarters – 
explicitly and negatively comparing the protest to WIB – the peacefulness enables casual 
socialisation. At the end of the protest the activists disperse, heading home perhaps or to meet 
friends or prepare for Friday dinner. I head to the Uganda bar, one of a few places in West 
Jerusalem that stays open on Shabbat. It’s usually quiet at this time and I write up my field-
notes, but often others I know or have only seen drop in at this time, on their way back from 
the West Bank. Like Nur who I recognized from a march in Tel Aviv. She’s here to meet 
Rachel, a Jewish activist arriving from England and we talk over beer and humus. Rachel 
kindly offers me a place to stay in London for my upcoming conference.   
Though initiated and led by ‘locals’ neither the WIB vigil nor the Sheikh Jarrah 
protest are particularly constituted either by a local community or a single movement. This is 
generally true of most of the weekend protests which, though they number less than one 
hundred people at best, are impressively transnational in their make-up. Not present at the 
protest are teams of dedicated lawyers engaged in the ongoing court cases deliberating the 
evictions or those who secure representation for arrested activists. Neither can you see the 
Norwegian Refugee Council, which along with several other local and major international 
NGOs are based in the area, also coordinate some of the legal assistance. Journalists, 
researchers and various other agencies monitor, assist, publicise and interject in Sheikh Jarrah 
in various ways. This snapshot of Sheikh Jarrah is just one moment in the dissenting 
community in Israel and Palestine. The protest is temporal social ‘performance’ in Turner’s 
(1988) terms which for an hour or two brings together people from various neighbourhoods, 
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 EAPPI, Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine & Israel. A voluntary human rights 
observer program coordinated by the World Council of Churches (https://www.eappi.org/en/about) 
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cities, countries and predilections. Aside from a few organisers and shapers of the protest 
practice, the majority are not fully engaged with a given script for this performance. It is not a 
Durkheimian cohesion ritual focused on a collective totem (Durkheim, 1912b) nor a carnival 
affair or intensely affective direct-action event (Juris, 2008a). Some chant, some don’t, some 
don’t like certain slogans, the volume of the drums annoys one while others do a little 
shimmy. Mostly people are sitting or standing in small groups chatting casually and on the 
whole participation is fluid, informal and elective. I began to explore the various 
understandings of the situation by appropriating the classic protest chant and asking 
participants ‘What are we fighting for?’. 
The Moral Multiverse 
 
Nilli: ‘What are we fighting for  - oh that’s a hard one - we’re fighting for different 
things you see - I don’t know, can I get back to you on that’ 
 
Vered: ‘I’m fighting so I can go camping, hiking at the weekend. I want a normal life’ 
 
Moshe: ‘I could give you the political answer, justice, equality, bla-bla-bla, but I just 
want to live in a normal city. Like Montreal’ 
 
Abdul: ‘This is not political this is social’ 
 
Kate: ‘I’m here in solidarity with the Palestinians’ 
 
As the above responses demonstrate, ideological discourse is also fluid and relatively un-
ascribed. While Palestinian national flags are present and the chants call out ‘Free Free 
Palestine’, such overtly nationalist symbols and notions are often rhetorical devices. This is 
true even for the Palestinian organizers, as Abdul’s own statement shows. Though in many 
imaginations the Two State Solution is the obvious answer, Farouk from Hizme in the West 
Bank tells me he doesn’t care what flag flies, ‘so long as I’m left alone to build a house and 
raise my family, find work – that’s what peace is’. Amongst Internationals, Palestinian 
national liberation and justice are strong tropes, as is anti-Semitism as one Israeli activist 
uncomfortably acknowledge to me. Others talk of respect for Human Rights or liberal 
democratic values, while some defer judgement saying they are on ‘fact-finding’ tours. Israeli 
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critiques and visions of the future are also fragmented. While the Women in Black call for an 
end to occupation Yigal from B'Tselem thinks this ‘a rather outdated notion’. The One State 
Solution is openly posited while another sees hope in the future primacy of urban polities and 
focuses his efforts on Jerusalem. Subjective critiques are unfolding and coming to Sheikh 
Jarrah has also changed peoples’ perceptions. Moshe, an Israeli citizen raised in the U.S. 
‘came to Sheikh Jarrah a classic left-Zionist Two State activist...after that year I was an anti-
Occupation activist’. Tomer who had never protested, came here because he ‘didn’t think it 
was right that the police were arresting people’ and is now with the rather more radical Israeli 
collective Anarchists Against the Wall. 
Sheikh Jarrah is fairly typical of much of the popular committees’ form of solidarity 
which has been prevalent for the past decade or more. Its focus is a particular localised 
instance of dispossession, it insists on being peaceful and avoids overt alliance to the major 
Palestinian political parties. It invites Israelis and Internationals to join and persists in the 
face of physical coercion and incarceration by state and private security agencies. These 
protests are all monitored by numerous Palestinian, Israeli and international NGOs, 
journalists, film-makers and researchers. Reportage is published in local and international 
media outlets and included in publications by and for major global governance organisations 
such as UNICEF, UNDP, The European Union, and the Quartet. Efforts at direct contact and 
coordination between the various protests are now being attempted through personal 
networks, conferences, and strategy meetings. However, with the exception of one or two 
isolated cases these protests have had few definitive victories in terms of rolling back 
dispossession. In the absence of any political opportunity structure over the last number of 
years, these protests are now critiqued by some as symbolic acts (al Saafin, 2012). Debates on 
indices of success or failure and the importance of symbolic acts aside, we can concretely say 
that these protests have managed to endure for years and have played a significant role in the 
growth of international dissent to Israeli policies (Landy, 2011). By calling upon and 
welcoming people from all over the world to join them in solidarity, the Palestinian activists 
have played a major role in the growth of grassroots transnational opposition to Israel’s 
politics and practices.  Though we can rightly call this diverse set of peoples and practices a 
network, what sustains these protests week after withering week is the affective component of 
the sociality of prolonged dissent, which is producing what maybe properly understood as a 
transnational community. 
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What is community? 
 
‘There’s a left-wing community in Tel Aviv, but not here in Jerusalem’ 
answered Sarah 
 
Vered Amit points out that the historical practice of ethnography has reinforced a correlation 
between place and community, in effect employing location as the unit of analysis rather than 
the object of research (Amit in Amit & Rapport, 2002). The discipline took its time in coming 
to understand that their cultural isolates were not timeless units of utopian sociality. In the 
1950s Max Gluckman and the Manchester School confirmed that ‘tribal’ life was neither 
harmonious nor isolated. Gender, generation, blood-lines and indeed any facet of a social 
structure as much shaped dissent as it did order (Epstein, 1969; Mitchell, 1969; V. Turner, 
1957, 1967). Some time passed before this observation was applied to that great community 
of modernity, the Nation. Gellner and Anderson were amongst the first to unpick the 
historical contingency and the mechanisms through which national communities had come to 
be imagined in the minds of their members (Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983, 1994). The later 
turn to transnational studies has further problematised traditional concepts of belonging and 
also questioned the role that academia has played in reproducing the notion of nation as the 
natural representation of modernity (Appadurai, 2008; Beck, 2005; Wimmer & Glick-
Schiller, 2002). 
If communities need not be constructed from harmonious outgrowths of concrete 
social bonds and face-to-face relationships, then what are they? There is insufficient space to 
fully address this debate here, but the transnational turn has led to a reformulation of the 
concept in various ways. Studies on migration, business and finance, trade agreements, 
tourism, scientists, elites and more now talk of transnational communities in which ‘place’ is 
of secondary importance or less. Instead we have communities of practice, purpose, interest 
and episteme which are based on shared convictions, values, expertise, goals or socio-
political visions. What most authors agree on is a sense of belonging emerging from mutual 
interaction, a common project and/or imagined identity and the active involvement of some 
of its members (Basch et al., 1994; Djelic & Quack, 2010; Hannerz, 1992; Levitt, 2001; 
Mayntz, 2010; Metiu, 2010; G. Morgan, 2001; G. Morgan & Kubo, 2010). Despite the 
perceived explosion in transnationalism ‘approaches that dominate the study of globalization 
direct attention selectively to markets, organizations, and networks, neglecting other kinds of 
social collectives extending beyond national boundaries, such as communities’ (Mayntz, 
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2010, p. 64). Though some authors are now beginning to critically apply the term to 
transnational socialites (Dobusch & Quack, 2010; Mariussen, 2010; Metiu, 2010) its general 
absence limits our understanding of both the role and impact of novel community formations 
in the studies of social protest and the wider discussion of how and when community is 
produced.    
How is community? 
Amit uses the term community to distinguish a collective connection that is not merely or 
even primarily instrumental. This excludes for example members of a workforce if they 
engage only through formal roles. However, when co-workers begin to meet for coffee, lunch 
conversations, or go bowling together some of them may come to feel part of a community.  
 
‘Most of our experiences of communality arise similarly out of more or less limited 
interactions afforded by a variety of circumstantial associations, with our neighbours, 
the parents of children at our children’s school, or team-mates, fellow students, club 
members, conference-goers and more’ (Amit in Amit & Rapport, 2002, pp. 58–9) 
 
This sense of belonging, through quotidian and banal interaction which Amit calls 
consociation, emerges first through eye-contact, recognition, then being able to put names to 
faces, telling stories about mutually shared experiences, and in some cases leading to 
friendship, intimacy, love or lasting animosity. An example is Dyck’s observation of the 
construction of community sentiment in suburban Canada through the consociation practices 
of parents supporting their children at track and field days. At these weekly events parents 
shared the purposes and practices of positive child rearing, leading to formal identification as 
a ‘track parent with reference to a person’s history of co-participation with others in 
happenings’ (Dyck, 2002, p. 116). Repeated presence at and participation in track days, 
entails casual social interactions and a growing intimacy with both the people there and 
certain  behavioural norms. This, Dyck argues, can lead to one being identified  with – and 
feeling as part of - a community. Even more limited, less formal and indirect familiarities are 
produced through the proclivities of our daily routines. Over time we begin to recognise 
others, at shops, bus stops or our favourite bars. By regular movement through spaces we 
learn the rhythms of the lives of people whom we do not know. For Wallman (1998) 
recognising and occasionally being recognised by others in these ‘traffic relations’ also 
fosters a sense of belonging, without the need for direct  interpersonal relationships or 
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substantial exchange. Implicit in Wallman’s analysis is the awareness that community 
imagination comfortably accommodates an affinity to others whom we shall never meet. This 
understanding is of course in line with Anderson’s (1991) formulation of national belonging 
and also evokes ‘a wider set of social potentials that exist for a specified population’ (Pink, 
2008, p. 171). However, the community of dissent which passes through Israel and Palestine 
is a rather ambiguous population to specify. Due to its diffuse and dispersed constituency, in 
which ‘belonging may or may not be recognized, interpreted, responded to and felt’ (Amit in 
Rapport & Amit, 2012 loc. 388) and because of its non-traditional modes this population is 
not well imagined as a community along its transnational dimension, either by observers or 
practitioners.  
Division and unity through complexity 
There are though significant obstacles to a sense of community amongst this collection of 
peoples, obstacles both real and imagined. This is an impressively heterogeneous group 
containing a mix of cultures, experiences, genders and generations. It contains a multitude of 
different understandings of the problem and its resolution. Such diversity of opinions is 
inevitable for three main reasons. Firstly there is the obvious relativity of acculturated 
understandings, experiences and expectations of Palestinians, Israelis, and Internationals. 
This is further compounded by the historical depth and unfolding nature of the situation, and 
the complex production of narratives and counter-narratives. These narratives have been 
central characters in a major geo-political performance for over a century now with each 
character vying for the attention, sympathies and assistance of audiences and powers near and 
far. Thirdly in this period of ‘relative’ quiet, expropriation of Palestinian land and property is 
not simply a state controlled exercise. As described in the previous chapter it is a 
transnational project where private capital, diaspora resources, urban planning, archaeological 
preservation, environmental quality, messianic beliefs and other stakeholders devolve the 
state from culpability. This is important to understand; both the Israeli state and the Jerusalem 
municipality claim Sheikh Jarrah is a civil matter in which they are prohibited from 
interfering. The Judaisation of East Jerusalem (as it is now being referred to by both 
concerns), has nothing to do with, it seems, either local or national politics. 
This third reason is particularly effective in creating differentiation in dissenters’ 
understandings and misunderstandings of the problem and in their capacity to define exactly 
what is wrong here. In East Jerusalem alone a property developer and a religious tomb are 
driving evictions in Sheikh Jarrah; in Silwan illegal homes are demolished and a bronze-age 
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archaeological dig undermines the foundations of others; a national park is established on the 
land of Issawiya and a by-pass road is set to cut Beit Safafa in two. Why would the 
municipality not maintain the rule of law and develop the city’s religious, tourist and leisure 
areas? In Area C of the West Bank, where the Israeli military has jurisdiction over the 
Palestinian civilian population
54
 dispossession occurs by various means. The construction of 
the West Bank ‘barrier’ around Walaja, the settlement security fences near Beit Ummar and 
the military Firing Zone 918 all confiscate land on the grounds of security needs. Is the 
security of citizens not the paramount concern of the state? Construction companies 
expanding settlements in Area C and the road systems that serve them, expropriate land under 
the rubric of infrastructure development and ‘natural growth’. What state would not serve the 
basic needs of its citizens and growing population? Absence of infrastructure is also an 
effective mean of dispossession, as when raw sewage from the Betar Illit settlement pollutes 
Palestinian agricultural land in the valley below, degrading its capacity to support farmers 
and their families. Perhaps these are unfortunate accidents? Bureaucracy is useful 
everywhere. Palestinian villages like Susiya are ‘unrecognised’ by the Israeli state and so they 
are not connected to transport, water nor the power grid. They also have their homes, schools, 
sheep pens and portaloos demolished on a regular basis on the grounds that even a portaloo is 
an illegal construction. Susiya and the surrounding villages are also subject to less subtle 
means of harassment and dispossession. Nearby settlers regularly pull up or burn olive trees 
and physically attack shepherds, but you’ll find a few bad apples in every lot. 
Identifying blame and thus a resolution are difficult to clarify. In terms of collective 
action framing there is no unifying diagnostic to describe the problem, no definitive 
protagonist to blame and no certain prognosis for resolution. Framing process theory sees 
movement actors as ‘signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of 
meaning for constituents, antagonists, bystanders or observers’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 
613). Collective action frames function to organise experience and guide action ‘by 
simplifying or condensing aspects of “the world out there” but in ways that are intended to 
mobilise potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilise 
opponents’ (ibid, p. 614). While I do not dismiss the descriptive and analytic utility of 
framing theory, the diffuse powers that transnational collectives of dissenters face 
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  In the West Bank since the Oslo accords, the Palestinian Authority nominally administers civil 
and security matters in Area A and civil matters in Area B. Israel administers security in Area B 
and both civil and security matters in Area C. 
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problematises these framing processes, a fact that is compounded by the diversity of 
backgrounds and experiences within the transnational collective itself (W. L. Bennett, 2005; 
W. L. Bennett & Segerberg, 2011; Olausson, 2009; Schrock, Holden, & Reid, 2004). Such 
diffusion of power is not unique to the Israeli-Palestinian context and indeed is now quite 
common across the neo-liberalised globe. While the dictator’s delight in pasting his bust on 
every street corner ultimately identifies him as the head that must roll, the Palestinians 
evicted from Sheikh Jarrah are locked in an Israeli court fight over private property rights 
with a faceless incorporated legal body, arguing over the validity of Ottoman era documents. 
That their opponents in court are Nahalat Shimon International, one of a number of US 
funded organisations that have explicit Zionist motivations to settle Jews in East Jerusalem, 
has no bearing on the proper proceedings of Israeli civil courts (Fendel, 2010; Ir Amim, 
2009; OCHA, 2010; Reiter & Lehrs, 2010). Apportioning blame in Sheikh Jarrah is highly 
problematic and this is just one of many instances of how dispossession has been advanced 
during this period of (very) relative quiet. One eventually comes to hear and understand the 
common term used in dissenting circles; ‘creeping annexation’. 
However, a lack of unified diagnostic or prognostic has not precluded participation in 
protest nor inhibited non-instrumental socialisation by the dissenters. Given that most protests 
are routine events, there is a limited need for tactical or urgent meetings during the week and 
those that occur are not open to the dissenting ‘masses’. Being ‘normal’ people dissenters 
spend much of their week tending to the ordinary needs of living, the quotidian affairs. In 
doing so a complex of intersecting personal networks and structural momenta produce a high-
degree of non-instrumental exchange as a matter of routine, hospitality, friendship and 
chance. A Rabbi, an Anarchist, and an Arab walk into a bar…it’s no joke, the bar just 
happens to be Uganda. Stewart (2007) refers to such movement and exchanges as the 
‘ordinary affects’ of life, the unceasing and unremarkable encounters which make up most of 
our days. The residents of Sheikh Jarrah invite activists to join them in breaking the Ramadan 
fast for Eid al-Fitr. Vered visits a hospital in West Jerusalem to be with the family she knows 
from Bil’in in the West Bank. She hasn’t seen them in almost a year and their young son is 
seriously ill. A Jewish-American protestor falls in love with and marries a Palestinian activist 
in the West Bank, they first met while she clung to him trying to prevent his arrest. Mags 
returns to Jerusalem from Finland for a short visit and we go for coffee where an(other) 
anthropologist friend of hers joins us. I’m asked to collect someone’s cat from the vet in West 
Jerusalem and bring it to Bethlehem. Introductions are made at dinner parties and I discover 
that Jerusalem’s bi-lingual school is also a haven for dissenters where their children learn of 
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alternative narratives to the Israeli national curriculum, my own two boys included. At these 
schools I meet the Israeli-Palestinian lawyer who represents Susiya in the Israeli High court, 
the local head of UNICEF, the Reuters journalist covering the West Bank. If all this direct 
and indirect sociality, structure, specialization, leisure activity, exchange and contestation 
existed within a village or neighbourhood there wouldn’t be much compunction about using 
the term community.  
Is the colloquial use of ‘community’ just shorthand for dissent’s capacity to produce 
social capital - ‘ties that are based on mutual trust and mutual recognition [that] do not 
necessarily imply the presence of collective identity’ (Diani, 1997, p. 129)? To what extent is 
collective identity essential to the notion of community, indeed how and why should we be 
talking about community at all? In the last section I build upon the earlier critique of 
contemporary community practice in the transnational realm to suggest that what links the 
various interpretations, practices, purposes and interests into community is the shared feeling 
that something is wrong. To use Nate Silver’s (2012) term wrong is the affective signal which 
cuts through the discursive noise, it motivates the disparate individuals to concerted political 
action imprinting a particular pattern in the meshworlds of participants. In an unintentional 
turn this practice also fosters non-instrumental consociation. The consequent emplaced 
sociality of this political tourism, structured by the famous protest performances and the 
intervals of ordinary living, follow and create lines of dissent sociality that are often devoid 
of strategic content. In the small and severely constrained landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict the daily reality of military occupation creates inescapable avenues along which 
dissenters are common wayfarers. When one chooses to attend the performances of dissent 
and follow the pathways that lead from one to another the faces and places encountered 
become familiar, shared and sometimes intimate.  
Is this what we might call community and why might it be important to do so? From 
an academic point of view I would concur with Vered Amit’s assertion that community is 
conceptually good to think, as in: ‘How, when, where and why do people come together? 
What are the terms of their engagement? To what extent are they able to establish and 
perpetuate a coordinated effort? How do they feel about it?’ (Amit, 2012 loc. 428). This last 
question highlights what I believe is a problem in the recent turn to understanding 
transnational protest as a ‘network’ phenomenon and practice (Anheier & Katz, 2004; 
Castells, 2004, 2012; Juris, 2008a). My fear is that such descriptions fail to ascribe social 
legitimacy on the practice of collective dissent, both in the minds and feelings of practitioners 
and the forces they oppose. We are all comfortable with descriptions of the ‘Jewish 
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community’ or ‘business community’ and equally familiar with the more sinister collectives 
of spy and terrorist networks. So I also believe that it might be of value in perpetuating the 
coordinated effort of solidarity activism for Palestine if we allow ourselves think and talk 
about community. To emphasise this, I present a short piece written by Vered and sent to me 
one dark night as she wasn’t beginning to feel overwhelmed by the effort of it all. I include it 
here in full for it reflects both the deep emotional strain of sustaining a life of active dissent 
and the solace and power taken from the knowledge that ‘we’ do not struggle alone.  
 
Vered, August 2012, 3am 
‘I know you. I know what you are going through. I know that sometimes you feel like 
tearing your hair out at the insanely popular self destructive habits humanity has. I 
know that sometimes it does not make you sad to think of us not here. I know you've 
found solace in the beauty and wondrous nature of the planet, of the universe, of the 
unknown and the known and cry tears of utter pain at what we are destroying. I know 
that you, like I, have wondered out loud, alone, with adversaries and with rebels, with 
the television, with strangers, on twitter, on tumbler, with your photos, your planting,  
your poems, your images, your songs, your chants, your Mic checks, your creative 
intelligent anger finding outlets....we wonder.  
 
‘I know that you have despaired when storms arise with your fellow troublemakers. 
We debate tactics, we share roles, at every step strive to live the life we speak of. We 
discuss new ways. We invest our time our energy our love our understanding our 
patience and the weight of what we see sometimes hangs on us heavily.  We try to 
share all this, we all try to participate.  And I know you also fail. We try to be aware, 
mindful of the sexual tensions, the racial understanding, the privileged and the not. 
We have also ignored the brazen patriarchy, the racial tensions, the discrimination. 
We too have at times read the news and believed what we thought was right. How 
open am I to changing my mind? I know you have felt guilt. When you leave and 
when you stay.  I know you have had to stop sometimes to just. Breath. I know that 
you get tired. I know that you rage. I know that you have questioned what it is that we 
are doing. I know that you have been angry or frustrated at times when your privilege 
was, even if for a moment, no longer the white elephant in the room. Or deeply 
questioning perhaps even occasionally rejecting the contentious solidarity beings who 
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come from your oppressors society. And you all also had to face what it is that makes 
something deep inside you move into action.  
 
‘I know that you have found various ways to survive. When so many new experiences 
force you to rethink how you see the world. Sometimes we get locked in our trauma. I 
know that you have found escape in numbing the brain. I know you have also 
sometimes forgotten what it is to love. Where compassion and >> [sic] meet. I know 
that your anger has taken hold of your insides and twisted them up. Hands tingling at 
the thought of picking up a baton, of pushing back hard, of kicking that tear gas 
canister back in the direction it has come from. I know that you want to survive. I 
know that you do not care when the money gets hurt. A glass window, the tires of a 
truck, the D-locks, the padlocks, the black bloc, the arms in concrete, the mind in 
front of the machine. I know that you do not care that they call us violent, disturbers 
of the peace, disorders of the public, naysayers, betrayers, enemies of the state, 
downfall of society.  I know you that you “prefer stirring things up to keeping the 
peace.” We are everywhere and we are more or less the same. The lines between us 
blur.  I know you know that “culture and ethnicity should be springboards for 
overthrowing the state.” The Silk Road is our information highway. The Spice Road 
is our cultural orgy. The issues, concerns, and passions that drive us are shared, 
overlap, hug one another. And sometimes contradict. However I know that you stand 
tall opposite the energy that bears force. I know you and you know me. I just wanted 
to let you know that I know you are around and that makes me feel whole. We Are 
Everywhere.’ 
  
Communities of practice, purpose, interest or affect 
Authors have been re-imagining the concept of community in the face of novel socialities at 
the turn of the millennium and Djelic and Quack highlight four common understandings in 
transnational studies (Djelic & Quack, 2010). Perhaps we could describe the transnational 
flows that pass through the performances of solidarity activism as one of these kinds; a 
community of practice, purpose, interest or episteme? While the popular committee protests 
do share a mode of practice in non-violent or more properly ‘unarmed’ resistance, practice 
alone would exclude the professional contingency of journalists, legal experts, fund raisers 
and NGO assistance that have such crucial and engaged roles. The purpose of protest 
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performances are well stated in the local dimension; resisting evictions, dispossession, 
restriction, ending the occupation etc. However, there is no consensus on the greater purpose 
of the network of protests, as Nilli admitted earlier ‘we are fighting for different things’. 
Perhaps, we can better imagine this transnational dissent as producing a community of 
interest or episteme. However, as Mayntz points out interest ‘must be understood in a very 
general sense to avoid misinterpretation’ (Mayntz, 2010, p. 66) and episteme has more 
generally been applied to communities of ‘professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain’ (Haas, 1992, p. 3), such as doctors and academics. We 
can say though, that even while practices, purposes, interests and episteme are differentially 
constructed and constrained, everyone from the Palestinian waiting at the checkpoint, to a 
Rabbi for Human Rights, the Anarchist blocking a bulldozer, the UN report compiler, the fact 
finding Christian or Fasel from Sheikh Jarrah who wants his house back, all share the feeling 
that something is wrong here.  
Following the model of affect used in this thesis we must affirm that this feeling is not 
of secondary importance, nor is it a mindless reaction. It is a sophisticated, pervasive and 
often astute process by which we perceive, understand and judge our world. The feeling that 
something is wrong is Damasio’s ‘wordless knowledge’ and Prinz’s embodied judgement. It 
remains independent of conscience, discursive critiques or framings, both those which aim to 
support it and the counter-frames which attempt to deflect its critique. The feeling constitutes 
the core of moral reasoning and dumbfounds the complexity arguments to the contrary. I 
cannot argue here for a historically consistent universal codification of Right or Wrong which 
we all access. Wrong is a cultural construct and we cannot doubt that those advocating a 
‘Greater Israel’ through the expansion of settlements feel this to be the right thing, but all 
transnational dissenters be they foreign or local come to the scheduled sites of protest because 
they feel something is wrong. They may arrive there by different paths but they have all 
become moral actors. Palestinians who have lived for generations under both banal and 
violent expressions of military occupation have little reason to judge their lot as somehow 
legitimate. Many Israeli dissenters have had to overcome nationally promoted sentiments of 
right and wrong and both they and the Internationals are no doubt also being acculturated in 
some way by the emergent ‘moral entrepreneurs’ of Global Civil Society (Beck, 2005). 
Given that the feeling that something is wrong is the basis of any moral judgement and 
precedes cognitive formulation, the need for unifying discursive frames is not proven for 
collective mobilization. Regardless of its origin or object of attribution, what resonates with 
all dissenters is the sense of wrong and the ethnography shows that this is enough to sustain 
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dissent, overcome discursive complexity, ideological tensions and post-modern obfuscations 
of oppression. Driven by this ambiguous certainty of wrongness these people move through 
and come to share the established and emergent physical spaces in which first faces and 
places become familiar and then possibly loved or loathed in concrete relationships. Yet 
others in the dispersed population equally engaged by this sense of wrongness pass by unmet 
in the bustling commerce of dissent. This is the recognisable pattern in the meshworks of 
dissenters in this ethnography. It is not only apposite and analytically useful to conceive of 
dissent in Israeli and Palestine as producing community on the basis of a shared sense of 
wrong, it is in many ways a more concrete and inclusive unit of analysis than the practices, 
purposes, interests and episteme. 
Imagining the Unimagined  
It would be wrong to ignore the impediments that this community faces. It is certainly not a 
peaceful ‘place’ to be and it is the object of systematic derision, oppression, incarceration, 
and occasionally violent death. Its fragmentation along national identities is highly 
problematic. Despite being ideal candidates for cosmopolitan identity the mobile, affluent 
and urbane Israelis find it particularly hard to subordinate their own national identity and 
their role as the oppressor. Palestinians in the occupied territories have a severely impeded 
capacity for movement, which restricts their opportunity for non-instrumental sociality within 
the community. One cannot simply go for coffee in Jerusalem. One cannot simply go to 
Jerusalem. The Israeli and Palestinian activists are not only a minority in the populations in 
which they live, they are also dispersed across a dozen or more performances which mostly 
happen at the same time on Friday or Saturday, thus diminishing their visible extent. Though 
the Internationals bring much needed vigour (and numbers) to activities, their framings and 
actions sometimes unintentionally offend both Palestinians and Israelis. For this they are 
mostly forgiven but their high turnover diminishes the sense of permanence of the 
community. The professionalisation of dissent and service provision by NGOs is also open to 
accusations of profiteering or ‘normalisation’, of helping to maintain the occupation through 
the provision of services, whose responsibility should be with the occupying power, Israel 
(Allen, 2013; Nakhleh, 2012). Finally, it cannot be said that there has been much material 
success in terms of ending the occupation, and few Palestinians or Israelis speak of hope.  
Communal divisions, costly misunderstandings, a fast and fluid turnover of people, 
and institutional dysfunction are perhaps inevitable in transnational communities, indeed we 
have come to expect as much from their traditional counterparts. However, such issues will 
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inevitably play out through framing processes and novel negotiations in the unfolding global 
civil structures. A lack of instrumental progress or hope and subsequent burnout and despair 
are perhaps the most difficult and most important issues to address, and not just for pro-
Palestinian activism. Many other contemporary social issues requiring major structural 
realignment will not come quickly and will inevitably be opposed by resource rich embedded 
interests. If as academics we recognise that community is good to think with we can still 
critically approach the ambiguities of its instances in terms of scale, duration, mediation, 
formalization and so forth (Amit, 2012). Perhaps more relevant to the performance of dissent, 
given that community is traditionally evoked to express and harness social capacity and a 
sense of permanence, its appropriation by academia may also assist its practitioners in re-
imagining the extent and potential of their own novel social formations.  The knowledge that 
from within Global Civil Society distributed communities emerge, interact and provide a 
legitimate sense of belonging may assist dissenters in imaging their capacity to endure what 
may be many years of striving to put the obvious wrongs of the world to right. 
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Part III 
Love 
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8. Love & Betrayal and the Intimate Affects of Dissent 
In a number of ways this section on Love differs significantly from the preceding texts on 
Weirdness and Wrongness. Firstly, whilst the first two themes emerged from encounters in 
the field, the tensions between dissenting Israelis and their ‘non-aligned’ intimate 
acquaintances was an issue which I had been concerned with since my Master’s thesis. How 
such relationships may inhibit or enable protest and how they are managed within the 
network of mixed and passionate political ideologies and practices were questions I had 
determined to ask before I entered the field. Such lines of questioning and the development of 
participant relationships, though not always determined by the import this concern, were 
constantly at the back of my mind. My own theoretical concerns were shaping my 
ethnographic praxis. Furthermore, the praxis for understanding love also differed 
fundamentally from the previous topics in that, whilst I personally experienced the affects of 
weirdness and wrongness in the field, I have not experienced the sense of betrayal upon 
which this discussion of love and intimacy in dissent pivots. Though I am long enough in the 
tooth to have loved and lost more than once, and to have had and overcome fraught times 
with my own father, I simply have not had the kind of relationship with my nation that 
Israelis have with theirs. This is crucial to my argument and I shall devote the first chapter of 
this section to the Israeli hegemonic proscription to love the nation, without which the sense 
of betrayal afforded by dissent would not emerge. This is not to say that patriotism isn’t 
taught in Irish schools but - perhaps because of a post-colonial distrust of authority, the 
cultural backwardness and economic crappiness of my seventies upbringing, and the fact that 
the term ‘nationalist’ was associated solely with  the IRA in that period – in my own 
experience national pride came third place to cynicism and emigration.  
Fundamentally, I have no personal reference or ability to empathise with the notion of 
loving the nation in the way that, I argue, Israelis are at least expected to, certainly I cannot 
imagine any of my friends or family ever accusing me of betraying my people or my nation 
unless I actually committed espionage, and even then I’m not sure it would come to that. The 
knowledge I present here is therefore qualitatively different from the preceding, in that the 
third position of understanding here is less focused. It spans a greater intersubjective space of 
difference than occurred with weirdness and wrongness. My own experiences of these affects 
was something I shared with my participants, a commonality that acted as a conduit to 
understanding. It can be argued in a positive sense that my participants’ voices are therefore 
stronger in this section, but personally I worried more about this section because I felt I was 
projecting my theories upon my participants’ experiences. In an attempt to alleviate this 
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feeling and reduce the impact of my own impositions, I have asked the key participants 
referred to in the two following chapters to review, revise and if need be refute these texts. 
Methodologically, then the knowledge presented in the following is more collaborative in 
terms of the production of text but experientially less shared, and less understood, by the 
researcher.  
The second major difference in this section relates to affect theory and the form and 
quality of emotion being discussed. The kind of love I attempt to relate to and describe here is 
not generally considered to be of the perceptual quality dealt with in the preceding, it is not 
love on first sight but falls into the emotional category known as affective loyalties. Though 
we may unexpectedly feel a rush of positive sensuality when we apprehend a significant 
other, as I do sometimes when I check on my sleeping children, such wonderful embodied 
affirmation does not describe the complex, unfolding and often conflicting sensations that 
both emerge from and produce long-term intersubjective intimacy. In many ways this section 
provides balance to the focus on perceptual affect discussed previously, in that it relates to the 
construction of affective meaning through social practice; to wit through the ongoing 
practices of caring and resource giving in these otherwise tense relationships. Following from 
Bauman’s (2003) understanding of love as containing a sacrificial dimension, I submit that 
we may come to call ‘love’ that confusion of irreconcilable signals we experience 
simultaneously when we live in fundamental disagreement with intimate others, precisely 
because we continue to maintain practices of sharing and caring despite painful and highly 
emotive difference. We come to understand through the intimate affects of dissent that love is 
not happily-ever-after but diffuse and enduring affection through fundamental and highly 
emotional charged moral disputes. While Gould (2009) and others have pointed out how the 
‘speech acts’ of others can recast complex emotions of fear and shame into ‘anger’, I theorise 
that the affective confusion of dissent is renamed and recast as love, not by an act of speech 
but through enduring acts of social intimacy and by the prevalence and appeal of the western 
discourse that friendship and family is about love. Both practice and discourse reshape the 
affective dimension of lifeworlds and meanings, 
 
Part III is also divided into two chapters. The first lays out the formation of powerful 
affective loyalty to the nation and subsequent accusations (and feelings) of betrayal that result 
from the becoming of dissent. Betrayal is reciprocal here. For the ‘true’ patriot the Israeli left 
are clearly traitors and self-hating Jews, but the dissenters too have been betrayed by the 
nation that raised them to believe in the righteousness of its cause and the ‘principles of 
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Zionism’. The following chapter moves on to the affects of dissent within the pre-existing 
intimate network of family and friends, and addresses the thesis on complex love outlined 
above. Furthermore, the recasting of love out of confusion and betrayal and maintenance of 
intimate relationships has, over time, a queering effect on normative Israeli notions of the 
patriotic family. In this I suggest that the lifeworlds’ of the non-aligned intimates are 
suspended, or even reshaped, in the effort to understand the dissenting loved one. The 
intimate effects of dissent may thus lead to the application of Arendt’s (1968) faculty of 
judging and the intersubjective production of understanding in the third position. This trying 
process occurs not in the briefness of an ethnographic research project but over the decades 
of long-term relationships. I therefore begin with a short life story from the field, which 
sketches out some of the ambiguities in affective loyalties experienced by Tali, one of the 
Women in Black, over three generations of dissenting activity in Israel. 
Tali’s Story  
 
‘A few hours after the birth of my first son Oz I was asked by the other new mothers 
in the maternity ward, ‘Is it a boy or a girl?’. When I told them it was a boy they 
exclaimed, ‘Oh wonderful. We need soldiers!’ I was shocked and this has stuck with 
me forever. Is this what we are bringing children into the world for? When Israelis say 
that Arabs don’t love their children, that they only want to make martyrs, I think of 
this moment’. 
 
Tali had another child a few years later, a boy named Nadav. They grew up together 
in a house in Ein Karem, a beautiful old Arab village on the southern outskirts of Jerusalem. 
The entire village had been abandoned in the war of 1948. It is a Nakba house, in a now 
famously idyllic Nakba village full of Israeli artists and tourists. She began to protest against 
the occupation in her unassuming way in late 1970s. She makes no claims to know solutions, 
does not debate the finer points, is not a shaper of tactics or leader of protest movements. 
Nonetheless, along with a handful of other women, she has helped maintain that ‘space’ 
where the occupation is publically presented to an Israeli society that would rather ignore or 
deny its existence, Kikar Paris in the centre of west Jerusalem. Her husband, Micha has also 
been a long-time dissenter to his nation’s hegemonic narrative.  
In 1991 Oz sat his mother down to tell her he was joining an elite combat unit. 
Though military service is compulsory for most secular Israeli Jews, one need not join a 
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combat unit. Oz worked hard to get into the unit and get through basic and advanced combat 
training. He served his three years of compulsory service and began his annual reserve 
rotations in 1996. In 2000 he was called up during the Second Intifada. In 2002 at the apex of 
violence, Oz signed the Combatant’s Letter and became one of about 600 reserve officers and 
combat soldiers publically refusing to serve in the occupied territories. Over the next ten 
years Oz became involved in the transnational dissenting community, befriending and 
working with a variety of organizations, Ta’ayush, Anarchists Against the Wall, G8 protests 
in Edinburgh, Samba Bands in the West Bank and Tel Aviv. By 2010 his critique of Israeli 
politics, policies and society moved further away from the left-wing Zionism of Courage to 
Refuse. It was around this time that he described the Combatants Letter to me as ‘macho 
bullshit’. For Oz the end to the occupation wouldn’t be the end to his society’s ills, he was 
part of an illiberal nation: ‘People can move here from abroad and just because they are 
Jewish they have more rights than people born here, people who have been here for 
generations. I hate to think what would happen if the occupation ended today – the racism…’, 
he shook his head and spoke of his fears through his silence. 
At the height of his dissenting activity in Israel, he met and fell in love with Rinat. 
They married in 2009 and had their first child in 2010. Rinat describes her family and 
upbringing as ‘pretty’ right-wing, a euphemism understood by those who know how Israeli 
Likudniks speak and feel about Arabs and the righteousness of a maximalist Jewish State.  
Oz’s critique was profoundly radical for her, antithetical to her upbringing and how she 
understood the conflict but clearly this was not a barrier to their relationship. Within a few 
years she was reading The Invention of the Land of Israel by Shlomo Sands and wondering 
out loud, how can a people come to a foreign land and claim to own it.  
Tali meanwhile is now delighted with her grand-daughter and at the weekly vigils she 
tells me of her malapropisms and of her innocence. There is a sadness when she thinks of that 
innocence. Nadav her younger son moved to Berlin in 2010 and doesn’t have any plans to 
come back in the near future. Oz and his family spent 2012-13 in Paris on a post-doctoral 
research project. I asked Micha once how he felt with his children living abroad: ‘It’s great, I 
hope they don’t come back. There is no future in this place’. For her part, though they live so 
far away from each other, Tali is proud that her two sons are such good friends: ‘That’s what 
I’m happiest about’. Oz and Rinat did return though. They have family here and Rinat is a 
psychologist who works primarily through Hebrew. In 2014 she gave birth to a son. Both are 
doing well. 
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Like other life stories Tali’s is told through significant events that are far from the 
ordinary affects of which I have dealt with previously, the minutiae of everyday from which 
sociality and action emerge. Tali has experienced the birth of two children and their transition 
into adulthood, wars, sudden and unexpected acts of brutality, moments of pride and loss of 
innocence, acts of love and care and instances of betrayal. The story as I have presented it is 
drawn together from snippets of conversations we had over the course of a year or more, at 
the Women in Black vigil, over coffee in her home, driving to Tel Aviv and more. Like other 
life stories it is not the course of a single history, isolated and aloof, but the inevitable 
threading together of the lives of others. There is a tremendous amount of lived experience 
and other relationships left out of my terribly thin description of Tali and the relationships she 
has and has had, but the device highlights the particulars I wish to discuss in the following; 
the triad of family, love and nation from which betrayal emerges. 
Part I: Love & Betrayal in the Nation 
Oz was not necessarily destined to dissent. His upbringing in a village abandoned by 
Palestinian families in the 1948 war by parents actively engaged in protesting the state’s 
occupation, did not prevent him from enlisting in an ‘elite’ combat unit and serving in the 
territories. His brother Nadav did not serve, opting for the ‘grey refusal’ of being 
psychologically unfit for service, though he never became involved with organised protest or 
activism. Neither the family nor the state independently determined the nature of the boys’ 
affective loyalty to the nation but the notion of ‘love’ for Israel is overtly and effective 
promoted in hegemonic discourse. The ‘Combatants Letter’ which Oz signed at the beginning 
of his dissenting process begins:  
 
‘We […] who were raised upon the principles of Zionism, self-sacrifice and giving to 
the people of Israel and to the State of Israel, who have always served in the front 
lines, and who were the first to carry out any mission in order to protect the State of 
Israel and strengthen it.’ 
 
The ‘principles’ of Zionism are a discursive product and so open to contextual adaptation and 
manipulation in the ‘social poetics’ of their reproduction (Herzfeld, 1997). Though not a 
political or structural principle the notion ‘love of Israel’ or ‘love for Israel’ runs prior to and 
through the history of modern Zionism. In the context of divisiveness in the early Diaspora, 
first century (CE) Talmudic sage Rabbi Akiva made the injunction of loving one’s neighbour 
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into a rule. Later Chazal (sages) interpreted that rule as a commandment to love thy close 
neighbour, the Jew, an interpretation that became institutionalized in the 12th century by 
Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah55 (Illouz, 2014). In the late nineteenth century Hovevei Tzyon – 
which in Hebrew means Lovers of Zion -  was a forerunner of the modern Zionist movement, 
establishing Rishon LeZion in 1882 as one of the first new Jewish settlements in Palestine. 
The name of the settlement, now a city, is Hebrew for First of Zion. Rabbi Kook, the first 
Ashkenazi rabbi of Israel added spiritual import writing, ‘Love for the Jewish people and the 
work of defending the entire people and every individual is not just an emotional 
accomplishment.  It is an important area of the Torah’ (Malachim Kivnei Adam, p. 483 cited 
in Shulman, 2012). Rabbi Kook also founded the Bnei Akiva religious youth movement that 
seeks to ‘foster within each student a love of Hashem and a lifelong commitment to Talmud 
Torah, Am Yisrael and Eretz Yisrael’ (Bnei Akiva, 2012). That Religious Zionism often 
seems to marry love of God, the Talmud, and the People and Land of Israel into an 
overarching nationalist ideology, is also supported by an encounter I had in the ISM 
Solidarity tent in the al-Quraish home in Sheikh Jarrah, a building where the front-half of the 
house has been occupied by yeshiva students while the Palestinian family remains resident in 
the rear-half.  
 
‘I was sitting in the makeshift tent with Liv from Finland. She’s here with the ISM. 
It’s cold dark, boring and winter. She asked me along because they were short of 
people for the night-time vigils. We chat about each other’s past, present and possible 
futures and tend to the fire to pass the hours. The point of the vigil is to prevent the 
settlers in the front of the house from harassing the family at the back. The tent, more 
of a canvass gazebo, sits over the passageway between the two. Micro-settlement 
practices. Liv tells me they also hassle her, ‘spitting, throwing water, cursing at me in 
English and Hebrew’. At around midnight two or three of the young orthodox men 
return and one, known to the ISM people as ‘the Rat’ comes to the entrance to the tent 
and starts to talk to us in English – a little jeering I think. I say ‘Shalom, erev tov’ – 
hello, good evening in Hebrew – and he turns to me, perhaps surprised asking ‘You 
speak Hebrew?’ I tell him my wife is from here and I’d learnt Hebrew at Ulpan. ‘Ve 
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 A foundational code of Halakha (Jewish religious law) authored by Rabbi Moshe Ben Maimon, also 
known as Maimonides in English and Rambam in Hebrew. 
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ata ohev haYudim?’, he continues – And do you love the Jews? In the second while I 
tried to formulate a nuanced response to such a declarative question, the Palestinian 
grandmother starts to shout in Arabic from the back of the house. The young man 
quickly made his departure into his almost bare one room abode.’ 
 
Learning to love of the Am Yisrael (People of Israel) - and – by conflation of the 
concept of peoplehood as nationhood Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel) - is not in any way 
confined to religiosity. Perhaps most famously an argument between two great twentieth 
century Jewish philosophers seemed to hinge on this point as an exceptional characteristic of 
‘Jewish tradition’. In an exchange of letters between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt, 
Scholem, a scholar of Jewish mysticism, accused Arendt of not having demonstrated ‘Ahavat 
Israel’  in her analysis of the Adolph Eichmann trial in Jerusalem in 1963 and in her thesis on 
the banality of evil therein (Arendt, 1963; Scholem, 2002). Scholem wrote: 
 
I will clarify what stands between us. It is the heartless, the downright malicious tone 
you employ in dealing with the topic that so profoundly concerns the center of our life 
[the Holocaust]. There is something on the Jewish language that is so completely 
indefinable, yet fully concrete – what the Jews call ahavat Israel, or love for the 
Jewish people. With you, my dear Hannah, as with so many intellectuals coming from 
the German left, there is no trace of it (Scholem, 2002, pp. 395–6 orig. emph.). 
 
It is interesting that Scholem describes this love as ‘indefinable yet fully concrete’ for, in a 
paper in which I struggle for some such a definition, this phrase could plausibly be used to 
describe any kind of love, yet Scholem feels this to be exceptional to ‘Jewish language’. 
Kaposi (2008) argues that subsequent conflations of Scholem’s love of the Jewish people 
with love of the State of Israel are ideologically laden and mistaken, yet Arendt’s written 
reply addresses love of the collective in various forms: 
 
How right you are that I have no such love, and for two reasons: first, I have never in 
my life “loved” some nation or collective – not the German, French or American 
nation, or the working class, or whatever else might exist. The fact is that I love only 
my friends and am quite incapable of any other sort of love. Second this kind of love 
for the Jews would seem suspect to me, since I’m Jewish myself…[T]he 
magnificence of this people once lay in its belief in God – that is, in the way its trust 
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and love of God  far outweighed its fear of God. And now this people believes only in 
itself? (Scholem, 2002, p. 399). 
 
In the production of sociality and value system in contemporary and secular Israel, the 
inculcation of love of land and nation is also evident.  I’ve been told by participants that 
scouts and schools are also instilled with such values, on hikes in the hills and desserts. The 
‘IDF Spirit’ is an official codified document which outlines the ‘ethics, doctrine and values’ 
of the Israel Defence Forces. The document lists as its second value (after defence of the 
state),   ‘Love of the Homeland and Loyalty to the Country’ (IDF, 2011). Every Israeli who 
goes through basic training is taught this code of ethics. In the transnational dimension 
amongst the Jewish Diaspora, blog posts, ‘pro-Israel’ web-sites and even conferences are 
replete with proclamations of ‘Love for Israel’. Ahavat Israel, which Illouz describes as ‘a 
form of hyper-solidarity’ became in her opinion increasingly institutionalised as a value after 
World War II, not just in Israel but in the transnational Diaspora, to such an extent that ‘the 
imperative of hyper-solidarity has been the dominant political ethos and pathos of 
contemporary organized Jewry’ (Illouz, 2014). More recently, during operation Protective 
Edge on Gaza in the summer of 2014, the idea that this love is not only exceptional but also 
trumps almost all other consideration was, to use a military term, reinforced by questions 
over the conflict. Addressing Jewish Diaspora dissent to the operation in the New York 
Times, in an accusation remarkably similar to Scholem’s, Shmuel Rosner explicitly raised the 
issue of love in relation to rights and belonging and on ‘matters of life and death, war and 
peace’: 
 
‘If all Jews are a family, it would be natural for Israelis to expect the unconditional 
love of their non-Israeli Jewish kin. If Jews aren’t a family, and their support can be 
withdrawn, then Israelis have no reason to pay special attention to the complaints of 
non-Israeli Jews’ (Rosner, 2014). 
  
Like most nationalisms, patriotic feelings of love and pride towards the country are 
both promoted by the state and experienced by individuals. If it is the job of the state to 
organise and administer, it is the job of the nation to promote affective loyalty (Berezin, 
1999, 2001). This affect is promoted and produced through interactional ritualism, 
educational curriculae, civil society organisations, state institutions and local media 
(Handelman, 2004).  As such feelings of love and pride towards the nation are the 
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dramaturgical element of the hegemonic order of things. It becomes natural and right to love 
the nation, this is how we should tend to and express emotions relating to the nation-state. As 
my exchange with the settler in Sheikh Jarrah above shows, in ethno-nationalisms such as 
Israel’s and Palestine’s, the nation conflates with peoplehood (see also Kanaaneh, 2003). 
Even though I was taken aback by the question, it is perfectly natural then for the young man 
in the tent at Sheikh Jarrah, to have asked me if I love the Jewish people. It has become a 
contemporary shibboleth of a ‘proper’ Zionist if you will, with the inference that such love is 
unequivocal and absolute. While ‘Love of Israel’ may not be a principle of Zionism per se it 
is a desired affect.  
Acts of Betrayal I: Apostasy  
If un-questioning Love of Israel is the dramaturgical expectation of Jewish acculturation 
process in the state, even an obligation for ‘proper’ Israelis, any perceived transgression of 
that affective order is itself a moral transgression. It is wrong simply not to Love your nation, 
not to feel pride when you see the flag and so to act ‘against’ the nation is quite a different 
order of transgression. As Prinz (2007)argues, morality is an embodied judgement on a 
transgression apprehended in action or thought and evokes reactions such as anger, contempt 
and disgust. The evocation of these three particular emotions has been linked to the violation 
of three moral codes in the so called CAD triad hypothesis. Developed by a team of social 
psychologists through cross-cultural experimental tests, anger is linked to the violation of 
individual autonomy, contempt to the violation of communal codes including hierarchy, and 
disgust to violations of purity, sanctity and divinity (Rozin et al., 1999). Moral disgust 
signifies a betrayal of the very natural order of things.  I have spoken previously about the 
vitriol directed towards the Women in Black as they protest the occupation every week in 
front of an Israeli audience. The women have told that Jerusalem is a ‘very right-wing 
city…you see all the skull-caps’, referring to the high level of religiosity in the city and a 
strong secular association in Israel of religion with fanaticism. Personally, I don’t believe 
fanaticism is confined to religion in Israel and the secular proscription to love Israel without 
equivocation can also be observed through reactions to that transgression by ‘ordinary’ 
Israelis. A particularly violent reaction occurred in late 2011. 
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Fieldnotes: 30.09.2011 - Sheikh Jarrah 
I see a woman in her mid-twenties talking seriously on the phone in a very English 
accent.  Thinking she's another foreign researcher I introduce myself before the 
protest gets going. She is Vered, the woman who would become one of my key guides 
and participants. She's very friendly and tells me about her activism.  Her phone rings 
again. ‘Some activists were attacked by settlers this afternoon, just North of Jerusalem 
– Anata or somewhere, do you know where it is?'  I don't but I offer her a lift in my 
car if she can get directions – ‘No, they've hired a mini-bus and they think it’s better 
to go in a group’. She admits she's very unsure about going herself – will it help she 
wonders? It seems many activists are converging on the place. The Sheikh Jarrah 
protest is finishing and there's a palpable tension in the exchange of information going 
on - people are looking intense and intentional. It’s getting dark. I want to go home. I 
feel there will be trouble. I don't know why, I'm still afraid of possible violence like 
the kind I've seen on the news and I decide not to follow the mini-bus in my car. I 
avoid the trip on the pretext of self-preservation and the continuation of the project - 
health and safety and the good name of the university. But really it’s because I'm tired 
and afraid and instead I go to the American Colony Hotel to write up my fieldnotes. 
 
The group of Israeli activists went up to Anatot (not as Vered thought the Palestinian 
village of Anata) to protest against the fact that, earlier that day the residents had come out 
from the gated community, walked up the hill to where a small group was sitting in solidarity 
with a Palestinian landowner whose land was being taken by expansion of the settlement. The 
incident was video recorded. Some of the residents approached the group, one man spitting 
out the word mityavenet – a particularly poetic term for a female traitor (bodeget) meaning 
‘she who has become Greek’. This refers to the apostasy of Hellenised Jews who adopted 
Greek customs and culture during the Seleucid rule in the second century BCE. The 
successful Maccabean revolt, celebrated in the festival of Hanukah, is also celebrated in 
Zionist narratives as a powerful exemplar of Jewish militarism. The sin of elective apostasy is 
an anathema to the Zionist natural order. A larger group of activists, Vered among them, 
returned that evening to the settlement to protest the first assault which had left the 
Palestinian landowner and his wife in hospital. The second group gathered outside the closed 
gate of the settlement, while a group of mostly male residents gathered on the other side. 
After some time the settlement security official opened the gate and what several people have 
described to me as a lynching ensued, culminating with perhaps up to one hundred men, 
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carrying Israeli flags marching in triumph as they drove away the activists chanting ‘Death to 
Arabs’ and ‘Death to Leftists’56. This event was significant, it made the papers (a rarity for 
left-wing activism). Though she’s been gassed and arrested at Palestinian protests in the 
territories Vered had ‘never seen anything like it’. Some news reports of the time reflect this 
level of vitriol: 
 
Israeli Police Join Settler Pogrom at Anatot, 23 Israeli, Palestinian Activists Injured 
‘Israeli activists who were present saw that settlers were wearing police issue T-shirts 
and their service weapons, which are distinctive for the police. They brought their 
police attack dogs as well. The hooligans broke bones, smashed car windows, slashed 
tires and destroyed cameras, all in good fun. And no one, of course, was held 
accountable nor will anyone’ 
(Silverstein, 2011) 
 
Israel Police turned a blind eye to a lynching 
‘What happened Friday afternoon at the entrance to the settlement of Anatot was a 
pogrom, a lynching. There's no other way to describe an event in which hundreds of 
large men are wildly beating and pursuing a nonviolent group of male and female 
activists for an extended period of time. There's no way to convey to those who 
weren't there the threatening sense of the approaching dark - not in words, not in 
pictures, not even in video’ 
(Raz, 2011) 
 
What was considered most significant by many activists is that Anatot is not home to 
‘radical’ religious-Zionists, but a secular community of a type known as ‘quality of life’ 
settlements. One activist/author wrote:   
 
‘These settlers were not necessarily identified with the hardcore religious right. Their 
sociological background is reflected in their voting patterns: in the last Knesset 
elections…54% voted Likud, 18% Kadima, 11% voted for Lieberman and his Yisrael 
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 Edited video footage of the day’s events are available on the Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity web site at 
http://www.en.justjlm.org/601 and YouTube at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKzNrNhTu5w  
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Beiteinu party, and the National Unity Party (which received the majority of votes in 
most “hardcore” religious settlements) received only 5% of the vote. The takeaway is 
clear: the idea of “quality of life settlers” is a fiction. The violence that these same 
dozens of Anatot residents enacted last week would have made the extreme/radical 
outpost settlers proud’ (Etkes, 2011). 
 
The proscription, or hegemonic inference, that one should Love one’s nation is in no 
way unique to Israel. The degree of distain currently directed towards Israeli dissenters is 
however striking and a growing intolerance of ‘others’ has been noted by public figures.  
Retired Shin Bet security chief Yuval Diskin notes that over the past 10-15 years, ‘Israel has 
become more and more racist. All of the studies point to this. This is racism toward Arabs 
and toward foreigners, and we have also becoming a more belligerent society’ (cited in 
Ravid, 2012). However, expectations of loyalty to the state have always been high in Israel 
and in the Zionist narrative even moving abroad has been equated with treason. In this 
narrative ‘exile’ is a place of isolation, degradation and suffering and Jews who live in the 
diaspora should move to Israel. The ingathering of exiles is a core principle of Zionism and 
Israelis who leave are regarded as traitors and losers, they are ‘yordim (‘‘stigmatized 
emigrants’’) and Jewish communal deviants in the eyes of at least some members of those 
social groups’ (Gold, 2004, p. 331). Prime Minister Itzak Rabin stated this much publicly and 
more recently Finance Minister and leader of the secular centrist party Yesh Atid
57
  Yair 
Lapid berated Israeli ex-pats on his official Facebook for being ‘willing to throw away the 
only Jewish country just because Berlin is more comfortable’ (cited in Sterman, 2013). As 
most of the withering replies from Israelis in Berlin pointed out to the Finance Minister, 
emigration is most often an economic consideration. Seeking a better quality of life by 
moving to a state subsidised settlement in the occupied territories is not considered radical 
but reasonable, but moving ‘abroad’ for the same reason is an act of betrayal. That an 
economic consideration can be framed as treason gives some indication as to the regard in 
which resident political activists are held in Israel. Those who are most generous think them 
naïve to believe they can affect change. Less generous are those who think them naïve to 
believe the ‘Arab mentality’ will ever accommodate peace with Israel. And then there are 
those who feel that dissenting Israeli Jews are scum who should die for peacefully agitating 
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for an end to military occupation and settlement expansion, for seeking two States for two 
Peoples or G-d
58
 forbid, a single state for all its citizens. There is a phrase in Hebrew for such 
people, regularly shouted at the Women in Black by passers-by: Go’al Nefesh – something 
that disgusts you to your very soul. 
Acts of Betrayal II: Deceit   
The feeling of betrayal is not one-directional, affect at its core always has an intersubjective 
foundation. The progression from a sense of unease flagged perhaps by weirdness, through 
the wordless knowledge that something is wrong, and the uncertain and unceasing cognitive 
wrangling with political diagnostics and prognostics, is accompanied by a critique of one’s 
self, society and culture. Israeli dissenters are not only wilfully engaging in Arendt’s judging 
with the Palestinian other but also with their own compatriots and nation, those with whom 
they learned to be Israelis. One of the most common terms used by my participants to 
describe the non-aligned is ‘brainwashed’. Raised on the principles of Zionism, in schools, 
scouts, as soldiers and in civilian life, in the face of their dissenting experiences and 
lifeworlds, they come to feel lied to by authorities, teachers, perhaps parents too but certainly 
lied to by the nation and its hegemonic forms and practices. 
 
Thursday,  March 22
nd
 2012. Tel Mond, Israel 
‘In view of recent unfortunate developments in Israel I witness a sort of weakness and 
maybe even fatigue among fellow scholars, educators and mental health practitioners 
who are also dedicated to human rights. I have therefore disclosed and discussed these 
difficulties with our friend and colleague Dr. J from New York who will be visiting 
here.  She agreed to meet with activists of Psychoactive, PCATI and other concerned 
mental health workers at our home in Tel Mond where she will address the issue of 
vicarious traumatization and the cost of being a moral witness’ 
 
The above email has been forwarded to me by a participant who knew I was 
interested in morality. I contacted the organisers asking if I could attend as an observing 
researcher and found myself driving down to the coastal plains to a small village with Nilli, 
who worked with Psychoactive, and Tami an American (and Jewish) intern with Physicians 
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for Human Rights. About forty people were gathered for the evening and the majority were 
older than me, in their fifties and sixties. Food and drinks had been laid out and after a few 
pleasant minutes eating and mingling Dr. J began her talk in English. She had described her 
presentation in an email as follows: 
 
‘I think it might be interesting to speak about the high price professionals and non 
professionals alike pay when they find themselves witnesses to political and 
individual abuse. My thinking is influenced in part by Margalit's work, in which he 
defines the moral witness as an eye witness to human suffering that has been caused 
by evil; he adds that a moral witness must be exposed to risk in the act of witnessing.  
As I see it, for those of us who work with traumatized patients, or who are bystanders 
to political abuses that the Israeli government is currently committing in the 
territories, the risk is vicarious traumatization.  I would go on from there to describe 
some of the practices that we found to be helpful in dealing with vicarious trauma and 
shared trauma in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina’ 
 
In this she posited the Israeli activists as witnesses to the suffering and even violent 
death of Palestinians. She stressed their trauma through Lacan’s notion of ‘symbolic death’, a 
person’s  symbolic world is also often destroyed when disaster or violence is visited upon 
them. Again she referenced this violence and symbolic death to Palestinian experience. After 
the presentation the floor was opened to discussion and, after some hesitation, I posed what I 
thought to be the question that nobody seemed to be asking. I had been talking to a man in his 
sixties before the presentation and like many of the Women in Black he had come to Israel 
from the United States in the late sixties, ‘To escape the draft and the Vietnam war’ which he 
opposed on conscientious grounds. ‘To come to Israel and build a nation on socialist values 
[of the Kibbutz movement] seemed like a valuable goal compared to the war and civil rights 
turmoil that defined America at that time. I came to build a better society.’ When I asked how 
he felt about Israel today, he exhaled his pipe smoke and silently shook his head. This 
generation of liberal Israelis are aghast at the state of their nation. The question I asked of Dr. 
J was ‘Is it not the Israelis who experience symbolic death? Is it not their worldview which 
has been destroyed? Is the trauma not vicariously linked to witnessing the suffering of others, 
but in the knowledge that their nation is not a better society but one which inflicts suffering?’   
No one voiced an objection to my interjection, indeed the room went quiet for a 
moment, many heads were bowed, eyes fixed on the floor. I need not draw cautious 
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inferences from that silent pause to say Israeli dissenters come to experience a symbolic 
death. Nearly all of the Women in Black spoke of it - ‘we were so innocent before 1967’ as 
Tali told myself and Elisheva, a young anti-Zionist Israeli activist as we walked one evening 
near the Green line in Jerusalem. Rinat, another of the Women in Black who sadly and quietly 
passed away during the fieldwork period, told me how she felt about the nation. Born in 
Germany in the late 1920s her family escaped to the United States before the war and as she 
turned thirty she made the decision to immigrate to Israel. ‘I wouldn’t have come if I’d 
known what I know now’ she told me, ‘I gently encourage my children to leave, but they 
want to be near me and of course I want them to be here. I’m too old to go anywhere myself’. 
There was no drama to her statements, her deep sadness was measured and reasoned. She was 
84 when she passed away in February 2013. She had still been attending at Kikar Paris two 
months before. 
Judging from Deceit  
 
'This corrosive Israeli exercise in the control of another people, breeding the contempt 
of the powerful for the oppressed, is a betrayal of the Zionism in which I still believe’ 
(Cohen, 2014). 
 
The break-up of a long-term relationship can be fraught and occurs over an extended period 
of time. The longevity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict affords a lifetime of assessment on 
the correlation between the hegemonic discourse which legitimises the state’s positioning and 
the actions the state executes. In the effort to reproduce the occupation, discourse and actions 
change over time as they adapt to changes in technologies, practices of resistance and the 
transnational dimensions of local legitimacy. So it is that ‘indefensible borders’, ‘benign 
occupation’, ‘disputed territories’, ‘regional instability’, ‘terrorism’ ‘Western democracy’ and 
‘biblical heartland’ are all elements that have long been utilised to resist withdrawal to the 
1967 borders. Such arguments must contend with changes in strategic appraisals, alternative 
discourses, internal critiques and varied external forces using terms such as ‘belligerent 
occupation’, ‘colonialisation’, ‘International law’, ‘fascism’ and ‘apartheid’.  The host of the 
event in Tel Mond did not feel it necessary to list the ‘recent unfortunate developments in 
Israel’, we can safely presume that almost everyone in his target audience would agree with 
his assessment. The inference is that the people gathered together that evening are already 
engaged in critically judging the acts of the nation and finding them in discord with its 
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notional ideals. These are a people who were experiencing ‘a sort of weakness and maybe 
even fatigue’ as the state they served and helped to build, seems to move further away from 
their hopes of a better kind of society.  
As Jackson points out, understanding others through Arendt’s (1968) intersubjective 
judging requires more than an intellectual movement from one’s own position to theirs;  
 
‘[I]t involves physical upheaval, psychological turmoil, and moral confusion. This is 
why suffering is an inescapable concomitant of understanding – the loss of the 
illusion that one’s own particular worldview is universally tenable, the pain of seeing 
in the face and gestures of a stranger the invalidation of oneself. And it is precisely 
because such hazards and symbolic deaths are the cost of going beyond the borders of 
the local world that we complacently regard as the measure of the world that most 
human beings resist seeking to know others as they know themselves’ (Jackson, 2009, 
p. 239 emph. added). 
 
For Israel dissenters that invalidation of oneself is also an invalidation of the nation’s actions 
and the narratives used to legitimise a forty-year military occupation, ongoing dispossession, 
settlement expansion, a slew of illiberal legislation and a society which seems to lack 
compassion for others. The narrative they were raised on and believed in, has been a deceit 
and through this act of betrayal has forced them to divest themselves of the particulars of the 
national hegemonic worldview. This is not a better society but a place they think of leaving 
or hope that their children will leave. Though the nation has betrayed them, it will not itself 
attempt the costly and difficult task self-deconstruction to rectify or even examine the cause 
of such a transgression. While, in the process and practice of dissent, the sense of betrayal is 
reciprocal, the purported love of the nation is not reciprocal in the sense of giving away of the 
self. As Chaim Shalev notes in his critique of Rosner’s of the ‘unconditional love’ expected 
by the national family. ‘Fair enough’, Shalev admits, ‘but leftists and liberals might also have 
their own expectations of family’ (Shalev, 2014).  Perhaps, in Bauman’s understanding, the 
nation cannot love its citizens. There never was, nor ever can be reciprocity in that 
relationship. For if the ‘loving self expands through giving itself away to the loved object’ 
(Bauman, 2003 loc. 269) - just as a citizen-soldier might do and die for love of country - the 
nation requires and so desires citizens. For Bauman desire is not love but ‘the wish to 
consume [to] imbibe, devour and digest – annihilate…to strip alterity of its otherness; thereby 
to disempower’ (ibid). If we apply Bauman’s critique of love, against desire disguised as 
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love, we can say that though the nation may reward the citizen for their services it cannot 
give itself away, only the resources and symbols it has gathered onto itself. Furthermore the 
nation will only bestow such favours onto the individual who has been stripped of her alterity 
and consumed into the body politic, the ‘true’ patriot who does not dissent to practices.  
To return to Arendt, she could not and would not love the collective, even one to 
which she felt she belonged. Her ‘dismissal of ahavat Israel runs even deeper than her distaste 
for collective narcissism, [it] threatened what [she], and many other thinkers before her, 
defined as the very essence of thinking: namely, independence of mind’ (Illouz, 2014). For 
Ardent, the unwillingness or ‘quite authentic inability to think’, unimpeded by prejudices and 
traditions, precludes the possibility of knowing the truth and allows for what she sees as evil 
to be a product of the everyday and banal sociality.  Conversely, when the ambiguities of 
actual experience confront the certainties of received narratives, we may be unwillingly 
forced to think about the truths we had previously received. In the case of the contemporary 
Zionist ethos in Israel to question or doubt is to betray, and there is less and less room for 
ambiguity. Such belligerence, which underwrites a belligerent occupation, and the 
vindictiveness, vitriol and violence which increasingly accompanies the insistence to love 
Israel unconditionally, is a betrayal of historic Jewish values and the Zionist dream that Israel 
would be a light unto nations. Israeli dissenters are however, not simply atomised individuals 
in a strange and estranged collective. They too like Arendt love their friends and the families 
who raised them and it is the interpersonal tensions in these intimate relationships that arise 
through the emergence of dissent which are addressed in the following chapter. In this I shall 
suggest that, whereas the desirous and selfish-love that a collective demands inhibits the 
faculty of thinking, the practice of love as a sacrificial disposition which gives itself away to 
the loved intimate can enable the faculty of judging and lead to an understanding of 
dissenting perspectives and lifeworlds. 
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 9. Love & Betrayal and the Intimate Affects of Dissent Part II 
The resource rich and institutionalised state plays a significant role in collectivising both 
discursive and affective elements of our lifeworld, in preparing and producing how we 
interpret our environment, but thankfully it is not the only available collective, nor the sole 
provider of interpretations. This chapter moves from the abstract yet concrete relationships 
between citizen and state to the concrete yet still ambiguous long-term interpersonal 
relationships with family members and friends. Some networks, such as families with a 
strong left-wing or liberal Zionist traditions, may have a high-density of relationships 
supportive or at least sympathetic to dissenting thought and practice. For Aaron this liberal 
background fostered his movement towards dissent. ‘We were raised to be politically 
engaged with society and the development of the state. We would always discuss politics at 
the dinner table. It’s because of this that I could become radically critical’. However, for 
many of the active Israeli dissenters with whom I’ve worked their discourse and critique is 
far from the left-wing Zionist tradition, a distance difficult to bridge. Ideas like the Two-State 
solution is not necessarily considered relevant or possible today. Furthermore, there are also a 
significant number of activists whose personal networks contain radically different right-wing 
interpretations on the nature and actions of the state. A number of participant activists were 
raised in strongly Zionist backgrounds, secular right-wing Likudniks, national-religious 
Zionists, individuals raised in ‘settlement society’  in the occupied territories and even 
extreme right-wing Zionist Kahanists. The emergence of dissent within such a family incurs 
accusations of betrayal which are not only thrown by or directed at the nation but occur 
within intimate personal networks and across dinner tables. 
In this final section I turn to the intimate affects of dissent within the network of long-
term concrete affective loyalties in which the term ‘non-aligned’ is an understatement. I focus 
on the continuity of practices of care, sharing and intimacy that ignores and overcomes 
powerfully conflicting and highly emotional differences of opinion with regards to the nature 
of the nation-state. This is not to say that irrevocable schisms do not occur, merely that the 
affects of continuity, when it does occur, are a recasting of love in the relationships as a 
complex, sacrificial, painful and uncertain exchange. ‘The joys of parenthood come’ as 
Bauman warns, ‘in a package deal with the sorrows of self-sacrifice and the fears of 
unexplored dangers’ (Bauman, 2003 loc. 840). Significantly in terms of the social 
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construction of emotion, the dramaturgical code, it is the discursive ideal in Western 
imagination that family and friendship are ‘about love’, that allows this conflict to be recast 
as such. I’m reminded of the words of one dissenting acquaintance here: ‘Of course I love 
him, he is my father’. Furthermore, when love is recast as complex and sacrificial the 
continuation of practices of care and intimacy subtly facilitates a queering of the normative 
ideals within these intimate relationships. The dissenter is not some radical other, or traitor, 
or whore but a daughter or friend, someone whom you may have known and cared for years 
before the emergence of dissent. The persistence of both love and dissent necessitates a 
movement away from the certitude of hegemonic interpretations. For, if ‘judging, in Arendt’s 
sense of the term, is always, in practice, less a question of a person’s intellectual acuity than 
of his or her emotional and social capacity’ (Jackson, 2009, p. 238), then love facilitates the 
faculty of judging. 
Methodologically, this discussion on intimate interpersonal relationships did not 
emerge from my own participation in these personal networks. The fieldwork period did not 
evolve into a kinship study and the intimate networks were much more difficult to access 
than the dissenting community was. I could not live with a dissenter’s family, for I have a 
family of my own and indeed, few dissenters cohabited as a multi-generational kinship unit. 
The cohort in their twenties and thirties are often in shared apartments far from ‘home’. Some 
of the older generation were starting families of their own, grandparents remained in the 
original family abode. Longstanding friendships were also widely dispersed networks, often 
living in other cities, with whom dissenters met infrequently. This is not to say that these 
relationships were insignificant, only that contemporary social life for ‘middle-class’ Jewish 
Israelis is geared more towards movement than continuity of residence across generations. 
Much of the ethnography presented here is thus based on how people talked about family and 
friends and much of my inferences come from the intonations, subtle movements and even 
pauses of my participants. In this effort I was greatly assisted by the patience, trust and 
openness of a number of key informants with whom I became very close and who have 
reviewed and revised the text presented here. 
Theoretically, we must keep in mind the discussion that has gone before, the cracks in 
the hegemonic patina that seem just weird at first, the growing certainty that something is 
wrong and the immersion within a community of dissent. These are processes that have taken 
time and occurred within longstanding relationships which pre-date dissent. These 
relationships, which include both kinship and friendship, are normatively understood in the 
dominant discursive force of Western intimacy as loving. This discourse also presents love as 
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self-fulfilment, pure, certain and an end in itself (Berlant, 2012; Illouz, 2013; Schneider, 
1968; Watanabe, 2004). The emergence and practice of dissent requires that the 
understanding of love is recast as complex, sacrificial and uncertain, an intersubjective 
‘creative drive, and as such fraught with risks, as all creation is never sure where it is going to 
end’ (Bauman, 2003 loc. 228). This is not merely a change in normative understandings but a 
reforming of an affective lifeworld (Gould, 2009). Subsequently, the relationship endures 
dissent and in doing so the non-aligned intimates begin to understand the activists not as the 
traitors and whores of the nationalist narrative, but as committed and compassionate sons, 
daughters and friends. The maintenance of relationships through love enables Arendt’s 
(1968)faculty of judging to produce new understandings, in which neither the self is lost nor 
the other subsumed. It produces knowledge in the third position. Before expanding on these 
processes and relating the narratives which support them, I shall begin with a short theoretical 
discussion on the intimacies which underwrite them. 
On Intimacy: Kinship, Caring, Sharing, Shouting & Love 
The Practice and Feeling of Kinship 
David Schneider (1968) famously concluded that kinship does not exist, certainly not 
as a distinct cultural system or a category of comparative analysis. His critique dismissed 
Western folklore traditions of blood-ties and biology and led to serious reconsideration of the 
genealogical paradigm which had long dominated both modernist kinship studies and the 
Western concept of family (Edwards, 2009). Ethnographic accounts have revealed a 
wondrous array of means of defining parental, sibling and multi-generational relations which 
discount or ignore blood, birth and biology in lieu of fluidity, choice and social practice (see 
Bamford, 1998, 2009; Bodenhorn, 2000; Middleton, 2000; Schweitzer & Nuttal, 2000). Such 
fluidity and electability of relationality is not exclusive to non-Western societies and various 
authors have noted changing forms of kinship and the ‘queering of family’ in Europe, the US 
and elsewhere through reproductive technologies, economic constraints, individualization and 
the legitimisation of LGBT discourses and practices (Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Edwards, 2009; 
Handler, 1988; D. H. J. Morgan, 1996; Roseneil & Budgeon, 2004; Stacey, 2005; Watanabe, 
2004).  
Much of the focus on kinship has shifted away from the genealogical paradigm 
towards the production of relationality through processes and purposeful acts, such as 
feeding, sharing of substances, and acts of caring (Carsten, 2004; Strathern, 1988; Strazdins 
& Broom, 2004; Weismental, 1995), leading many anthropologists to link kinship with 
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‘feelings of intersubjective mutuality of being, using such terms as “conviviality”, “love”, 
“amity”, and “enduring diffuse solidarity”’ (Stasch, 2009, p. 133). Such terms point to the 
enduring elusiveness of firm ways of separating kinship from other types of relationships, and 
scholars of Western familial life speak of the ‘post familial family’ or ‘family practices’ 
(Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; D. H. J. Morgan, 1996). Nonetheless, Family (much like Nation) 
survives academic deconstruction and people continue to ‘reflect upon and argue over 
‘kinship’ and ‘family’ in their social discourse and practice’ (Watanabe, 2004, p. 19) and to 
experience ‘the mysterious effectiveness of relationality’ (Viveros de Castro, 2009, p. 243). 
Family may be a normative ideal but it is also an ongoing practice with a deep affective 
component. 
Love and Discourse 
To what extent can the affective component of such mutuality be called love? Though 
Schneider found that American kinship was about love, which he defined as ‘enduring 
diffuse solidarity’, this related to how family relations became idealised in contemporary 
Western discourse (Schneider, 1968, p. 51). Neither the historical nor cross-cultural records 
support this supposition and almost anyone could concur with Shalins when he notes that ‘in 
practice not all kin are lovable – and often the closest relatives have the worst quarrels’ 
(Sahlins, 2011a, p. 12). Many authors have pointed to the 9
th
 and 10
th
 century European 
origins of early romantic love when the ‘language of love and feelings’ between a man and a 
woman emerged with the pacification of courtly society leading to the ‘transformation of 
desire’ in poetry, song and literary works (Belsey, 1994; Elias, 1982, 1983). Outside of 
Europe, Lindholm also suggests that ‘a powerful ideology of romantic love was well 
developed, at least among the elite, in many premodern non-Western complex societies’ 
(Lindholm, 2007, p. 11), including Japan, China, India, the Middle East, ancient Greece and 
Rome. However, the love lives of elites are hardly representative of the majority of men and 
women. For many throughout history the family was to a great extent a unit of economic 
necessity, such as 17
th
 century colonial Quakers where ‘households required self-denying 
laborious parents and children’ (A. B. Levy, 1988, p. 27). For Levi-Strauss (1969) the 
elementary structures of kinship were not love but a taboo on incest that determined which 
women could be suitably exchanged for reproduction purposes. Much of classic kinship and 
social network studies had observed the effort at reproducing and maintaining kin, socials 
norms and political structure through the ‘expectations and obligations’ contained within 
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codified kin relations and practices (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Gluckman, 1955; 
Kapferer, 1969; V. Turner, 1957). Little talk of love here. 
Nevertheless, the depth of the discourse of love as the idealisation of interpersonal 
relationships in Western societies can be read from the breath of its critique. Though family 
may be ‘about love’ this does not equate to being or feeling loving. Feminist critiques have 
highlighted the reproduction of patriarchy in pair-bonding, in how marriage benefits men 
more than women, and that talk (and expectations) of love obscures gender inequalities and 
struggles for power in social institutions which promote and define gendered difference 
(Burns, 2000; Duncombe & Marsden, 1993; Illouz, 2011; Weisser & Atkinson, 1974). 
Simone du Beauvoir’s has noted that in love men retain their sovereignty, while women aim 
to abandon themselves (Beauvoir, 1949). These are the acculturated imperatives of a 
hegemonic dramaturgical code, the affective dimension of lifeworlds which are central to 
Western patriarchy. The romantic happily ever after narrative of true love is a trap – and 
clearly a fallacy to anyone who has actually fallen in love. But the critique also points to the 
power of that narrative, namely that ‘the idea of romantic love has come to dominate the 
relations between the family and marriage has become dependent on emotions instead of 
economic necessity’ (Wehner & Abrahamson, 2004, p. 1). Here we see an extension of love 
beyond the pair-bonding of courtly romance and onto the (Western) family unit as a whole 
and constructs belonging to society itself through the ‘love plot of intimacy and familialism’ 
(Berlant & Warner, 2000, p. 318). For better or worse, it is the power of the discourse that 
family is about love that plays a significant role in how we should and how we do feel about 
our intimate kin. 
Intimacy beyond the Family 
This is not to say that such relations do not carry with them expectations and 
obligations, socially defined and interpersonally borne. However, over the course of years 
expectations will be unmet and obligations unfulfilled at various times, yet families – if not 
all families or the ‘whole’ family – mostly endure. The same can be said of some friendships. 
Though in the Western genealogical model friendships are normatively excluded from the 
imagined ideal unit, friends are an important source of care, affection and comfort to many of 
us. Some friendships may have been tested, severely at times or may have been forged in 
testing times. For the Trukese, two hunters who have shared hardship and isolation far out at 
sea become ‘siblings from the same canoe’. In the west they may become friends for life. 
181 
 
When such friendships do endure, I suggest that they too contain within them something of 
Sahlins’ mutuality of being (Sahlins, 2011a). 
Furthermore, though the idea of family and normative forms of relatedness still hold a 
powerful sway on how relationships endure over time, we must also recognise that often in 
contemporary western societies ‘much that matters to people in terms of intimacy and care 
increasingly takes place beyond the “family”, between partners who are not living together 
“as family”, and within networks of friends’ (Roseneil & Budgeon, 2004, p. 135). The notion 
of intimacy I use here thus includes both friends and family – kith and kin. It does not flatten 
the two nor privilege one kind over the other, but is an ambiguous and unfolding solidarity of 
uncertain outcome that includes joys and thanks and praise, endures betrayal and continues in 
hope. This is not a theoretical sleight of hand designed to suit my data but is based on the 
testimonies and practices of my participants. What Vered calls her ‘safety net’ is comprised 
of some of her family and some of her friends and for Roy it is inconceivable that his 
relationships with friends from the army will end because of stark political differences - 
‘They’re my boys!’, he exclaimed, ‘what am I going to do’. Just like Arendt, we may love 
our friends too. 
It may be (and has been) argued that love has nothing to do with the reality of affine, 
consanguine or alternative constructs of intimate relations. Yet anthropologists have 
repeatedly remarked upon caring, sharing, conviviality, amity, enduring diffuse solidarity, 
mysteriousness and mutuality to describe such affective loyalties. Illouz argues that romantic 
love is not the source of transcendence, happiness and self-realization but part of the 
discourse which disempowers women. However she continues; ‘Patriarchy explains the 
structural imbalances in the sexes but does not explain the powerful hold that the experience 
of love, or its hoped for fulfilment, exerts on both men and women (Illouz, 2013 loc. 235). 
We may add that familial love and other intimate relationships are also difficult and 
demanding practices shaped by ill-informed ideals of loving but which nonetheless manage to 
endure the reality of disappointment and even betrayal. Ultimately, the power of love does 
not reside in its truth but in its affect, its potential to make us feel and think in certain ways 
and in the intimate moments when we experience or recall its touch. I turn now to the 
narratives of a handful of my participants who have been generous enough to recall such 
moments for me on their difficult journey into dissent. 
182 
 
Intimate Affects of Dissent I: Turmoil  
Yoav and his Family 
I first met Yoav on the last day of 2011. It was an early Friday afternoon under City 
Tower in Kikar HaMashbir the commercial heart of West Jerusalem. The Israeli activists 
were gathering for a march through town to the Sheikh Jarrah demo. At the height of the 
Sheikh Jarrah Solidariot protests a year before such marches were common-place and large 
but this was the first in some time. A few dozen people were hanging around in small groups 
and three or four drummers from Yasamba were drawing the attention of delighted non-
aligned shoppers. I was standing alone smoking a cigarette. I smoke cigarettes when I’m 
alone so as to look busy and self-contained. Smokescreen. Yoav approached me dressed in 
his mid-twenties with a Palestinian Keffiyeh wrapped around his neck and tucked into his 
black jacket. He asked me for a light. He doesn’t figure much in my field-notes of that day’s 
march and demo: 
 
‘Quite the event, invigorating shouting Di LaKibush [End the Occupation] at 
perplexed shoppers – though I didn’t shout at all but talked to [Yoav], whom I’d met 
through the magic of cigarettes’ (31/12/2011). 
 
It was an unusual day with public profile, scuffles, dog attacks, stones thrown at ‘us’ 
and at ‘them’. ‘Just like the old days’, Tali told me. Though I didn’t feel it at the time I was 
getting into the swing of being an activist and an anthropologist. I met a lot of people I knew 
and a lot of people new. Yoav and I had the normal conversation, exchanging presents and 
pasts. I was a researcher who introduced him to some people, he was an Israeli who’d just 
gotten back to the country and hadn’t been an activist before he’d left. He was interested in 
what I did, what I knew and thought. He’s not sure if he’s come back to stay, he’s not 
comfortable with what’s going on here. We swapped numbers before we parted. 
We exchanged a few texts and voice mails over the next week but didn’t meet again 
until the 11
th
 of January, at the Educational Bookshop on Salah HaDin, in East Jerusalem. 
My notes read: 
 
‘Yoav is depressed, overwhelmingly so, by how ‘closed’ Israelis are here. He’s just 
back he can’t stand it. He’s looking to me for advice and inspiration. I too was feeling 
depressed…I fish out some reasons why he should stay – why didn’t I tell him to 
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leave? I use logical reason, talk about aggressive liberalism. He keeps telling me how 
he values my opinion. How I’m moral and humanist, how I’m doing something 
important. He feels he’s going to have a breakdown if we stay here. We drop off a 
book to Roy, an Israeli co-director of an NGO with an office in Sheikh Jarrah, then 
we go to the American Colony Hotel and share a bottle of Malbec. It’s good, I enjoy 
it, its deeply political always linked to the ‘situation’; on anti-Semitism – he felt it at 
first abroad, it’s a primed defence mechanism but only a 1% phenomenon; on religion 
– he doesn’t feel tribally Jewish anymore; Israelis are brainwashed, isolated. He’s 
having real problems and now ‘feels like a stranger among Israelis while I used to 
identify with them closely, I have grown worlds apart’. Like Oz.’ 
 
We met again the following Friday. He’d gone down to Sheikh Jarrah again but I’d 
been elsewhere. There was no big march that week but the protest had gone down to the Al-
Kurds house and he’d found it intimate and invigorating. ‘I talked to the Palestinians, they 
told me some of the things that had happened…it felt good, I felt I had more in common with 
the Palestinians [than the Israelis].’ We went to the Cinematheque for some food and he 
talked animatedly about his dismay and anger – at Israel and his upbringing, which was for 
him traumatic. It was in the army that his disbelief began, ‘I knew from the first day that this 
wasn’t right, but I still had to overcome my background, the Zionist indoctrination I received 
did not allow me to see the situation for what it was. It blinded me from seeing the full 
picture’. But, I said, you seem more upbeat than when we met in the Bookshop. ‘I am, I know 
I’m going to stay. I’m going to do something, you convinced me of that’. I hadn’t felt that 
convinced myself. He talked of the distance he felt from his old friends and a growing 
identification with Palestinians. ‘I was ostracised too as a religious child…I couldn’t look at a 
woman without feeling guilt’. 
Yoav would later reveal to me that his family and upbringing were really right-wing, 
‘no I mean really’, he said turning to look me in the eye as we walked past the Moskovia 
prison complex in the city centre. As a child his parents would take him to demonstrations in 
support of imprisoned HaMachteret Hayehudit (Jewish Underground activists), to events 
where new settlements were established in the territories, and visits to Nablus and Hebron 
when new Torah scroll were brought in to synagogues. The Jewish Underground was a 
terrorist organisation linked to the Gush Emunim settler movement who had carried out a 
series of bombings and shootings on Palestinians in the early eighties. Its most prominent plot 
was Yoel Lerner’s 1982 foiled plan to blow up the Dome of the Rock on the Temple Mount 
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complex. When he was young Yoav’s family were sympathetic to the aims and worldviews 
of the radical Zionist right which has its own tradition in Israel. Kach, a far-right political 
party formed by Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1971, was designated a terrorist organization in 1994, 
but the now deceased Kahane and his political thoughts remain a potent symbol of the 
religious far-right. Other heroes of this social milieu included Dr. Baruach Goldstein who 
perpetrated the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre in Hebron in 1994, killing 29 Palestinian 
worshipers
59
, and Yigal Amir who assassinated President Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. At one 
demo Yoav got arrested. He was eleven years old at the time.  
I never met his family and Yoav himself was moving around a lot at this time. 
Though feeling isolated in Israel he spent a good deal of his time in Ramallah, making 
Palestinian friends, going to parties. He later explained ‘being in Israel was painful since I 
changed so much and could not relate to it, but with my new found identity as a humanist, I 
could relate to Palestinians who were not brainwashed by the regime’. His family connections 
at this time though were clearly a cause of concern and frustration. At one point in late 2012 
he became very upset with me when I used a picture of my son in the Facebook photo 
campaign Stand with Susiya. He wrote to me ‘look, my mother and her step father used to 
take me to demonstrations from age 5 so I am very sensitive to exploiting children for 
political gains’. He then ‘unfriended’ me from Facebook for a time.  
That summer though he asked my advice on a family matter - should he, could he 
bring a Palestinian friend to his brother’s wedding in May. The up-coming and unavoidable 
family event, coming as it did in the midst of a period of radical shift in his feelings, identity 
and political critique, was a discomforting proposition. 
Not Uncommon Bonds 
Yoav’s story of moving far from the narrative he was nurtured upon is not particularly 
unusual. I also met Shira who grew up in a settlement in the West Bank who ‘never realised it 
was a settlement, or what a settlement was, until I left Israel’. Amit also grew up in a right-
wing family, his brother is a lawyer who represents settlers and they no longer talk to each 
other. And there is Yael an activist in her mid-twenties, whom I came to know well: 
 
                                                 
59
 Recall that in the logic of the occupation, the IDF’s response to the Goldstein Massacre was to first 
to restrict and eventually deny all Palestinian access to Shuhada Street. The demonstration which 
began this ethnography is a product of this event.  
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I grew up in a very right wing family in Jerusalem, with my mother. My school was 
national-religious and we used to sing songs like ‘Baruch Goldstein he’s the hero’. I 
used to climb up to the top of the hill near Walaja [in Southern Jerusalem] and get to 
the top with such a sense of pride and achievement, I had no idea that it was occupied 
territory. The first time my mother threw me out of the house was when I joined 
Meretz in my teens. They’re a left-Zionist political party. The second time she threw 
me out was when I told her I was anti-Zionist. 
 
Many of the Israeli activist cohort in their twenties and thirties have made a similar 
movement. These are individuals who grew up with and through the first Lebanon war, the 
First Intifada, the Oslo Peace process, the assassination of Rabin, the Second Intifada. Yael 
has witnessed the blood and screaming and the smell of burning flesh on the streets of central 
Jerusalem, the brutality of the suicide bombings. Most of this cohort also came into adulthood 
with some form of service in the Israeli Army. Their critique is also far to the left of Liberal 
or Left-wing Zionism and few activists of this age group believe in the possibility, utility or 
desirability of the Two State Solution. One doesn’t have to come from a right-wing 
background to have ongoing intimate relations with people opposed to your socio-political 
critique.  
Roy was a combat soldier serving in Hebron during the Second Intifada. He was at the 
siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in April 2002 when he ‘totally shot Manger 
Square to pieces’ and at the siege of the Yasser Arafat’s Mukataa [headquarters] in Ramallah 
later that year. ‘We rolled into town on tanks singing Bob Dylan songs, then took control of 
all the buildings around the Mukataa - room by room, floor by floor – putting all the families 
in the basements and then executed Tsir Lahats [pressure cooker]. We just opened fire with 
everything we had, shooting at the building for twenty-four hours straight’. He was involved 
in the formation of Breaking the Silence, an organisation that records testimonies from Israeli 
soldiers serving in the occupied territories. He now co-directs an NGO for grassroots 
Palestinian empowerment in Jerusalem and still maintains close and frequent contact with his 
army buddies, ‘they’re my boys, what am I going to do!’.  
The rhetoric of familial bonds is often strong within military units, that ‘band of 
brothers’. In the Israeli military, particularly in combat units, the term Achi (Hebrew: my 
brother) is routinely used to address a fellow member of the unit. The structure of reserve 
service also results in the practice whereby most soldiers continue to serve in the same unit, 
with the same company and commanders, from their late-teens to their mid-forties, thereby 
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developing lifelong connections with their fellow-reservists, the unit gradually becomes an 
‘extended family’ (Zemlinskaya, 2004, p. 8). Testimonies from Breaking the Silence support 
Roy’s experience; ‘Y: We’ve always done reserve duty together...They know everything 
about me, the way brothers do. My refusal caused some unpleasantness, but the ties weren’t 
severed’ (Chacham, 2003, p. 61). There is something of the Trukese canoe sibling effect in 
the shared experiences among soldiers, but thankfully intimacy does not insist on the 
intensity, fear of death and killing. There is enough intensity in the ambiguity of ordinary life 
for lasting, supportive and loving friendships to form and endure. Vered’s ‘safety net’ 
includes a handful of friends from high-school. She had moved from England to Israel with 
her family in her early teens, very much against her will. She didn’t talk to her parents for 
two years. But at the same time the people who supported her at school during this period 
became and remain close intimates, despite the fact that she herself became radicalised 
through activism and its proximity to the occupation. Throughout the fieldwork period Vered 
was very much concerned with and at a loss to explain, to herself as much as anything, why 
these friends did not join the protest, were not angry and aghast at the actions of their state, 
argued against her and refused to be moved by her testimony. Still it was these friends who 
texted her on Friday and Saturday evenings ‘Hey babe, hope you’re not arrested’. 
 
Intimate Affects of Dissent II: Tentative thoughts on Endurance 
Making Meaning from Conflict and Confusion 
The importance of strong personal bonds on the ability to mobilize resources, foster 
cohesion and maintain membership for social movements has long been highlighted by a 
number of researchers (Booth & Babchuk, 1969; Della Porta, 1988; Diani, 2004; Diani & 
Lodi, 1988; McAdam, 1986; Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson, 1980). Conversely other 
researchers have noted that affections for families and sexual partners can interfere with 
loyalty and the fulfilment of duties to the activist collective (Goodwin, 1997; Jasper, 2004; 
Klatch, 2004). I do not address here questions of mobilization nor of straying from the path of 
collective dissent. In the first instance there was almost no concerted effort made to recruit 
Israelis by any of my participants or the organizations during the field work period. The 
common trope is that ‘there is no point talking to Israelis’. Most activists are of the opinion 
that Israeli society is too brainwashed and that change will only come from outside pressure – 
in the transnational dimension. I also have little access to participants who stopped coming to 
protests and worked closest and longest with those who recurrently came out at the 
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weekends. The main concern here is with how dissenters cope with interpersonal strains on 
important relationships and the affects of those relationships. I do so tentatively, for of all the 
experiences I went through in becoming a dissenter with other dissenters, the unfolding and 
loss of a deep relationship to Israel and the subsequent unfolding and loss of deep 
relationships to people is not something I can say I have myself experienced. Nonetheless, I 
believe there has been sufficient collaboration on this section to support the thesis that love is 
an affective disposition which enables the judging of radically different lifeworlds. 
Certainly we can admit that the support of friends and family in any difficult 
endeavour can be important and both Roy and Vered are thankful that their parents are 
behind them. But some relationships do atrophy and are lost to dissent. Emotionally speaking 
the cohort in question here – twenty to thirty-something Israelis – grew up in an emotional 
habitus (Gould, 2009) where feelings toward the nation were carefully nurtured in collective 
practices, as outlined in the previous chapter. As discussed in the theory section, despite 
theoretical conflict, Bourdieu’s habitus can be equated with phenomenology’s lifeworld 
(Throop & Murphy, 2002). Furthermore, just as Gould highlighted the place of emotion in 
habitus, a lifeworld is also a fully embodied and intrinsically affective phenomenon. With the 
emergence of dissent, feelings of positivity and pride towards the Israeli collective cease to 
be experienced and so such experiences cease to be shared with some members of one’s 
personal and intimate network. The inability, or refusal, to feel the ‘right’ way about the 
nation not only reduces the opportunities for the practices of sharing which have fostered 
intimacy in the first place. Not feeling as one should is also a transgression of the 
dramaturgical code which may be felt as moral transgression against the national collective, 
against personal acquaintances, perhaps even against the natural order. For the CAD 
hypothesis (Rozin et al., 1999),  this single but sweeping transgression has the potential to 
evoke feelings of contempt, anger and disgust in a single intentional outburst. 
If we can say that the ability to feel the same way about events would seem to be 
generally significant in maintaining strong bonds within any collective (Jasper, 2011, p. 
14.10) then feeling differently is not going to help. There is in the relationship reciprocal 
anger at action and inaction, remembrance of pasts and hopes and questions of who is 
betraying whom, there is anxiety and even fear that the relationship maybe lost. It becomes a 
confusion of affective states, reflexive and moral emotions and affective loyalties, which has 
no clear form and no certain expression. It is an intensity of feelings that remains unnamed. 
In her exploration of affective confusion in activism, Gould has suggested that specific 
communities in stress and experiencing emotional uncertainty may have their emotional 
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habitus ‘transformed’. She found that ACT UP, which agitated for legislation, medical 
research, treatment and policies to fight the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, successfully 
mobilized support from the U.S. gay community through ‘speech acts’ of movement leaders. 
Repeated articulations by movement leaders altered the prevailing emotion culture of the gay 
and lesbian community, recasting what was felt as shame and fear of rejection with a 
collective pride and legitimate anger at government inaction (Gould, 2009). The confusion of 
emotions was named and so given meaning. 
There are no movement leaders in Israel addressing and transforming the emotional 
habitus of Israelis. All those I worked with had already been through the transformative 
experiences of experiencing weirdness and wrongness but this transformation leads to stress 
and uncertainty within their pre-existing intimate relationships. I submit that a further 
transformation occurs in which the emotional confusion within intimacy is named love and 
given meaning by the endurance of solidarity. It is named love not by a charismatic leader but 
by the powerful and pervasive discourse that family and friendship is ‘about love’ and the 
endurance is demonstrated by continued practices of care and intimacy. Out of the confusion 
love is recast by both discursive incantation and ritual performance. Love becomes 
understood not as a simple thing felt as goodness but as a sacrificial, sometimes painful, 
ongoing and uncertain effort. I turn to Yael and Yoav, who more than any others I knew were 
in the midst of such intimate uncertainty. 
Moving Back 
Yael is moving back in with her mother and I’m packing my car with all her stuff for 
the short journey across town. She can’t afford to rent a place on her small salary from the 
store. ‘Maybe don’t tell her you’re not Jewish’, she says as we drive off and I agree 
somewhat hesitantly, hoping that perhaps the issue won’t come up. Yael goes up to her 
mother’s apartment first and I carry bags of stuff up the stairs after her, back into the small 
and already packed apartment she grew up in. I’m introduced to Yael’s mother, smile and say 
hello before returning to the car for more bags of stuff. It’s a hot day and when I bring up the 
last of the cargo Yael’s mother insists that I drink some water. She’s being very nice to her 
daughter’s friend and thanks me for helping her. She asks the usual questions strangers 
politely ask each other; where I’m from, what I’m doing here, how I know Yael, and so I tell 
her my story of meeting an Israeli woman, having children and coming to carry out research. 
‘Are you Jewish?’, she asks and without hesitation or awkwardness I tell her, no I am not. No 
drama or recriminations ensue and we discuss Zionist history and books on Zionist history 
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that we have and haven’t read. Before I leave Yael’s charming and hospitable mother insists 
on giving me two books in Hebrew for my children. I politely depart with thanks and smiles, 
leaving Yael’s mother to help her anti-Zionist daughter settle back home. 
Yoav, of course, went to his brother’s wedding dressed smartly in a suit. He did not 
bring a friend but spent the time alone with his family. After the wedding he posted the 
following on his Facebook wall: 
 
‘For my family's credit I must say they gave me an honor of sayonara [sic], several 
blessings at the wedding and accepted me with open arms while simply refraining 
from talking about politics or arguing. They know I am different but do accept me as I 
am though of course they wholly disagree. They gave me several honors and I was 
quite moved and surprised by that.’ 
 
This is the enduring solidarity of kinship which Schneider spoke of and that Shalins sees as 
the ‘magic’ of mutuality of being (Sahlins, 2011a, 2011b; Schneider, 1968). Love is felt at 
these moments of generosity. A generosity which by many rational calculations is undeserved 
but which is given nonetheless because we care for other. Though love may not be a source 
of transcendence and self-realization, the social construct that family is about love is not just 
a dry, proscriptive trap it is also a meaningful and affective aspect of lifeworlds which has a 
powerful hold on our experiences and hopes. The discourse of love is a powerful incantation 
which situates our interpersonal strife, shapes our affects and perceptions and enables us to 
confront the other with compassion. 
Intimate Affects of Dissent III: Provisioning for the Third Position 
 
‘No one can be fully aware of another human being unless we love them. 
By that love we see potential in our beloved. 
Through that love, we allow our beloved to see their potential. 
Expressing that love, our beloved's potential comes true.’ 
(Frankl, 1946) 
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The above quote is a succinct paraphrasing
60
 of psychiatrist Viktor Frankl’s thoughts on the 
intersubjective power of love. Between 1942 and 1945 Frankl laboured in four different Nazi 
death camps, including Auschwitz, while his parents, brother, and pregnant wife perished. 
His book Man’s Search for Meaning both documents this time and presents his hypothesis 
that the essence of humanity is characterised by the constant striving for meaning and that in 
truth, ‘The salvation of man is through love and in love’ (ibid p.37). The search for new 
meaning through love is the final yet ongoing intersubjective intimate affect of dissent. Love 
for the dissenting other enables intimacy to endure. In that endurance lie the foundations from 
which Arendt’s (2009) judging may begin to emerge. The hegemonic certainties of the 
lifeworld, in which the dissenter is a vile aberration, have already begun to flake and fall. The 
dissenter is not an Arab fucking whore deserving of death, she is a wife, a daughter, a 
childhood friend, a cherished hope. I began to consider this possibility on the bus-ride back to 
Jerusalem after the Open Shuhada Street demonstration in Hebron. I found myself sitting 
beside Meira. She is perhaps in her mid-forties, married with children and works with 
Psycho-Active, a collective of psychologists providing therapy for activists and publishing 
articles on impact of the occupation on mental health. As we chatted about my work and her 
life she told me that her husband was ‘right-wing’. I asked how that works out. ‘Oh, you 
know we argue all the time, but when we’re with company and he thinks I’m not listening, I 
hear him arguing my side of the story’. Still, despite my prompting of close participants I 
rarely encountered the intimate lives of the non-aligned intimates of dissenters, certainly not 
to the extent that I could develop deep and trusting relationships to them. The dissenters 
themselves, like Vered, were often sceptical as to their ability to affect the perspectives of 
even those closest yet opposed to them. Most claimed that they don’t even bother trying. 
Then on Friday the 14
th
 of February 2014 I met up with Vered at Uganda, the bar in 
central Jerusalem where we used to debrief each other every Friday evening after 
demonstrations during my fieldwork period. These early evenings before Shabbat came in 
had become such a important part of our relationship as researcher, participant and friends. 
Though neither of us went regularly to protests anymore by 2014, we continued to take the 
time, when we could, to sit and tell each other about our worries and joys and to offer and 
hear advice on how to proceed. She had been busy organizing the annual Women’s 
Conference at Beit Ummar and was deeply concerned about ‘normalization’. If the past ten 
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1946 p. 111. 
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years of Palestinian dissenting practices have been characterised by Solidarity - 
Normalization is positioned to be the dominant discursive tactic in the coming future. It is 
aimed at boycotting institutions or events which bring together Palestinians and Israelis, but 
which do not place resistance to oppression and occupation as its goal (PACBI, 2011). 
However, normalization is also impacting Israeli participation in the joint struggle. Our 
conversation on the topic soon turned towards the related issue, mostly ignored by ten years 
of solidarity activism, of Israeli dissenters addressing their own population. I wrote the 
following immediately after we met that evening, which only coincidentally happened to be 
Valentine’s Day. 61 
Uganda, Feb 14th 2014 
Vered is talking about normalization issues – ‘My friend Nomi from the Anarchists 
and BDS says it’s all over Twitter. It’s all they’re talking about but Nomi thinks they’re 
wasting time doing nothing, lazy. I asked Salah and Rachael what they thought about it’. 
Salah runs the popular committee in Beit Ummar. ‘He just said derogatorily’ Vered continued 
“those girls on Twitter and Facebook sitting in the malls in Ramallah, you think they know 
what to say?”  She then brings up the issue of talking to Israelis. This has become a 
suggestion, or more an accusation, emerging out of the normalization debate. Some 
Palestinian activists argue that solidarity has had its day and achieved nothing, that Israeli 
activists are just making themselves feel better by going to demos in the West Bank – ‘What 
are you doing here, you should be talking to your own people’. Vered too thinks the time has 
come and wants to put together a full frontal media assault, papers, TV ads showing what the 
occupation really is. ‘You want to shock Israelis?’, I ask. ‘Yes we must!’ 
We talk of possible tactics, doing seminars in Jerusalem, perhaps the universities or 
even here in Uganda. Then she mentions her non-aligned friends, whom for years have 
tolerated and endured her lefty rantings. ‘You remember Shanieh and those guys [her oft 
spoke of “safety net”] they’re ready to hear, they’re asking me to show them, I want to set up 
a meeting – I could get 20 non-aligned people together to listen no problem. They’re saying 
to me, alright Vered we get it, we want to know’. We talk about where and how we might put 
something together for such a group. Maybe Roy, with whom we are both close and who as 
an accomplished and sensitive communicator on the subject could lead a relaxed and friendly 
forum. A social action. She suggested a meeting at her place, ‘because I want it to be safe for 
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them and to shock them’. I understand where she means, these are her friends and mostly she 
wants to make them feel safe. The shock should be mitigated by the sense of security and 
honesty and mutual care they have for each other. She wants to shock them but not hurt them. 
We imagine the routes of possible tours around Jerusalem through the Qalandiya checkpoint 
in towards the territories, all the time bearing in mind the image of these close friends.   
These people, part of her safety net, are the reason she could ‘stay in this hell hole’. Along 
with the feeling she’s involved in something important here, these people and others 
including her parents, enable her, even force her, to stay here to continue to resist despite the 
exhausting intensity of it all. These are after all the people who texted her hoping she’s not 
been arrested.  
Perhaps Vered’s friends are in a position to divest part of themselves and to 
understand her. Perhaps this will affect some small change. They seem to be engaging in 
judging. Perhaps love, like knowledge, is also of and in the third position. Perhaps love is the 
affective sine qua non of judging, knowledge and understanding. [End fieldnote] 
 
Conclusion 
When we combine the first section on Love and Betrayal in the Nation with the forgoing, I 
have presented these intimate affects of dissent as a comedy, rather than tragedy, narrative – 
an exposition, complication, resolution and coda in which it could be said the characters are 
better off than where they began. Though based on my experiences and understanding of the 
lives of others I present these affective processes through their positive rather than focusing, 
say on the emotional management of irrevocable loss. It is not however a presentation of how 
they understand their experiences, there is too much stringing together of my academic 
esoteric for it to be anyone else’s modus of meaning and in that sense I am, in the final part of 
this thesis, leaning a bit too far over the shoulders of my informants. But still there seems to 
be a space created by participants and their intimates through an understanding and 
demonstration of intimacy as being about love, in the sense that Bauman (2003) conceives of 
its sacrificial and sometimes painful dimensions, which merges with Jackson’s interpretation 
of Arendt’s judging as a painful and fraught process of divestment of the self’s certainties. 
It must be stressed that the self-divestment required by judging, as evidenced by 
Vered’s talk of her friends being ‘ready’, did not just occur as a function of their relationship 
alone. Those relationships are situated within the wider social milieu and precisely because 
they are long-term relationships they are also witness to long-term trends and dramatic local 
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and transnational episodes which continuously impact on how they understand the world they 
live in. In Israel the practices of the state, the socio-political swing to the right over the last 
ten years or more, the dominance of and investment in the settlement lobby, the shrill and 
expanding definitions of terrorism in the relative quiet of the last ten years and the 
dubiousness of ‘pro-Israeli’ posturing in the International arena are all causes of great 
concern to many Israelis in the traditional liberal or Zionists left. Furthermore the tale of 
Vered and her safety net is not one of extreme epistemological distance between intimates, as 
is the case with Yoav and Yael. Yet the possibility still holds that the discursive thorns of 
intimacy as being about love, may also be potent points by which - with due care - the false 
certainty of the received interpretations in our lifeworlds may be gently torn to allow a space 
for judging the lives of others, a space in which new understandings and knowledge may be 
collaboratively constructed in third position. A space in which we may imagine a better place.  
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Conclusion 
It is has been difficult for me to draw conclusions from this thesis, or more precisely it was 
difficult for me to draw this thesis to a conclusion. In the first instance the sectioning of the 
discussion on weirdness, wrongness and love are to some extent potentially standalone 
processes which do not necessarily and definitively lead from one neatly to the next in the 
way I have presented them. To say that these processes have occurred for some people and 
might happen again for others is trite. Each section also draws on a number of theoretical 
fields, from subjectivity and perception, to collectivity and social movement theory, to 
kinship and concrete relationships. To link these together through a theory of affect is the 
obvious point of the thesis, and to say that emotion runs through all facets of being would add 
nothing new to this body of work. However, my greatest difficulty stems from the fact that 
the ethnographic time period of my fieldwork represents a thin sectioning of an inconclusive 
and often ugly history. Worse still, the situation violently deterriorated after fieldwork ended. 
Because of my family connections and commitments I remained in Israel to write this thesis 
through 2013-14. Life went on, kept becoming and the weirdness, wrongness, loves and 
losses continued to unfold around me, and within me. Though I had stopped going to 
demonstrations regularly in late 2012 to give myself some space to reflect and write, and to 
share the freer times with my children, my own social network and lifeworld remained 
closely tied to my participants in dissent. Then in the Summer of 2014, after the collapse of 
the Kerry peace initiative in the Spring, I experienced vitriol and violence of an extent and 
quality that went far beyond what had gone before. My fieldwork friends and acquaintances 
were also shocked to their core. I was and am disgusted and so relating to or drawing 
conclusions from a research period defined by peaceful resistance to institutional and 
measured violence is eclipsed by appalling instrumental violence and raw hatred. That said I 
am neither sure that the brevity of an ‘eclipse’ nor the sense of ‘instrumental’ as meaning 
useful are the right words for describing what happened and keeps happening here.  
 
I shall start with the first issue of formulating a theoretical conclusion, for this is an easier 
task to overcome, shielded as it is (and should be) by a requirement to think independently of 
my immediate moods. To begin with, in terms of the model of intentionality and lifeworld as 
affective processes presented at the beginning of this thesis, I have argued that both human 
perception and interpretation are guided by that wordless knowledge which is felt. Weirdness, 
Wrongness and Love are all equally implicit in forming, appraising and adjusting the 
relationships participants have with intimates, fellow dissenters and public discourses on 
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identity and conflict. Though, according to this model feeling can occur before ‘thought’ and 
at times may overrule ‘rational’ options or understandings, we cannot elevate affect over 
other human faculties. Weirdness is most definitively a subtle and ambiguous signal, easily 
dismissed. The feelings of wrongness discussed, though possessed of a degree of certainty, 
are not of the intensity of moral shock or outrage. This wrongness demonstrates a capacity to 
listen quietly to a well reasoned argument and unfolding contingencies. It can defer judgment 
as it were, and rather than leaping back in anger when its turn comes it merely asserts to the 
self that - ‘no this is still not right’. Even the love spoken of here is susceptible to doubt. 
None of these are passions that overwhelm, they are affective perspectives cascading through 
incessant reiterations of interpretation in our lifeworlds and those of others. Though thinking 
may be wilfully decoupled from feeling by an intellect practiced in such an art, we must 
acknowledge the subtle and prescient processes that make mind of the body. 
The nuance and sophistication of affective processes is, I believe, also essential to 
understand from the methodological perspective of researching affect as anthropologists. If 
we simply go about looking for emotions which we have pre-defined then those are the ones 
we are going to find. As I have noted, my inclusion of love in this thesis was to a significant 
extent driven by my desire to understand the intimate perils of being an Israeli dissenter. 
However, I did not go looking for the weird and the wrong. Indeed, I had never considered 
that weird was a feeling until half-way through fieldwork. Certainly we will never advance 
our understanding of how affect and affective lifeworlds are constituted if we think in terms 
of a handful of distinct ‘basic emotions’, many of which are found in Darwin’s (1872) The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. In this I found that Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
family resemblance proved very useful here in freeing my understanding from categorical 
constraints and allowing the ambiguity of affective experience to rise to salience. It also frees 
the researcher from the methodological red herring of not being able to definitively know 
what someone else is feeling. I suspect that the times that people experience pure joy or 
hatred are rare and fleeting. As with all experience affect is always ambiguous and unfolding 
and yet in the ordinary condition of plurality people empathise, understand and act with 
others all the time without definitively knowing the mind of others. Our understanding of 
others is always in the third position. Paying attention to the movements, tone and testimonies 
of participants, interrogation of our own embodied reactions in fieldwork situations and 
exploring those emotions with participants is all that is required to access the uncommon and 
complex ways in which we feel. If we then integrate this knowledge with how people act and 
what they talk about, then we can develop new categories through which to theorise what 
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affect is and how it works, and where it emerges. To paraphrase Ingold (2008), the 
anthropology of affect cannot be thinking about feelings, it must be thinking with feelings. 
Finally, we must ask how this relates to social movements theory and understandings 
of activism in general. Perhaps more importantly, how can we apply the findings of this 
thesis in a way that will assist the non-violent efforts of solidarity activism and what can 
other movements learn from this ongoing struggle? Again, the first question is easier to 
answer for the role of affect is already well recognised by multiple authors cited in this work 
in terms of mobilisation, cohesion, internal dynamics and so forth. But again the emphasis 
here is often on the passions, the use of moral outrage and anger to mobilise, evocations of 
pride and righteousness to maintain momentum, and the intensity of mass mobilisation and 
clashes with security which foster collectivity. This thesis suggests that the dynamics of 
affect in protest involves a great deal more ambiguity and even uncertainty caused by the 
diversity in practitioner’s backgrounds, experience and knowledge. The ethnographic 
researcher is particularly well placed to observe the effect of such personal and interpersonal 
nuances on the practice and possibilities of collective dissent. Furthermore, in order to 
properly understand how social movements hold together the researcher must look beyond 
the movement itself. It seems reasonable to assume that Palestinian solidarity activism is not 
unique in affording and involving a great deal of non-instrumental sociality or that activists 
everywhere are also embedded in a world of sociality outside of the ‘movement’. The 
potentials and tensions in this multiplicity of relationships, coupled with the efforts of other 
loosely aligned struggles and the economic and occupational possibilities in the third sector 
present a complexity of possibilities. Such complexity is though anthropology’s bread and 
butter today, and social movements cannot be properly understood as social isolates or 
instrumental networks of exchange anymore than any other social formation. To this end, 
Arendt’s work on political action, thought and judgment have proved particularly useful in 
understanding the implications of the ethnographic findings here (Arendt, 1958, 1968, 1971). 
Though I attempted to integrate various social movement theories to these findings the results 
often ended in critique due to the limitations of imagining dissent as distinct from everyday 
life. Once the caveat of affect has been introduced to Arendt’s theories, I believe that the 
application of her more generalised understanding of innate human political faculties and 
conditions could greatly enrich our understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
The complimentary concern of what Palestinian solidarity activism can teach us and 
subsequently what insights this thesis can provide to activism in general causes me to pause 
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in thought, producing doubt. Of all the emotions not discussed in this work hope is perhaps 
the one most poignant in terms of its absence. Lack of hope though not ubiquitous is 
prevalent with Palestinians and Israelis in particular. This is a condition of this struggle; for 
decades nothing has worked. Marches, strikes, boycotts, petitions, legal recourse, squatting, 
lobbying, blogging and even hunger strikes have all patently failed to resolve the conflict, or 
even halt Israel’s systematic dispossession of Palestinian land and sociality. Most dissenters 
living here tell me the situation has never been worse. Yet at the same time there is cause for 
hope. Beyond the undetermined borders of Israel-Palestine an underlying sense of wrongness 
seems to be growing at a grassroots level, within traditional political alliances and also 
amongst the global Jewish Diaspora. I would be the first to admit that this feeling is greatly 
indebted to Israel’s rightward momentum since the horrors of the Second Intifada. Palestinian 
violence hasn’t worked either. Yet Israel’s security narrative appears less and less sincere in 
the face of an emboldened and politically empowered neo-Zionist movement which seems to 
delight in the exceptionalism of Jewish hegemony, the righteousness of colonialisation and 
even the purported morality of periodically killing, literally, thousands of civilians to prevent 
or revenge the murder of a handful of its (Jewish) citizens. However, I also believe that 
solidarity activism has played a crucial role in the transnationalisation of dissent here. 
Though they are now being maligned as ineffective even from Palestinian quarters, the 
insistence, perseverance and proliferation of popular committees in calling upon peoples of 
all creeds, colours and places to witness and experience a decade of repression of peaceful 
protest has galvanised a community of civilians across the globe. At these protests those 
normally distant from the weirdness, wrongness and even moments of love, are afforded the 
opportunity to see and feel for themselves. The tactic of emplacing others within the 
experience of oppression is then perhaps the most important lesson we can learn from these 
few hundred ordinary activists. 
My own experience of the practice of this tactic was not however unproblematic, and 
nor was it easy or simply empowering for most any of the participants I came to know. In the 
hope then that this thesis may provide insight to my own participants and dissenters in 
general I offer three suggestions for consideration. First of all, be welcoming. The small size 
of the protests, their weekly rhythm and the tightness of various micro-movements involved 
is fostering ‘cliqueiness’. The flip-side of the sociality of dissent and sociality in general is 
exclusion. The moral uncertainty of why we protest and the weirdness of the activity itself 
can dominate the experience of the newcomer. The polarising simplicity of chanting and 
political rhetoric can as easily disturb as motivate participants, who have just turned up 
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because something is either not quite right or something is definitely wrong. In the process of 
becoming a dissenter that ‘something’ is often as yet undetermined, so it is important not only 
to be welcoming but also to be patient so that people can come to terms as they remove the 
veil of complexity which they have been accustomed to. It takes time (and sometimes love) to 
divest the deep complexities of the self. Collective dissent is not the social norm today and 
slogans in themselves are not sufficient to alter the subjectivity of the ordinary complexity of 
being. Secondly, take time to appreciate and even celebrate the resistance. The small size of 
Palestinian solidarity protests pretty much precludes the empowering affect of mass 
mobilisation, yet its capacity to endure and continuously attract support week after week, 
year after year is an achievement in itself. Taking a leaf out of the self-aggrandisement of 
nationalism’s imagined community, time taken to acknowledge and praise the unimagined 
community of transnational dissent could equally serve the purposes and aims of such social 
endeavours.  
Finally and most generally; we must normalise the practice of collective dissent. 
There are so many impediments to activism. It is in equal parts boring, dangerous and 
unrewarding. Given that these are very real and rational reasons not to become dissenter only 
highlights the importance of affect in its emergence. But the greater problem may be that 
consent is the standard valorised by contemporary society, or by established elites. Consent in 
itself is not necessarily negative but, given the proclivity for power and inequity to 
emergence within any social system, collective dissent must always be considered a 
legitimate political expression. In the final analysis I would have to agree with Arendt that 
unthinking political passivity allows for evil. Contemporary conceptualisations of legitimate 
political participation as consisting solely of periodically voting for national legislature and 
execution is (still) clearly insufficient to counter either the inequities of oppressive 
nationalism, or the prowess of transnational networks of embedded elites and institutions. In 
such a reality Arendt’s (1958) call to valorise universal and direct political action, as the 
highest form of political activity resonates strongly. If there will always be power then there 
must always be we, the polis. A community of doubters and definite dissenters who will feel 
and speak that some form of truth exists beyond the narratives we were taught to receive and 
accept. 
Inconclusions 
Sadly I cannot conclude this dissertation at a point of theoretical positivity. Life goes on, 
keeps becoming and the weirdness, wrongness, loves and losses become familiar facets of the 
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lifeworld by which the dissenter beholds the world. Israel’s occupation hasn’t come to a 
conclusion and doesn’t go away even when fieldwork ends. Writing my thesis in Jerusalem 
took longer than I had anticipated and so I remained in close contact with and part of the 
concerns of dissent. Some became and remain my friends and with them I experienced the 
shock, horror, impotency and dismay of the abject brutality and naked hatred of the summer 
of 2014. I took no fieldnotes during this time, just hasty scraps written in cafes and bars as I 
tried to make sense of what was happening, as I tried to understand what I was feeling. I use 
no citations or references here, I simply offer my considered opinion. When unarmed protest 
is violently repressed, when transnational grassroots agitation is dismissed, when diplomatic 
efforts are derided a space opens up where men of violence are free to roam. 
The kidnappings of Naftali Frenkel (16), Gilad Shaer (16) and Eyal Yifrach (19) on 
June 12 were not far-off events. These young men were kidnapped while hitchhiking between 
al-Maasara and Beit Ummar, a road I’ve travelled many times. Eyal was a student at the 
Shavei Hevron Yeshiva, on Shuhada Street in Hebron. The background to the summer was the 
failed negotiations mediated by U.S. Senator John Kerry. By this time I have friends in the 
U.S. State Department who have not needed to feature in this story but who believe that, 
regardless of the spin offered by the Israeli government and media outlets like the Jerusalem 
Post, the talks failed at the end of April at the behest of the Israeli administration. The right-
wing coalition cannot accommodate concessions and quietly delights in the creeping 
annexation afforded by the post-Oslo status quo. During June, at a birthday party I listened to 
and chatted with people who had gone to Hebron during the search for the three boys. They 
said they hadn’t witnessed such devastation since the Second Intifada; a child’s cot smashed 
to pieces, faeces in a sink. Wanton and vengeful was the search for the boys.  
Hamas, according to Prime Minister Netanyahu, were to blame and hundreds of 
Hamas affiliates were arrested – many of whom had just been released as part of the Kerry 
negotiations. I did not believe Hamas were responsible, it didn’t make sense. I also did not 
believe the three boys would survive, I thought of their fear if they were alive. Nine 
Palestinians were killed during the eighteen day search until the bodies of the youths were 
found in shallow graves in fields west of Beit Ummar on the 30
th
 of June. The boys had been 
killed within minutes of their abduction. The Israeli authorities were almost certain of this a 
day or two into the search, but placed a gag-order on the recording of Gilad Shaer’s 
whispered call to the emergency services until after the bodies were found: ‘They’ve 
kidnapped me’, Gilad was heard to whisper, followed by the sound of automatic gunfire. 
Then singing in Arabic. 
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None of this would be sufficient and Rabbis, Members of Knesset and Facebook 
groups publically screamed vengeance. On the night of Tuesday 1
st
 July men tried to abduct 
10-year-old Moussa Zalum, on the main street of Shua’fat in Jerusalem, just a few minutes 
north of Sheikh Jarrah. It was said they put a rope round his neck but his mother beat them 
off with her bag and the men sped off in a car. Early on Wednesday morning, 16-year-old 
Mohammad Abu Khdeir was abducted from the same Palestinian neighbourhood, brought 
down to a nearby forest and burnt alive. This is the evolution of legitimacy here. Perhaps 
suicide bombings are too complex, or killings in the name of security don’t send a strong 
enough message. What we really need to be doing is picking up children from the streets and 
murdering them with righteous glee. Or so the logic seems to go. Almost incidentally a 
conflict in Gaza escalated. It could have been avoided, but why should it be? Conflict in Gaza 
is the status quo. Killing random children is new. Sirens hailed three times over Jerusalem as 
rockets approached, the nations rallied and rioted and righteousness and violence ran amok. 
Once I took my children to the stairwell when the sirens went off but neither they nor I were 
scared. What I feared was the roving mobs of Israelis, teenage boys and girls off school for 
the summer, grown men and mothers gathering in the centre of town chanting Ma’vat Aravim 
– Hebrew for Death to Arabs. I could hear the chants from my balcony, born along on the 
summer breeze. Ma’vat Aravim was painted on my children’s ‘bi-lingual’ school. It was more 
than just talk. Palestinians were accosted and beaten by gangs. Israelis too when they strayed 
into the wrong neighbourhood. None of my Israeli activist friends had experienced such overt 
fascism on the streets. Protests for peace were organised and attacked. Protective presence 
patrols were coordinated in an attempt to prevent or at least to bear witness to attacks on the 
streets. I began to join these, alternating nights with my wife – one of us would be out at 
night and it was scary. Yael stood in one demonstration, facing her mother in the counter 
protest. The Women in Black seriously considered cancelling their vigil. I joined them again 
and asked the protective presence folk to come along. The women contacted the police 
directly and insisted on increased police presence at the square. Departures were coordinated 
and we’d go in groups back to the parked cars. Attacks often came after the protests were 
over and the police had left. I went to Sheikh Jarrah that same day. It was peaceful and 
pleasant, the ordinary Israeli nationalists don’t come down here. By the end of the demo we 
heard that three people had been shot and killed at a protest in Beit Ummar. 
This is on top of everything. Beneath the beatings and burnings, the blood, corpses 
and rubble the banality of life and occupation remained. A Palestinian friend from the 
territories was arrested and sent to military prison for three weeks while seeking work in 
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Jerusalem without a permit. I visited his family and gave them some food and money so they 
could have some form of meal at Eid al-Fitr. I had difficult family decisions to make at this 
time whose outcomes were beyond my certainty. I tried to make sense of what I was feeling 
amongst the chaos and the only name I could find was disgust. In August I took out a bank 
loan and left the country with my two children. I couldn’t take it anymore. Israel and 
Palestine is framed as being between two separate and distinct peoples or nations pitted 
against one another, but it is a single society reproducing itself through generations of 
oppression and Simmelian conflict. A righteous and cruel dystopia. 
 
I finish with the words of an Israeli friend who posted the following on his Facebook page as 
the chant ‘Death to Arabs’ reached my Jerusalem balcony on the breeze and the 2014 death 
toll in Gaza grew and grew. 
Camous, July 23, 2014 Jerusalem 
‘To my non Middle Eastern friends, I have a little request for you. 
 
I see that many of you are posting videos, pics and posts about what is happening over 
here. Most of it is about the Israeli aggression in Gaza, parts are about rockets and 
tunnels that target Israelis. This is not the time to write down my thoughts about who 
is right in this horrible mess, I still haven't done that in Hebrew, but for now let me 
just say that there are no winners in war, and I wish we’d learnt that lesson already. 
 
And it's not about who's right to begin with. It's not even about that so many of those 
videos were not shot in this war, or even in this region, which is weird cause we have 
so much horror going on here that I don't understand why fake it. It's about madness. 
We’re drowning in it, in blood and hate. We're drowning in fear and disbelief, getting 
sucked in dehumanizing the enemy, and the definition of that enemy is getting wider 
every day. 
 
What's happening here, in my eyes, is illness. We are ill. All of us, Israelis, 
Palestinians, whether holding a gun or not. Please, if you want to help, raise 
awareness, stop the killing, we don't need any more blame and finger pointing, we 
have enough of that, and we are totally immune to it anyhow. What we need is 
healing, and if you want to help, you can start by reminding us, 
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My friend, 
My dear friend, 
What happened to you 
You used to be so lovely and full of dreams, 
You used to call this land the holy land and there's nothing holy in watering it with 
blood 
 
You used to be so much more creative, if you can create bombs and war strategies 
surely you can create peace, if you can dig death tunnels surely you can dig your way 
out of this,  
 
if you can believe in your strength to carry the heavy losses, surely you can believe 
that under the hard skin of your enemy there is a beating heart like yours, 
what happened to you, my dear friend, that you covered yourself with fear and hate, 
show me where it hurts, so I can kiss you there, and remind you that whatever illness 
your heart caught, there is nothing you cannot overcome, whatever horror scenarios 
and memories keep you shivering in the shadows, greater are the wings that hope will 
give you, 
 
rise from this war, my friend, awake from your nightmare, 
you have proven yourself to have such powers and bravery to stand in front of your 
enemy, now use them to cleanse the enemy within, now use them to be free from fear, 
if you are who you say you are, my friend, and you are, 
please stop hiding 
if you want to be a light to the rest of the world, 
well, my friend, it is time to shine. 
 
If you are truly our friends, believe in us. For it seems we do not believe in ourselves. 
In times like these, of despair and hopelessness, remedy lies not in choosing the side 
that is suffering more but in showing a way out of suffering for all, not in choosing 
the righteous one but in the drawing of the field that is beyond right and wrong, where 
we all belong, where we all dance, where we can all get to if we will dare to believe. 
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(Yes, I get emotional. You should too. You don't need to get all mystical and hippie - 
though it's a lot of fun - but please do feel us, and please do act out of kindness and 
compassion, seriously now, we really need that)’ 
(posted on Facebook July, 2014) 
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Appendices 
Glossary 
Abu Mazen  Arabic Mahmoud Abbas .The kunya form of the Palestinian 
President. 
Al-Aqsa Intifada Arabic The Second Intifada (2000-2004/5), also known as the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada  Named after the Al-Aqsa mosque in 
the Old City of Jerusalem 
al-Hallil Arabic Hebron 
al-Quds Arabic Jerusalem 
Ashkenazim Hebrew (Hebrew: םי ִּזַנ ְׁכ ְׁשַא ). Jews of European origin, sometimes 
including Jews of the former Soviet Union states. The 
adjective form is Ashkenazi. 
Brit Shalom  British Mandate period political organisation advocating 
Cultural Zionism over the establishment of a Jewish State 
BTS acron. Breaking the Silence 
CARE  An international humanitarian agency delivering 
emergency relief and long-term international 
development projects. 
Dai LaKibush Hebrew End the Occupation 
DCI acron. Defence for Children International 
Dunam  Turkish Standard unit of land area in the Ottoman Empire. Still 
widely used. It now represents 1000sqm 
EAPPI acron. Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and 
Israel  
Eretz Israel Hebrew Land of Israel 
EU acron. European Union 
Fatah Arabic (Arabic: حتف Fatḥ). Formerly the Palestinian National 
Liberation Movement. A leading secular Palestinian 
political party and the largest faction of the confederated 
multi-party Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
FSU acron. Former Soviet Union 
Green Line  The 1948 Armistice boundary between Israel and 
Jordan. While the Green Line marked the boundary of 
Jordanian jurisdiction the lesser know Red Line drew 
the extent of Israeli control.  
Halakha Hebrew (Hebrew: הָכָלֲה; also transliterated as halacha or 
halachah). The collective body of Jewish religious laws 
derived from the Written and Oral Torah. 
Hamas Arabic Hamas (Arabic: سامح Ḥamās, "enthusiasm", an acronym 
of ةيملاسلاا ةمواقملا ةكرح Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-
ʾIslāmiyyah Islamic Resistance Movement). A 
Palestinian Islamic political organization.  
Hasbara  Hebrew  (Hebrew: הָרָב ְׁסַה , "explaining"). Israel's 'Public 
diplomacy' program to disseminate positive information 
about Israel abroad 
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Hijab Arabic (Arabic: باجح , ). A veil that covers the head and chest, 
which is particularly worn by a Muslim woman beyond 
the age of puberty in the presence of adult males outside 
of their immediate family 
ICRC acron. International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDF acron. Israel Defence Forces 
Intifada   Arabic (Arabic ةضافتنا). Meaning "shaking off", though often 
translated as "uprising", "resistance", or "rebellion". It is 
often used as a term for popular resistance to oppression 
ISM acron. International Solidarity Movement 
JA acron. Jewish Agency 
Jewish Agency  The Jewish Agency for Israel (Hebrew:  תידוהיה תונכוסה
לארשי ץראל , HaSochnut HaYehudit L'Eretz Yisra'el) is 
the largest Jewish nonprofit organization in the world. 
Previously called the Palestine Zionist Executive, it was 
designated in 1929 as the "Jewish Agency" provided for 
in the League of Nations' Palestine Mandate. 
JNF acron. Jewish National Fund 
Judea  The biblical name for the mountaineous region south of 
Jerusalem. The official Israeli state's designation for the 
Southern part of the West Bank 
Keffiyeh Arabic (Arabic: ةيفوك kūfiyyah). A traditional Middle Eastern 
headdress fashioned from a square scarf, usually made 
of cotton. 
Magav  Hebrew The Israel Border Police (Hebrew: לוּב ְׁגַה רַמ ְׁש ִּמ, Mishmar 
HaGvul) is the gendarmerie and border security branch 
of the Israel National Police. It is also commonly known 
by its Hebrew abbreviation Magav  
Mavat Aravim  Hebrew Death to the Arabs 
Mizrahim  Hebrew (Hebrew: םיחרזמ ) Jews descended from communities in 
the Middle East and sometimes including North Africa. 
The adjective form is Mizrahi. 
Moked  Isreali left-wing political party of the 1970s 
Moshav Hebrew Originally a form of collectivised farming community 
established as part of the settlement program. Many 
Moshavs are now residential villages with less emphasis 
on farming. 
Nakba Arabic Catastrophe, disaster or cataclysm. The term used to 
refer to the expulsions and displacement of Palestinians 
in the 1948 war. 
NATO acron. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGO acron. Non-Governmental Organisation 
OCHA   acron. United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs. A United Nations (UN) body 
formed in December 1991 by General Assembly 
Resolution 46/182 to strengthen the UN's response to 
complex emergencies and natural disasters 
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OCHCR acron. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. A United Nations agency that works to 
promote and protect the human rights that are 
guaranteed under international law and stipulated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The 
office was established by the UN General Assembly on 
20 December 1993. 
Olaim Hebrew (plural) Literally meaning to ascend, it is the term used 
to denote new immigrants to Israel 
Ometz LeSarev Hebrew Courage to Refuse. An organization of reserve officers 
and soldiers of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) who in 
2002 signed the Combatants Letter in which they stated 
their refusal to serve in the oPt, but  would continue to 
serving in the IDF elsewhere 
OPEC acron. Organisation of Petrolium Exporting Countries 
oPt  acron. occupied Palestinian territories (also OPT). A widely 
used acronym to refer collectively to West Bank, East 
Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip 
PA acron. Palestinian Authority 
Quartet  The Quartet on the Middle East, (aka the Diplomatic 
Quartet, the Madrid Quartet, or the Quartet. A mediating 
organization  in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it 
represents the United Nations, the United States, the 
European Union, and Russia. 
Samaria  The biblical name for the mountaineous region north of 
Jerusalem. The official Israeli state's designation for the 
Northern part of the West Bank 
Shalom Achshav  Hebrew Peace Now. An Israeli organisation whose objectives 
include the implementation of the Two State Solution. 
Formed in 1978 during the Camp David negotiations 
between Egypt and Israel, it mobilised some of Israel's 
largest marches in the 1990s.  
Shebab Arabic Youths A colloquial term referring to young men 
Ta'ayush Arabic Living Together or Coexistence. Founded in 2000 as a 
Jewish Arabic partnership movement is particularly 
active working with poor and peripheral rural 
Palestinians in the South Hebron Hills.   
Tag Mahir  Hebrew Price Tag. An Israeli far-right organisation, doctrine or 
tactic given to acts of violence aimed at the Palestinian 
population, non-Jewish institutions and building and 
occasionally even IDF resources in the West Bank. 
Emerging around 2008 the frequency of attacks has 
increased since 2011. My sons classroom was attacked 
and burned down in late 2014 
UN acron. United Nations 
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UNICEF acron. United Nations Children's Fund. A United Nations 
Program headquartered in New York City that provides 
long-term humanitarian and developmental assistance to 
children and mothers. It has no mandate in Israel but 
does operate in the oPt from a regional headquarters in 
East Jerusalem. It also monitors violations of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
UNOPS acron. United Nations Office for Project Services. An 
operational arm of the United Nations dedicated to 
implementing projects for the United Nations System 
and other international agencies in peace building, 
humanitarian and development projects. 
UNSCO acron. United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East 
Peace Process, formerly known as the United Nations 
Special Coordinator (UNSCO). A United Nations body 
which leads the UN system in political and diplomatic 
efforts related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as 
part of the Middle East Quartet. It also coordinates other 
UN agencies and programmes in the occupied 
Palestinian territory and was established in June 1994 
following the signing of the Oslo Accords 
UNTSO acron. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. A 
peacekeeping body founded on 29 May 1948 to 
providing  military command structure to the peace 
keeping forces which oversaw the Armistice 
Agreements at the end of the Israeli War of 
Independence/Palestinian Nakhba. It is still in operation 
today and based in  East Jerusalem 
UNWRA acron. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East. A relief and human 
development agency, originally intended to provide jobs 
on public works projects and direct relief for the original 
Palestinians who fled or were expelled from their homes 
during the fighting of the 1948 Israeli War of 
Independence/Palestinian Nakhba. It is still in operation 
today in the oPt and beyond providing education, health 
care and social services approx 5 million registered 
Palestinian refugees, including survivors from the 1948 
and 1967 wars and their descendants 
WIB acron. Women in Black 
WorldVision 
International 
 An Evangelical Christian humanitarian aid, development, and 
advocacy organisation 
WZO acron. World Zionist Organisation 
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Maps & Figures 
The following maps are taken from Google maps. 
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Fig.1 A typical Friday drive from Moshav Ora to Walaja, then Kikar Paris and onto Sheikh Jarrah. The dotted line marks the 1948 Armistice 
boundaries, aka the ‘Green Line’  
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Fig. 2 The route from fig.1 expanded to include the journey to Al-Maasara and Beit Ummar. 
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Fig. 3 The route from fig.2 expanded to include the journey to Hebron, Susiya in the South Hebron Hills and Tel Aviv. 
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Fig.4 The route from fig.3 expanded to show Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories in its regional setting 
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